Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brown defrauded Chicago-area mortgage lenders in 2004-2008, arranging with home builders and other sellers of new houses to receive fees for locating buyers to purchase their properties at inflated prices. Using his businesses, including Chicago Global, Brown located nominee buyers. To obtain financing, the nominees were referred to loan officers, including Spencer, who fraudulently qualified them for loans through false statements and documentation. Once a purchase was finalized, Brown and his coconspirators kept the surplus amount above what the seller was seeking. As co-owner of Chicago Global, Jackson recruited nominee buyers and provided, or caused to be provided, funds for the purchases and falsely represented the nominees as the source of those funds. Jackson’s participation in the scheme resulted in $8,515,570 losses to lenders. Spencer’s participation as a loan officer, assisting nominee buyers in 12 different fraudulent real estate transactions, resulted in $3,091,050 losses to lenders. Jackson was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Spencer’s conviction for bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and mail fraud and her 36-month sentence and affirmed Jackson’s conviction, but vacated her 112-month sentence, finding that an obstruction of justice enhancement was improperly applied. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Taylor sued prison officials alleging civil-rights violations. His complaint included misjoined claims, one of which was a failure-to-protect claim against Officer Brown. A magistrate issued a show-cause order indicating that he was inclined a remaining claim concerning medical indifference, but that Taylor could avoid a severance order and a second filing fee if he dismissed one of the misjoined claims voluntarily. Taylor drafted a response voluntarily dismissing his claim against Brown. Two days before the judge’s deadline, Taylor gave the document to a prison librarian to be e-filed. He was immediately transferred to another correctional facility. The court clerk never received the dismissal, however, and the judge severed the claim, opened a new case, and assessed a second filing fee. Both Taylor and the officer argued that Taylor’s voluntary dismissal was timely under the prison mailbox rule, but the court never addressed the issue. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the district court did not provide an opportunity to prove that the late-received documents were filed in a timely manner. The court noted that a nonjurisdictional deadline was at stake, and the opposing party conceded below that the mailbox rule applied. View "Taylor v. Brown" on Justia Law

Illinois parole agents and police officers conducted an unannounced parole compliance check at Lawrence’s residence. Lawrence’s fiancée, Williams, admitted them and motioned toward a first-floor bedroom. Agents saw Lawrence at the top of the stairs. Lawrence stated that his bedroom was the bedroom that Williams had identified. The agents checked the second-floor area and found a drawer on the hallway floor. They photographed the drawer as found, showing bags containing a white powdery substance (492 grams of a mixture containing cocaine) and currency ($1,564). Although the agents only had authorization to search areas under Lawrence’s control, they secured the second floor for their safety. Officers knocked on other doors and found cooperative residents. They did not find additional contraband, nor did they observe furniture missing a drawer. In Lawrence’s bedroom, officers found a nightstand missing a drawer, containing Lawrence's documents. The drawer found in the hall fit and matched. The closet contained clothing that fit Lawrence and a safe containing $14,364. In later testing, a certified drug-detecting dog, alerted to drugs on both the currency found in the drawer and that found in the safe. Convicted of knowingly possessing with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), Lawrence was sentenced to 262 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the government failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the court improperly admitted dog-sniff evidence, that the jury instructions were misleading, and that the sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

In June 2001, Morgan County Deputy Starnes stopped Pruitt’s vehicle. Starnes called in Pruitt’s driver’s license and registration and was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. Pruitt emerged from his vehicle with a handgun, and the two exchanged gunfire. Starnes was struck by five shots. He underwent surgery, developed an infection, and died. The state charged Pruitt with murder, attempted murder (Pruitt also shot Deputy Starnes’s son, who was accompanying his father as part of a college internship), and related offenses. Indiana state courts affirmed his conviction and imposition of the death penalty. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Pruitt intellectually disabled and categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence to support his claim of intellectual disability, by failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia and its effects. View "Pruitt v. Neal" on Justia Law

Cruz pleaded guilty to distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was sentenced within the guidelines range to 160 months’ imprisonment. Cruz argued on appeal that the court erred in failing to consider his mitigating arguments about the nature and circumstances of his offense, his cooperation with the police, and his family background. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge found that Cruz’s cooperation merited some consideration, but did not warrant a below-guidelines sentence because Cruz never followed through on his promise to testify against his uncle. The court also considered Cruz’s difficult upbringing, but noted that a difficult childhood was not an excuse for committing crimes as an adult. The court stated that his absence from his three children and his ill grandmother would not cause “any out of the ordinary hardship” and explained that the sentence was necessary to deter Cruz from future criminal activity, emphasizing Cruz’s continued criminal behavior despite many opportunities to learn from past mistakes. The judge noted that Cruz committed the offense just six months after being released from prison for another drug crime. The resulting prison sentence is therefore presumed reasonable. Cruz did not rebut this presumption View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Thomas, a Wisconsin prisoner, was injured in the Dane County Jail, while being handcuffed after disobeying an order. Disciplinary proceedings followed. Pending his hearing, Thomas was placed in punitive segregation, where, he alleges, he did not have access to the inmate handbook he had received just the day before. The jail charged Thomas with violating several major rules, including those prohibiting physically contacting staff, acting in a disorderly manner, and expelling bodily fluids at another person. Thomas waived a disciplinary hearing and received 10 days of segregation as punishment, but was transferred back to state custody four days after the incident. About a year later, Thomas sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) the officers involved in the incident. Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the district court dismissed some claims and allowed his excessive force claim and his related claims for failure to intervene, retaliation, and battery to proceed, then dismissed those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that administrative remedies were not actually available. Thomas could not raise his grievance about the jail guards at his disciplinary hearing. View "Thomas v. Reese" on Justia Law

World Outreach, a religious organization, purchased a YMCA building in a poor area of Chicago, planning to rent rooms to needy persons. The YMCA had a license for that use, even after the area was rezoned as a community shopping district. The city refused to grant World Outreach a license, ostensibly because it did not have a Special Use Permit (SUP). After the area was reclassified as a Limited Manufacturing/Business Park District, the city sued in state court, contending that the use was illegal. The city later abandoned the suit. World Outreach sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The city relented and granted the licenses. According to World Outreach the city continued harassing it. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city on all but one claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment in favor of World Outreach, regarding the attorneys’ fees for having to defend itself against a frivolous suit, reversed partial summary judgment to the city, and remanded. The frivolous suit cannot be thought to have imposed a merely insubstantial burden on the organization, but the organization presented weak evidence concerning damages for the two years during which it was denied a license. View "World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Kervin alleged, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that prison officials violated his constitutional rights after he insisted on being allowed to see his lawyer, who had come to the prison to speak with him. The meeting did occur, delayed by a few minutes. He contends that a guard threatened to file a false complaint and that he was placed in segregation as punishment and denied due process of law when his attempts to seek redress through the prison’s grievance system for his wrongful punishment were thwarted by biased grievance officers. Kervin admits he was punished that for defying the guard’s order by asking to be let out of the day room to meet with his lawyer after being told that he could not leave the room just yet. The district judge dismissed on the pleadings, after screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: backtalk by prison inmates to guards, like other speech that violates prison discipline, is not constitutionally protected. Kervin did not allege that he suffered any significant psychological or other injury from segregation . View "Kervin v. Barnes" on Justia Law

In the1980s, Habib married a woman in Pakistan and had three children with her there. It is unclear when or how Habib came to the U.S. In 1996, he married Bualice, a U.S. citizen, and three years later adjusted his status to that of lawful permanent resident based on that marriage. Habib did not disclose any children or prior marriages in his application to adjust status or during his interview. He applied for naturalization in 2004 and again neglected to list any children or prior marriages. When interviewed by USCIS, he stated that Bualice was his first wife. USCIS denied Habib’s application in 2010 on the ground that he had obtained lawful permanent residency by fraud and was ineligible for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and because he lacked a valid entry document. At a hearing, Habib’s attorney stated that he had not seen the Notice to Appear but, when given a copy of the document, proceeded to admit and deny the allegations without consulting Habib, who was present. After Habib was ordered removed, the BIA denied a motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review, finding that the Board abused its discretion when it determined that Habib was not prejudiced by his lawyer’s mistakes. View "Habib v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ramer was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. The conviction stemmed from a sham investment scheme in which Ramer and a codefendant solicited more than $1 million from individuals, but did not invest the money as they had promised. The district court sentenced Ramer to 42 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $1,077,500 in restitution. The court imposed a 3-year term of supervised release and, as a special condition, directed that Ramer make restitution payments “at a rate of not less than $100 per month.” Ramer appealed, arguing that the d court erred by not conditioning the restitution payments on his ability to pay. Before the Government filed its brief, the district court had amended the judgment to state that Ramer’s obligation to pay was “conditioned on” his ability to pay. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Ramer" on Justia Law