Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dobek was an engineer in charge of providing parts for F-16 fighter planes owned by the Venezuelan Air Force. The U.S. State Department announced that munitions, including parts for military aircraft, could no longer be exported to Venezuela without an export license, and revoked existing licenses. Dobek created firms to carry on business with Venezuela. The Venezuelan Air Force told Dobek that it needed canopy seals for its F-16s. Suspecting that Dobek was selling canopy seals to Venezuela, FBI agents executed a warrant at Dobek’s home, where they found a purchase order for the seals, with no purchaser named. Dobek had certified that he understood that the “products … to be provided are controlled by the … International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” He told a friend that he was looking for a box to ship “cockpit seals.” FedEx shipping records revealed that Dobek had shipped a box, labeled as “base molding,” to Venezuela after that discussion. This pattern of purchase and shipment was repeated a year later. Dobek was convicted of exporting munitions illegally, 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admissibility of an alleged co-conspirator’s emails, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the validity of the jury instruction on willfulness, stating that evidence of willfulness was overwhelming. View "United States v. Dobek" on Justia Law

Hankins, convicted in Arkansas of felony battery, was re-released on parole in March 2007. She moved to Illinois, where she came under the supervision of Illinois Department of Corrections parole officer Lowe. Hankins filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she asked him when her parole would expire and that he refused to tell her, saying that Arkansas would determine when it expired and would revoke her parole if she asked Arkansas authorities for the date. In February 2011 Lowe informed her that her parole had expired. Hankins claimed she was subjected to the restrictions imposed on her by the conditions of her parole for 13 months beyond when her parole had actually ended. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim, stating that Lowe “was guilty of deliberate indifference or its equivalent, recklessness deliberately” when he “withheld essential information that he was required to obtain, and could readily have obtained and given her.” The court remanded for determination of when Hankins’ parole actually ended. View "Hankins v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Orr died in a motorcycle accident. His daughters sought benefits under a group life insurance policy governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act and issued by USIC to Orr’s former employer. The policy provided accidental death, subject to exclusions, including one for loss resulting “directly or indirectly from … intoxication[.]” USIC asserted that Orr’s death resulted from his intoxication. The letter explained that autopsy and toxicology reports revealed that Orr’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident exceeded the legal limit and that USIC’s medical consultant opined that Orr “would have been impaired in attention, coordination, and balance,” as a result. The letter advised the Orrs of their right to seek review and included a copy of USIC’s Life Claims Denial Review Procedure, stating, in boldfaced, all-caps print, that a request for review must be submitted in writing within 60 days and warning: “If … you do not complete both the first and second review before filing a lawsuit, a court can dismiss your lawsuit.“ The document encourages claimants to call with any questions. The Orrs filed suit before completing the review process. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of USIC on grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Orr v. Assurant Emp. Benefits" on Justia Law

Xiong began working as a Dane County social worker in 1990, covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided that the Union would assist employees in pre-disciplinary, grievance, and termination processes. In 2012, Xiong’s supervisor, Fischer, learned that Xiong had forged signatures on documents, called in sick after Fischer had denied requests to be excused, failed to meet deadlines for an audit, attended divorce proceedings during work time, and moved a client from one home to another without completing required paperwork. Fischer requested a pre-disciplinary meeting, noting rules that Xiong had broken, and stating that Xiong could respond and have a Union representative present. Having taken unauthorized leave on May 22-23, Xiong did not receive Fischer’s letter until May 24, when he attended the meeting with his union steward. Xiong admitted to the allegations and to failure to pass theLong Term Care Functional Screen Test, required for certification as a social worker. A week later Xiong received a termination letter. Bypassing two steps of the grievance procedure, the Union began Xiong’s appeal with a hearing before the Chief Administrative Officer, who denied the appeal. The Union board voted not to arbitrate Xiong’s case. Rejecting the County’s severance offer, Xiong sued the Union, the Department, and Fischer. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Xiong v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Lake Street was obligated under a $1.5 million loan made by American Chartered Bank, secured by a mortgage. Unable to repay, Lake Street negotiated several forbearance-to-foreclose agreements. One required Lake Street to give the deed to the mortgaged property (its only significant asset) to an escrow agent who, in the event of default, would give the deed to Scherston, the bank’s affiliate. The bank’s charter forbids it to own real estate. Lake Street defaulted, Scherston recorded the deed. Lake Street, a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, brought an adversary proceeding against the bank and Scherston. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Lake Street focused on the deed rather than on the mortgage, claiming that the deeded property is worth more than the mortgage. It was Lake Street’s decision to give the deed to the bank; it did so to induce the bank’s forbearance, by giving additional security. There is no contention that the bank employed unlawful or unethical practices to the transfer, or that any unsecured creditors were harmed by the transaction—there is only one unsecured creditor and his claim is worth less than a thousand dollars. View "1756 W. Lake St. LLC v. Am. Chartered Bank" on Justia Law

Boatman pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). After two hearings, the district court gave him a below-Guidelines term of 76 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release, rejecting his request for a sentence of time served with community-based drug treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally flawed, because the district court failed to give meaningful consideration to his requested disposition. Boatman’s theory would demand more of the district court than the law requires. View "United States v. Boatman" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

Burford agreed to facilitate the purchase and sale of accounting practices for APS. The parties initially signed a contract assigning Louisiana to Burford. They later orally agreed that Burford should also cover Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky. APS terminated the contract. Burford sued for breach of contract; APS filed a counterclaim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, claiming that Burford started a rival business, “American Accounting Practice Sales,” after APS terminated his contract. APS obtained summary judgment on the contract claim, arguing that the contract was terminable at will. APS voluntarily dismissed its counterclaim with prejudice. As the prevailing party on the Lanham Act claim, Burford sought attorney fees. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that APS’s Lanham Act claim could have been pursued by a rational party seeking to protect its trademark. The Seventh Circuit reversed grant of summary judgment on the contract claim, but affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The contract provided that it could be terminated by APS only if Burford violated the terms of the agreement; even if it was indefinite in duration, the parties contracted around the default rule making such contracts terminable at will. View "Burford v. Accounting Practice Sales, Inc" on Justia Law

Pidgeon pled no contest to second-degree sexual assault of a child; other counts were dismissed. Pidgeon claims that he accepted the plea because his attorney and the prosecutor told Pidgeon that, if he did not accept the plea, he was subject to the Wisconsin persistent offender law, Wis. Stat. 939.62(2m). Under that law, a third “serious felony” conviction results in mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Counsel apparently thought that Pidgeon’s 1991 aggravated battery conviction constituted a serious felony; a conviction for the sexual assault would constitute a second serious felony; and Pidgeon faced a third possible conviction (third-degree sexual assault of an adult) in a case in which Pidgeon had not yet been charged. If Pidgeon agreed to the plea bargain, the district attorney’s office agreed not to prosecute. Both attorneys were wrong; the 1991 conviction does not constitute a serious felony. After exhausting state remedies, Pidgeon sought federal habeas corpus relief. The court found that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, allowing Pidgeon to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on Pidgeon’s failure to call former counsel as a witness during the hearing, as would be required in an ineffective assistance hearing in Wisconsin state court. View "Pidgeon v. Smith" on Justia Law

Armstrong was imprisoned for 29 years for a rape and murder. He maintains his innocence. His conviction was set aside in 2005. In 2009 a Wisconsin state judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution had destroyed key exculpatory evidence. Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging shocking prosecutorial misconduct, including: destroying potentially exculpatory evidence from the crime scene; arranging for highly suggestive hypnosis of an eyewitness; contriving suggestive identification show-ups; concealing a later confession from a third party that was relayed by a person with no apparent motive to fabricate the report; and enlisting lab technicians to perform an inconclusive DNA test that consumed the last of a sample that could have proven Armstrong’s innocence and identified the true killer. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; federal due process claims based on destruction of exculpatory evidence are not barred by the availability of state tort remedies for the same wrongs. At the time of the original investigation, it was clearly established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate a suspect’s due process rights. A reasonable police officer or prosecutor would not have concluded that he could destroy evidence to avoid disclosing it. If Armstrong can show that unconstitutional destruction of exculpatory evidence caused him to a deprivation of liberty, he can sue for that injury without a second trial. View "Armstrong v. Norsetter" on Justia Law