Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sorensen is the CEO of Inhibitor Technology, which produces rust-inhibiting products containing volatile corrosion inhibitor (VCI), branded with the federally registered trademark THE INHIBITOR. That word mark is owned by Sorensen; he also claims common law trademark rights in a design mark associated with his products, an orange-and-black crosshair. The WD-40 Company, maker of the spray lubricant, introduced the new WD-40 Specialist product line. Sorensen claimed that the branding for those products infringed upon his marks. WD-40 Specialist Long-Term Corrosion Inhibitor, which contains VCI and has a purpose similar to that of Sorensen’s products, contains on its packaging both the word “inhibitor” and an orange crosshair. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that WD-40’s use of the word “inhibitor” was a non-trademark descriptive fair use of the word. As to the crosshair mark, the court found that Sorensen had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to a likelihood of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The most important factors: similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evidence of actual confusion, weigh in favor of WD-40. No consumer would think that the marks are similar. The court noted the” clear weakness of Sorensen’s marks,” which appear inconsistently on his products. View "Sorensen v. WD-40 Co." on Justia Law

Presley was convicted of heroin and related gun offenses and of being a felon in possession of a gun. The judge sentenced him to 440 months in prison. Presley argued that, while in a cell near Breedlove, who testified against Presley pursuant to a plea agreement, Presley overheard Breedlove saying things indicating that his testimony had been false. Breedlove had been found to be suffering from a mental disease or defect. A guard at the jail in which Breedlove was held submitted an affidavit stating that Breedlove had admitted to the guard that he had testified falsely against Presley. The judge denied Presley’s motion for a new trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it was unclear whether Breedlove was mentally incompetent at the time of trial and whether that would have made him incapable of testifying truthfully, and that any error was harmless because of the overwhelming other evidence of Presley’s guilt. The court also upheld the court’s assumption concerning the volume of heroin that Presley was responsible for and the within-guidelines sentence, noting Presley’s lengthy criminal history. If Presley earns maximum possible good-time credit, he will be almost 64 years old when released and then undergo five years of supervised release. The court noted that violent crime is generally a young man’s game and the cost of imprisonment and “invited” the district judge to consider resentencing. View "United States v. Presley" on Justia Law

Liu a Chinese citizen in her mid-twenties, came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2011. She did not attend the school designated on her visa, instead taking free English classes in Chicago. Ten months after her arrival, she unsuccessfully sought asylum. At her removal hearing, Liu testified about her conversion to Christianity while in college in China and that the police raided her house church and asked the congregants why they were gathered. Learning that they were discussing Christianity, the police arrested all seven attendees. Liu was detained for four days in a room apart from her fellow churchgoers. She testified that she was mistreated and was released from detention after her parents paid 800 dollars. Liu was told to cease her church activity and report to the police every week. She was unable to eat and was diagnosed with a concussion. There were several inconsistencies in her testimony. Liu presented testimony from a family friend with whom she lived and attended church in Chicago and some documentation. The IJ denied Liu relief, finding that Liu did not submit adequate, reliable evidence to overcome her “incredible testimony.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Liu v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Erramilli has been caught three times fondling unsuspecting women on airplanes. Once in 1999 and once in 2002, he took a window seat behind a young woman, and when she appeared to fall asleep, he reached forward and fondled one of her breasts. Then, in 2011, he took a middle seat between a woman and her husband (who was blind in the eye closest to him), and when the woman appeared to fall asleep, he fondled her inner thigh. The woman discovered what was happening and reported him and he was charged with two counts of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244, which applies to acts committed on aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 46506(1). At trial, the government introduced evidence of his prior acts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 413. He was convicted and sentenced to nine months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Erramilli’s arguments that his prior acts should have been excluded and that, even if they were properly admitted, the jury instruction on their use was improper. His prior acts were relevant to prove his propensity to commit the charged offense, and to the requisite intent for that offense. View "United States v. Erramilli" on Justia Law

Arrested on August 31, 2012, Ramirez was indicted for cocaine offenses on October 4. At his October 15 arraignment, he pled not guilty. The court set a trial date. That date was continued twice at Ramirez’s request. At an April 5, 2013 status conference, Ramirez indicated that he wanted a trial date and would move to sever from his codefendants. The court rescheduled trial for June 3, 2013. Ramirez filed his motion on April 10. On May 3, the court denied the motion, and vacated the June 3 trial date, making an ends of justice finding. Before and during the June 17 status hearing, six co-defendants pleaded guilty. Ramirez requested that the court set a trial date, indicating that he would file another severance motion. The court set a hearing for August 9, again making an ends of justice finding. The court severed fugitive co-defendants, but otherwise denied the motion. Ramirez indicated that he preferred an October trial date. The court ruled out October, citing its crowded calendar, and set trial for February 3, 2014, making an ends of justice finding. During a November 19 status hearing, remaining defendants entered pleas. Ramirez again requested an earlier trial. On December 11, Ramirez moved to dismiss, arguing that the court continued the case due to its congested calendar in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, causing a delay in excess of the STA’s 70-day limitation. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of the motion. The six-month delay from August 9, 2013, to February 3, 2014, cannot be excluded. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukee is defending several lawsuits brought by scores of plaintiffs alleging that its police officers conducted unconstitutional stops and searches, including strip‐searches and body‐cavity searches. Judge Stadtmueller was assigned to preside over several cases. Milwaukee, asserting that some of the judge’s comments in opinions and conferences in the related cases raise questions about his impartiality, moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a). The judge declined. Milwaukee sought a writ of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The five challenged statements were made during the course of litigation; “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Judge Stadtmueller is presiding over several of these cases. It is not surprising that he might draw conclusions about the nature of the issue or problem. He is expected to look for and consider common threads and possible systemic problems to manage the cases effectively and decide them fairly. Even considering all the challenged statements together, nothing reasonably suggests deep-seated antagonism. View "City of Milwaukee v. Stadtmueller" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law

At 4:15 p.m. on Friday, March 8, the plaintiff’s attorney in a civil-rights case opened an electronic case file in the Southern District of Illinois by e-mailing the complaint and civil cover sheet to the clerk’s office as required by the local court rules. The clerk received the e-mail, opened a new case file in the Case Management/ Electronic Case Filing system (CM/ECF), and at 5:11 p.m. notified the attorney that it was available to receive uploads. On the next business day (Monday) the attorney’s assistant tried to upload the complaint but encountered problems with the electronic payment system. On Tuesday, March 12, she paid the filing fee and uploaded the complaint. The deadline to sue was Monday, March 11, and under local rules, the complaint was not “filed” until it was uploaded into CM/ECF. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded for reinstatement. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” and a paper is “filed” by “delivering it … to the clerk.” Although the filing process was not complete under the local rules until the complaint was uploaded, transmitting the complaint via e-mail effectively “delivered” it to the clerk for purposes of Rule 5(d)(2). View "Farley v. Koepp" on Justia Law

Carhart and Halaska own CHI. CHI terminated its sales agent, MRO, which filed a federal suit for breach of contract. Carhart bought MRO’s claim for $150,000 and became the plaintiff in a suit against a company of which he was a half owner. Halaska then sued Carhart in Wisconsin state court for breach of fiduciary duties to CHI and Halaska by becoming the plaintiff and by writing checks on CHI bank accounts without approval, depositing payments owed CHI into Carhart’s own account, and withholding accounting and other financial information from Halaska. A receiver was appointed, informed the federal court that CHI had no assets out of which to pay a lawyer, and consented to entry of a $242,000 default judgment (the amount sought by Carhart), giving Carhart a potential profit of $92,000 on his purchase of MRO’s claim. In Carhart’s suit to execute that judgment, CHI’s only asset was its Wisconsin suit against Carhart. The court ordered the sale of CHI’s lawsuit at public auction; Carhart, the only bidder, bought it for $10,000, ending all possibility that CHI could proceed against him for his alleged plundering of the company. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Auctioning off the lawsuit placed Carhart ahead of CHI’s other creditors. Carhart was not a purchaser in good faith. No valid interest is impaired by rescinding the sale, enabling CHI to prosecute its suit against Carhart. View "Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Moore and three others were arrested after a spending spree that involved their use of counterfeit debit and credit cards at Walgreens pharmacies. Moore was charged with conspiracy to use and possess counterfeit or unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b)(2), and possession of at least 15 unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). He pleaded guilty to the second count. The U.S. Probation Office determined that the total loss amount was $30,516.25 by attributing loss of $500 for 59 of the 60 cards and then adding the actual loss of $1,016.25 spent on the 60th card, Moore argued that the calculation should not apply to counterfeit cards “one comes merely to possess” but should only apply to the counterfeit cards “actually used” and that the proper loss calculation was $4,516.25. The district court rejected Moore’s argument and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment followed by supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting a challenge to the court’s calculation of underlying loss. The court vacated the imposition of a term of supervised release, stating that before it imposes a term of supervised release, the sentencing court must first make a finding that it is necessary under the circumstances. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law