Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Pajian filed for bankruptcy, Lisle Savings Bank, a creditor, filed a proof of claim ($330,472.19) in the bankruptcy court, but missed the bankruptcy court’s filing deadline (set under FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c)) by several months. The Bank argued that Rule 3002(c) applies only to unsecured creditors; as a secured creditor, it asserted, it was entitled to file a proof of claim at any time until plan confirmation. The bankruptcy court agreed with the Bank. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a secured creditor must file its proof of claim by the 90-day deadline specified by Rule 3002(c). View "Pijian v. Lisle Savings Bank" on Justia Law

Martinez is a native of Guatemala. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2011, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to knowingly transfer a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(f). In 2013, the government commenced removal proceedings for having committed a crime of moral turpitude within five years after admission, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Martinez admitted the allegations, but requested a continuance because he had filed a motion to set aside and vacate his conviction. He also argued that he was eligible for a stand-alone waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ ordered that Martinez be removed because he had not demonstrated good cause for a continuance and was ineligible for a waiver. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Pending collateral attack is not good cause because its tentative nature does not affect the finality of the conviction for immigration purposes. Martinez admitted that he waived any claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, that he understood his guilty plea could affect his immigration status, and that his attorney advised him of this. View "Palma-Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009-2012, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club committed racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, illegal gambling, witness tampering and firearms offenses. A 49-count indictment against 51 members sought forfeiture of Indiana real and personal property, based on racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1962 and 1963. In plea agreements, two defendants agreed to forfeit their interests in real properties, firearms found at those properties and any items bearing the name or insignia of the Outlaws found at those properties. The district court entered a “Preliminary Order of Forfeiture” against each, ordering the government to comply with due process requirements, alerting anyone other than the defendants claiming a legal interest in the property to file a petition within 30 days. Henson filed intervenor petitions, claiming that he was a resident of the properties and a member and officer of the Outlaws, who held a superior interest in the properties. The district court noted that the RICO statute allows challenges to forfeitures only by persons having an interest in the property at the time of the crime; the statement asserted an interest that arose after the crimes and asserted an equitable, rather than a legal, interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the government. View "United States v. Henson" on Justia Law

The Andermanns obtained mobile phone service from U.S. Cellular in 2000. Their renewable two-year contract was renewed for the last time in 2012. It included an arbitration clause that “survives the termination of this service agreement” and provided that “U.S. Cellular may assign this Agreement … without notice.” In 2013 U.S. Cellular sold the Andermanns’ contract to Sprint, without notice to the Andermanns. Months later Sprint sent Andermanns a letter, informing them of the sale and that their mobile service would be terminated on January 31, 2014 because Andermanns’ phones were not compatible with Sprint’s network. In December Sprint phoned to remind them that their service was about to expire, and added that Sprint had “a great set of offers and devices available to fit [their] needs.” Sprint made six such calls. Andermanns answered none, but filed a purported class action, contending that the unsolicited advertisements contained in the calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. Sprint requested arbitration, 9 U.S.C. 4. The district court denied Sprint’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding connection to the contract, asking: What would Sprint have done if forbidden to call the customers whom it had inherited from U.S. Cellular and must now terminate because of technical incompatibility? View "Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P." on Justia Law

Runnion was active in a troop run by Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, the largest regional Girl Scout organization in the United States. Megan is deaf. For several years she had sign language interpreters provided by the Girl Scouts that enabled her to participate fully in the troop’s activities. Girl Scouts then stopped providing interpreters. When her mother complained, Megan’s entire troop was disbanded. Megan alleges that the Girl Scouts violated the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. 794) by refusing to provide her with sign language services and then by disbanding her troop because her mother complained. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the court erred when it rejected as futile the “principally engaged” theory of Rehabilitation Act coverage in plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. View "Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law

Officers approached Ruiz’s car after they witnessed Ruiz engage in what they deemed to be suspicious behavior, including actions consistent with operating a “trap”—a concealed, non-factory compartment in a vehicle often used to hide drugs. Ruiz consented to the search of his car and then followed the officers to a nearby police station where he showed the officers two traps in his car loaded with heroin. Ruiz pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; the stop exceeded its lawful purpose and ripened into a de facto arrest; the encounter with the officers was custodial, requiring the suppression of all statements he made prior to receiving Miranda warnings; and he did not consent voluntarily to go to the police station and open the traps. View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of state gun crimes arising out of a shootout. He sought state post-conviction relief. The court denied his motion; the court of appeals affirmed. Johnson had 30 days to seek review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He applied for a loan to help cover the cost of the paper, photocopying, and postage. Wisconsin law permits inmates to borrow $100 annually for that purpose. The prison business office denied the request. Johnson contends that he met eligibility requirements. Johnson sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the wrongful denial of his loan request should excuse his failure to petition the state supreme court for review. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Johnson did not establish that the denial of his application was an objective, external impediment to his ability to comply with procedural rules or that it actually prevented him from petitioning for review. Johnson argued that the business office misinterpreted or misapplied prison policies. No state court has ruled on that question. For a federal habeas court to excuse a procedural default based on its own interpretation of a state prison policy, without guidance from the state courts, would be contrary to principles of federalism and comity that constrain federal habeas review. View "Johnson v. Foster" on Justia Law

Reilly participated in a pension plan offered by Continental, which administers its own defined-benefit plan. The pension depends on the highest average compensation in any 60-month period of employment. “Compensation” includes regular salary, incentive compensation, and deferred compensation deposited in 401(k) plans. Educational bonuses, referral bonuses, overseas allowances, and some other items are not included. When Reilly left Continental’s employ in 1999, he received a statement of qualifying compensation that implied a monthly benefit of about $5,400 starting in 2012, when he would turn 65. In 2012, Continental sent Reilly a different calculation, showing lower compensation and entitlement to $4,200 a month. After internal appeals, Reilly filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district judge concluded that Continental’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and ordered it to pay monthly benefits of $5,400. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Reilly did not show that $5,400 is the only possible outcome of proper calculation, only that the calculation was improper. By working through the original compensation numbers, the parties may agree what the right pension is. If not, the district court must remand to Continental so that the administrator can make a fresh calculation, which then could be subjected to judicial review. View "Reilly v. Continental Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Vietnam veteran, was diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression. In 2004 the VA declared him 100 percent disabled. Nonetheless, the Illinois Department of Human Services hired him that year as a “certified nurse assistant residential case worker” and assigned him to a residential facility. Two years later, he claims, a resident and members of the resident’s family assaulted plaintiff with an iron pipe and baseball bats. The Department suspended him on the complaint of the resident’s family and allegedly subsequently discharged him on the basis of an investigation by the Department of Children and Family Services that resulted in a preliminary finding that he had committed child abuse and neglect. The finding of child abuse was retracted. In 2014 he sued, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability by agencies that receive federal money. The district judge dismissed, finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that his claim was untimely. The Department was not served with process. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, noting that it is not clear when plaintiff was discharged and that it can take a long time for a discharge to ripen. View "Rutledge v. Ill. Dept, of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to five years of probation for a drug offense in 2013. He violated his probation about six months later by, among other things, causing an accident and a resulting injury to another person by driving while drunk. The judge imposed a sentence of one year and a day in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit reversed the sentence. The district judge omitted to determine the guidelines range for supervised release applicable to the case. Because of the nature of his drug offense, defendant had a statutory minimum term of supervised release of three years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Three years was also the top of the supervised-release guidelines range applicable to his offense. U.S.S.G. 5D1.2(a)(2), (c). The interaction between the two made three years the applicable guidelines “range.” The judge was not bound by the range, but was required, before deciding on the length of supervised release, to calculate the guidelines range and assess its appropriateness as a guide to sentencing the defendant, in light of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). In addition, the 22 conditions of supervised release that he imposed included some that have been criticized in recent cases. View "United States v. Downs" on Justia Law