Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Hill pleaded guilty to attempted extortion and to making a false statement to federal investigators concerning his extortion of bribes from liquor licensees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence in 2011. Hill filed a civil suit, claiming that FBI and IRS agents forced their way into his house with drawn weapons, searched the house, seized and kept his lawfully owned handgun, and twirled a loaded gun making Hill “so scared” that he was “in tears.” While being questioned he felt disoriented, was crying from pain in his head, and blacked out, but the agents did not call for medical assistance. He later learned that he had suffered a stroke. The district court dismissed, citing a Supreme Court holding that a person who has been convicted of a crime cannot seek damages or other relief under federal law (a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or “Bivens”) for violation of his rights by officers who participated in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [in the civil suit] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that only his claim that his false statement to the officers was coerced is barred. View "Hill v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Boultinghouse pled guilty to two counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm in interstate commerce after previously having been convicted of a felony offense, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). In 2011, Boultinghouse completed his prison term and commenced his supervised release. In 2014, Boultinghouse’s probation officer filed a petition, alleging that Boultinghouse had failed multiple drug tests and had been arrested for misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct and intimidation and had not reported the arrest to his probation officer as required. At the conclusion of a hearing at which Boultinghouse waived his right to representation by counsel, the district court found that Boultinghouse had violated multiple conditions of his supervised release, revoked that release, and ordered him to serve an additional prison term of 24 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded. While the totality of the circumstances, including the district court’s colloquy with Boultinghouse regarding his decision to proceed pro se, demonstrated that his waiver of representation by counsel was a knowing and intelligent decision as well as a voluntary one, the court gave no reasons for the term of imprisonment it imposed. View "United States v. Boultinghouse" on Justia Law

Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, citing the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die. If the district court concludes that Webster meets the requirements of Atkins, it should issue the writ stating that Webster is entitled to relief from the death penalty. View "Webster v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

There was a burglary of the Buhr property. Olson’s neighbor had placed a deteriorated, unlicensed trailer on the Olsons’ property. Believing that it was abandoned, Olson fixed and painted the trailer, leaving it near the road. The trailer disappeared. Olson did not file a police report. Detective Sherrick discovered the trailer in a ditch and suspected that Olson had stolen the trailer and used it to transport lawn mowers stolen from Buhr. He obtained warrants that authorized the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints and a search of the Olsons’ property. Despite obtaining no evidence implicating Olson, Detectives Sherrick and Shaw allegedly told assistant state’s attorney Ziegler that Olson should be charged. Ziegler had no personal knowledge. He swore that the facts set forth in the information were true, relying on the detectives’ statements. Olson was arrested. Charges were later dismissed. The district court dismissed Olson’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The prosecutor allegedly swore to the truth of facts to obtain the warrant. Acting as a witness, not as a state advocate, he is not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Neither the detectives nor the prosecutor are entitled to qualified immunity. The complaint permits a reasonable inference that the detectives, the prosecutor, or all three gave false information to the judge who issued the warrant. View "Olson v. Champaign County" on Justia Law

In 2001, representatives from the Moody Bible Institute of Chicago and Sysix Financial signed a master agreement, laying the groundwork for future leases of equipment from Sysix to Moody. In 2008, two lease schedules for computer items were executed; they appeared to have been signed by Moody’s vice president and Sysix’s president. Sysix assigned its interest in both leases to Rockwell, which acquired loans from PNB to finance the leases. PNB procured indemnification coverage for those loans from RLI in the form of a financial institution bond. Sysix’s president had forged the signature of Moody’s vice president on both lease schedules. Moody never agreed to either schedule nor did it ever receive any of the promised equipment. PNB notified RLI of its potential loss, but PNB itself soon went under. As receiver for PNB, the FDIC sued RLI. The district court granted summary judgment in FDIC’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the plain language of the bond covered FDIC’s losses The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act limitations period applies,12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(14), so the suit was timely. View "Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In November 2011, defendant was arrested. While in state custody, he was told by a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent that ICE had placed “a hold” on him. If he posted bail, he would be seized by ICE and taken into immigration detention. He was in pretrial detention on state charges until October 2012, when he was convicted on a state obstruction of justice charge. He was detained by the state for 17 months, then taken into custody by ICE and detained while his immigration case was adjudicated. On September 19, 2013, the immigration judge ordered his removal. Defendant withdrew his appeal. On October 17, 2013, defendant was indicted for illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. 1326) and taken into federal criminal custody. He pled guilty to that charge, arguing that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate, noting that he would not receive credit for the time served in immigration custody. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 57 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The court should have addressed defendant’s argument that the court should have reduced his sentence because the delay in charging him effectively denied him the ability to receive credit toward his federal criminal sentence for the months he spent in state custody and in immigration custody. View "United States v. Estrada-Mederos" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Governor has entered into gaming compacts with all of the state’s tribes (Wis. Stat. 14.035). The HoChunk Nation adopted an ordinance, authorizing Class I and Class II gaming on its lands. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(6), (7), (8), defines Class I gaming as social games and traditional Indian gaming, regulated exclusively by tribes; Class II gaming includes bingo and certain nonbanked card games (players compete against one another rather than against the house) that are authorized by state laws. Class III gaming is a residual category, regulated under tribal-state compacts. A 2008 agreement between the state and the Nation does not restrict Class II gaming. Since 2010, the Nation has offered nonbanked electronic poker at Ho-Chunk Madison. Wisconsin sought an injunction to stop the poker, which, if classified as Class III would violate the Nation’s compact with the state. The district court ruled that the poker was a Class III game. The Seventh Circuit reversed. States may not prohibit a tribe from offering gaming that is roughly equivalent to what the state allows for its residents. A state must criminalize a gambling activity in order to prohibit the tribe from engaging in it. Wisconsin decriminalized nonbanked poker in 1999. IGRA does not permit interference with Class II poker on tribal land. View "Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation" on Justia Law