Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joyce and Thomas divorced in 1999. Thomas continued to live in her apartment and borrow money. They occasionally had sex. Joyce threatened to kick Thomas out many times. Around 2 a.m. on December 27, 2006, Cruz, the downstairs neighbor, woke to hear screaming, choking, and thumps, followed by 10 minutes of silence, and the sound of dragging. She then saw Thomas and another leave the building. Cruz later heard someone go into Joyce’s apartment and say “oh my god move.” Police received a call from Thomas at 3:24 a.m. saying Joyce was unconscious. She was pronounced dead at 4:19 a.m. Thomas told differing stories, eventually stating: “I do believe I was accidentally responsible for the death of Joyce.” Thomas was convicted of intentional murder, first-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment. Thomas argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consider and consult with an expert to review the pathologist’s report and perhaps testify consistently with the defense’s theory that Thomas unintentionally caused Joyce’s death by putting pressure on her neck for too long during sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of his habeas petition. Reasonable counsel would have consulted a forensic expert; the state’s expert testified there was no evidence of external bruising but was still sure that this was intentional strangulation. Given the weakness of the case, especially concerning intent, had an expert testified, there is a reasonable probability the trial would have turned out differently. View "Thomas v. Clements" on Justia Law

Flagg and her nephew stole identities and created fake identifications, traveled to other states to open credit card accounts, bought merchandise, and returned to Detroit to sell the goods. After being caught, Flagg pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft. The district court sentenced her to three years for conspiracy and to a mandatory consecutive two-year sentence for aggravated identity theft. In calculating the Guidelines offense level, the court applied a two-level increase to the conspiracy count for relocating the fraud scheme to evade law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)). Flagg argued that she neither relocated the fraud scheme to another jurisdiction nor did so with the intent to evade law enforcement. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the fraud scheme was not relocated for the purposes of section 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) and that application of the two-level increase was a procedural error. View "United States v. Hines-Flagg" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers Coglianese and Bachler were on patrol when they observed Shields’s SUV partially blocking a crosswalk, in violation of an ordinance. The officers approached Shields, who was sitting in the SUV. Shields voluntarily exited the SUV and, at the officer’s request, walked toward the rear of the vehicle. He did not stop, but fled down the street. Coglianese gave chase and saw Shields pull a firearm out of his pocket. Coglianese caught Shields and pushed him to the ground. The officers placed Shields in handcuffs, rolled him over, and discovered a loaded six-shot .22-caliber revolver on the ground. The officers placed Shields in the police vehicle, and read Shields his Miranda rights. Coglianese asked, “Why are you running with a gun?” Shields responded, “I shouldn’t have had that weapon on me.” He was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The court denied a motion to suppress, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute violated the Second Amendment, and requests for continuance. After his conviction, the court imposed the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting: claims of failure to prove prior convictions; a challenge to denial of the motion to suppress; a Brady claim concerning background on Coglianese; denial of a continuance; and a challenge to sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Shields" on Justia Law

The Illinois Business Brokers Act of 1995 requires brokers for the sale of businesses in the state to register. Brokerage agreements must be in writing. Promises to pay unregistered brokers for their services are unenforceable. Global Technology, apparently unaware of the statute, orally agreed with Satyam Computer Services (based in India) to act as a broker in the purchase of Bridge Strategy, an Illinois business. Global brokered the acquisition, but Satyam refused to pay. Global sued, seeking a 3% commission ($600,000). Satyam contended that Bridge had compensated Global for its services as an intermediary and that it had never promised any additional compensation. When the litigation was four years old, Satyam moved for summary judgment with a new argument: that Global is not registered under the Act. Global argued that the Act is an affirmative defense, which under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) had to appear in Satyam’s answer. Finding that Global had not suffered prejudice, the court excused Satyam’s delay and entered judgment in its favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 8(c) does not provide a consequence for delay. District judges have authority to authorize a litigant to assert an affirmative defense despite its omission from the answer. View "Global Tech. & Trading, inc. v. Tech Mahindra Ltd." on Justia Law

Shell worked for the City of Anderson Transit System (CATS) as a Mechanic’s Helper on the day shift for 12 years. According to the job description for the position, a Mechanic’s Helper may occasionally drive buses to field locations. A Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) is required to drive the CATS buses. Shell’s hearing and vision impairments prevent him from obtaining a CDL. Shell never drove a bus. When general manager Blackwell was appointed at CATS as part of personnel changes made by the new mayor, he informed Shell that his employment would be terminated unless he obtained a CDL, as the job description required it. After he was fired, Shell sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), for failure to accommodate his disability and alleged that his termination was politically motivated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. A jury should decide whether the city violated the ADA; the factual record did not establish as a matter of law that driving a bus was an essential function of the Mechanic’s Helper position. View "Shell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Ortiz filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of his children to Mexico City. The children are currently residing in Chicago with Martinez, their mother. Martinez accused Ortiz of sexually molesting his seven-year-old daughter and asserted that their 16-year-old son had expressed a desire to remain in the United States. The district court denied the petition to return the children. After interviewing the children and hearing testimony from Martinez and a court appointed psychologist, the court found that Martinez had wrongfully removed the children from Mexico, but that an exception to the Convention’s mandatory-return rule applied with respect to each child. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ortiz v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Martin founded a street gang, the “Mafia Insanes” while serving 20 years in state prison for murder. After he was released on parole in 1998, Martin coordinated a sprawling Chicago narcotics distribution network. The government intercepted wire communications of Mafia members believed to be involved in the drug trafficking network. A jury convicted Martin of using a telephone to facilitate the narcotics conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The district court declined to alter Martin’s sentence on remand; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martin then sought collateral relief, contending that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Had he been “better informed,” Martin claimed, “he would have accepted the [g]overnment’s 30-year plea offer instead of risking a trial in which he was found guilty and, ultimately, being sentenced to LIFE imprisonment.” The district court denied his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Martin’s conclusory assertion was sufficient to trigger the need for a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Martin failed to present any evidence, apart from his vague and conclusory allegations, that the government actually offered a 30-year plea agreement. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

After being caught in a “sting” operation, Adams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and to possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment, he sought to set aside his plea, based on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Rosemond v. United States, which was decided after he entered the plea, but before he was sentenced. Rosemond holds that a person cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of section 924(c) unless he has enough time to drop out of joint criminal activity after learning that a confederate is armed. The Seventh Circuit rejected his claims. Adams acknowledged, as part of the factual basis for his conviction, that he and the other conspirators “agreed to rob a purported stash house of at least 50 kilograms of cocaine, using firearms.” Being armed was part of the agreement. Adams also acknowledged that “in furtherance of and as a foreseeable consequence of that agreement, a toolbox containing” firearms was placed in the van. Adams never attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy, so he is accountable for his confederates’ foreseeable acts. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2010, Advance obtained a policy from Cincinnati Insurance on Middleton properties. After a 2011 hailstorm, Larson, Advance’s president, filled out a form reporting damage. Larson inspected the roof with Jorgenson, a Cincinnati claims representative. Jorgenson’s estimate “note[d] some dents to soft metal roof vents and AC fins but stated that he “did not observe any damage to roofing.” Jorgenson estimated $1,894.74 for repairs and sent Larson a check, calculating a $1,000 deductible. Six months later, Advance was considering selling the building. The potential buyer, Welton, had the roof inspected. The inspector’s report prompted Advance to ask Jorgenson to reopen Advance’s claim. He arranged for a new inspection. The resulting report noted roof panel denting that “will not affect the performance of the panels (roofs) or detract from the panels[’] (roofs[’]) life expectancy.” Months later, Advance sold the building, without any further developments relating to its claim. Advance sued. The district court held that the policy did cover the hail damage, but that Cincinnati’s refusal to acknowledge coverage was not in bad faith. The parties stipulated to the cost of a replacement roof, $175,500. The court entered a final judgment in that amount in favor of Advance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Advance Cable Co., LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law