Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a casino investment venture gone awry, Balagiannis and Mavrakis entered into a settlement agreement: Mavrakis would pay Balagiannis $1.225 million. Balagiannis would dismiss pending federal court litigation with prejudice and withdraw the complaint he had filed against Mavrakis in the Greek legal system no later than September 28, 2012. Mavrakis made three of five agreed payments. In March 2012, Balagiannis sent a letter to a district attorney in Athens. The letter did not reference withdrawal of the complaint against Mavrakis, but requested “completion of the ongoing preliminary investigation.” After Balagiannis refused to confirm that he had withdrawn the Greek complaint, Mavrakis declined to make the final two payments ($925,000). In October 2013, Balagiannis filed suit alleging that Mavrakis breached the settlement agreement. Three months later (19 months after September 28, 2012), Balagiannis filed a declaration with the district court (filed in Greece), which may (or may not) have withdrawn the complaint in Greece. The district court held that Balagiannis failed to allege plausibly his compliance with the settlement agreement, and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reserve Hotels PTY Ltd v. Mavrakis" on Justia Law

Perotti , convicted as a felon possessing ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 210 months. Perotti was housed at the Terre Haute penitentiary, where he found employment as an orderly in the prison’s education department, which provides classroom instruction to inmates and oversees the prison’s leisure and law libraries. Perotti was responsible for janitorial tasks, supervised by instructors. An instructor offered him a promotion to the position of law clerk, assisting other prisoners with legal research. He accepted, but was later told that the department administrator had disapproved the promotion because Perotti had filed too many grievances. After an associate warden intervened he was given the position, about a month later. He was removed from that position weeks later, after another instructor filed a misconduct report that Perotti possessed another inmate’s legal materials outside of the library, in violation of prison rules. He was vindicated and awarded back pay, but he was not reinstated nor given another job before he was transferred to another facility. A jury rejected his claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and arranging for Perotti to participate in the trial by video conferencing. View "Perotti v. Diane Quinones" on Justia Law

Rossi was assaulted by several persons, one of whom was an off-duty Chicago police officer. Glenn Mathews, a detective with the Chicago Police Department, was assigned to investigate. For six weeks, Mathews did practically no work on the case; he followed zero leads, did not inspect the crime scene, and questioned no witnesses other than Rossi. Aside from taking some messages and filing perfunctory reports, he exerted no discernible effort. He then closed his investigation. Rossi sued Mathews under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he violated his constitutional right to judicial access because his failure to investigate led to the spoilage of evidence in his civil suit against the assailants. He also brought a Monell suit against the city for perpetuating a “code of silence” that shields police officers from investigation and promotes misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that Rossi was not denied judicial access because the police did not conceal from him any facts which prevented him from obtaining legal redress from his assailants, and dismissal of Rossi’s Monell claims for lack of evidence of widespread practices on the part of the police department. View "Rossi v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

An undercover agent saw Gary talking on the phone in the passenger seat of a car when the agent bought heroin from the driver. The driver made no attempt to conceal the drug transaction from Gary. Gary was seized following a traffic stop. Officers stopped the car because a narcotics detective gave them the license plate number and told them to make a stop if they observed any violations. During the stop, officers discovered heroin on the driver during a frisk for weapons. Gary was also patted down. One of the officers spoke with Gary’s parole officer, who asked to see Gary. The officer then handcuffed Gary and searched him, finding two cell phones. Gary was transported to the police station. The arresting officer admitted that the sole reason he seized Gary was to bring him to speak with his parole officer at the police station. Gary was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his mere presence in the car with a driver who was observed selling drugs was not enough to find probable cause and that the search of his cell phone exceeded the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest. View "United States v. Gary" on Justia Law

The government alleged that Pulgar entered into such a conspiracy with Schmidt and Myers to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Pulgar never met Myers, but Schmidt had. At trial, the government focused on Pulgar’s transactions with Schmidt to prove the conspiracy charge. Largely through Schmidt’s testimony, the government offered evidence that: Pulgar sold large quantities of cocaine to Schmidt at wholesale prices for over 10 years; Pulgar fronted cocaine to Schmidt; Pulgar accepted returns from Schmidt when lousy cocaine did not sell; and Pulgar enjoyed a friendship with Schmidt. Pulgar disputed the government’s evidence of fronting, and the evidence of a so-called “return policy.” A jury convicted Pulgar on the conspiracy count, although it found he conspired to distribute “500 grams or more of cocaine,” not the “5 kilograms or more” charged. The jury acquitted Pulgar of distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the government merely proved a buyer-seller arrangement, which, under well-established case law, is not enough to support a drug-distribution conspiracy. View "United States v. Pulgar" on Justia Law

Lara, a citizen of Mexico, married a U.S. citizen in 1988. He gained conditional permanent residency based on that marriage but never completed the process necessary to obtain unconditional permanent residency, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c). In 2008—10 years after divorcing his wife—he sought permanent residency through a discretionary waiver of the joint-petition requirements available to petitioners who can show that they had entered a failed marriage in good faith. He testified at the removal hearing that he had entered his marriage in good faith and the government offered no evidence to the contrary. Without making a credibility finding, the immigration judge determined that Hernandez’s marriage was not bona fide and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals evaluated Hernandez’s appeal on the assumption that everything he said about his marriage was credible, but concluded that he had not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his marriage was bona fide. The Seventh Circuit granted relief. Given Lara’s testimony that he had married for love, not immigration benefits—and the government’s lack of evidence— the Board’s conclusion implies that it demanded from Hernandez more proof than necessary to satisfy a preponderance standard. View "Lara v. Lynch" on Justia Law

SGI sued Yogi’s, alleging trademark infringement. Attorney Harris filed trademark applications for Yogi’s. SGI served Harris with a subpoena, for his deposition. The deposition did not take place. The court ordered Harris to be deposed at his office at noon on October 29. SGI sent Harris, who did not attend the hearing, a copy of the order by mail and facsimile on October 23. On October 29, SGI’s attorney, Park, arrived at the office. Harris was not there. The two spoke by phone. According to Park, Harris stated that he was aware of the order, but that it would take him at least an hour to arrive. Park told Harris that if he did not arrive by 1:00 p.m. it would be treated as a “no show.” The deposition did not occur. Harris faxed a letter stating his intention to comply and willingness to be deposed telephonically or by video. SGI did not respond or attempt to reschedule, but moved to hold Harris in contempt, seeking fees and expenses of $6,800. Harris filed an affidavit, explaining that during the week of October 22, he was in New York, and that he first became aware of the court order on October 29, when speaking with Park. On November 6, Harris sent Park a letter via email, facsimile, and certified mail, stating that he was available for deposition. On November 8, Harris called Park to reschedule. Park did not return the call; Harris sent another email. There was no response. On December 17, the court ordered SGA to take Harris’ deposition that same day. SGI complied. The court declared the motion for contempt and sanctions moot. SGI filed a renewed motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed its denial. View "Sik Gaek, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Following his guilty plea to charges of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamines, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), Nichols was sentenced to 127 months in prison. A year later, in response to a government motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), the court reduced the sentence to 88 months. His guideline range was 151 to 188 months, but the court concluded that a below-range sentence was appropriate based on his substantial assistance to the government. In hopes of securing an additional reduction, Nichols filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) based on the retroactive application of Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered by two levels the offense levels specified in the Drug Quantity Table. The district court took off another five months, leaving Nichols with a sentence of 83 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court used the wrong baseline and did not give him a generous enough reduction. Because Nichols sought and received an 83-month sentence, he has waived any argument for a different sentence. The district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) is discretionary. The district court’s decision was a sound one. View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Lockwood was convicted of felonies. After Lockwood his release, he owned an automotive repair business. In 2011, Lockwood’s friend, Curtis, approached him, upset that her brother had accused her of stealing $160,000 from their parents. Curtis thought that she could avoid prosecution if her brother were also in trouble, and asked Lockwood to place a package inside her brother’s truck and call 911 and report that it contained a bomb. Lockwood placed the package in the brother’s mailbox because he did not see the truck, then called 911. Authorities did not find a bomb. The next morning the family found an object, appearing to be a pipe bomb, in their mailbox. Federal agents interviewed Lockwood after examining Curtis’s cell phone records. After an agent played a recording of the call, Lockwood admitted that he made it. Lockwood denied knowing what the package contained. Lockwood said he told the operator what Curtis told him to say. Lockwood was charged under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), for possessing an unregistered firearm, and 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), as a felon in possession. Lockwood stipulated that the object was a destructive device, arguing that he lacked the mens rea to be convicted. Convicted, his sentencing range was 33-41 months on each count. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims that that the object was not a “destructive device” because it could not actually explode and that it lacked a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to supply federal jurisdiction. The court vacated his sentence. View "United States v. Lockwood" on Justia Law