Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tidwell, an Illinois inmate, file suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that three prison guards violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to protect him from attack by a fellow inmate and then subjected him to excessive force by restraining him during the attack. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for two of the guards, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the third. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Tidwell’s claims concerning his attorney and his inability to obtain the testimony of inmates. The court stated that he offered no reason to think that new counsel or an investigator might have turned up evidence that would have affected the outcome of the case. The witnesses whom he hoped to find were former inmates who, he says, would have been able to corroborate parts of his testimony, but the testimony would at best have duplicated Tidwell’s own testimony. Tidwell does not assert that any of these potential witnesses saw the actual incident. View "Tidwell v. Hicks" on Justia Law

DeBartolo, 48 years old, immigrated to the U.S. at the age of one, but never applied for U.S. citizenship. He is married to a citizen and his children are citizens. He has no family in Italy and does not speak Italian. In 1996 he was sentenced in an Indiana court to eight years in prison for dealing in cocaine. In 2011 he was indicted in federal court for possessing with intent to distribute more than 100 marijuana plants and manufacturing more than 100 plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). DeBartolo powered the lighting used to grow the plants with electricity that he stole from the electric company. . Because he helped the government to apprehend other drug dealers and pled guilty to manufacturing, the government moved for, and the court imposed, a below-minimum sentence of 25 months. There was no mention of deportation, but his conviction made him deportable and precluded cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i), 1229b(a)(3). After he completed his sentence he was removed to Italy. While his removal was pending he sought habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case, because his lawyer had failed to warn him that if he were convicted he could be deported. The judge denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the government should consider whether having served the recommended prison sentence, having then languished in INS custody, and being deported, DeBartolo has been punished sufficiently. View "Debartolo v. United States" on Justia Law

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that facts increasing a defendant’s maximum permissible sentence must be determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, by the trier of fact. In 2002, in Harris, the Court held that facts increasing the minimum permissible sentence may be found by a judge on the preponderance of the evidence. In 2013, in Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris and held that facts controlling both minimum and maximum sentences are in the jury’s province and covered by the reasonable-doubt standard. A jury convicted Crayton of distributing heroin. The indictment alleged that Hedges died from using Crayton’s product, but the jury could not decide unanimously whether Hedges’s death resulted from Crayton’s heroin. The judge found that it did. Under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) this required a sentence of at least 20 years’ imprisonment; without of the finding that Crayton’s heroin killed Hedges, the range would have been 0 to 20 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2011. While Alleyne’s case was pending, Crayton filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed while waiting for Alleyne. When Crayton filed another after the Supreme Court issued its decision, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. View "Crayton v. United States" on Justia Law

In December 2010, DNA testing linked Sylla to an attempted bank robbery that occurred in August, 2003. The perpetrator had bled during an exchange of gunfire. Sylla’s DNA had been entered into CODIS by the Bureau of Prisons after he pleaded guilty to a federal bank robbery charge in 2006. Sylla was indicted on July 16, 2013 after the Indiana state lab confirmed the match. He moved to dismiss, claiming that the applicable five-year statute of limitations had run, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a). The district court denied his motion and the jury found him guilty. The Seventh circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the federal DNA tolling statute, 18 U.S.C. 3297, was unconstitutional as applied to his case. That statute provides: In a case in which DNA testing implicates an identified person in the commission of a felony, no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of the offense shall preclude such prosecution until a period of time following the implication of the person by DNA testing has elapsed that is equal to the otherwise applicable limitation period. View "United States v. Sylla" on Justia Law

Former employees of an Indiana city sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the mayor had fired them because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The mayor responded that political affiliation was a permissible qualification for their jobs. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor with respect to nine of the 11 plaintiffs, finding his argument concerning political qualification for the jobs was sufficiently arguable to entitle him to qualified immunity, but declined to certify interlocutory appeal with respect to the other two plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings pending interlocutory appeal, reasoning that whether a job is one for which political affiliation is a permissible criterion presents a question of law. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. The court later dismissed in part, reasoning that a trial might show that one plaintiff has more discretion than her job description indicates. View "Allman v. Smith" on Justia Law

Taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of $18,030 in deficiencies and penalties for tax years 2009 through 2011. On the trial date, the IRs Commissioner submitted a “Stipulation of Settled Issues” signed by the parties. The document states that it “reflects” the parties’ “agreement as to the disposition of adjustments,” but contained no mention of agreement concerning the fact or amount of a deficiency for any of the relevant tax years. At the Commissioner’s request, the Tax Court granted the parties 30 days to file “decision documents” in lieu of trial. The Commissioner calculated a total deficiency of $12,252 and a penalty of $0. When the couple refused to agree to this amount, the Commissioner asked the Tax Court to enter a decision adopting the Commissioner’s figures. The taxpayers sought more time to produce an agreement, but the Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion on the ground that “the parties’ computations for decision and proposed decisions consistent with their settlement agreement” were overdue. The Seventh Circuit vacated. In light of the parties’ disagreement over the taxpayers’ liability, the Tax Court erred by entering a judgment without holding a trial. View "Hussain v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2006 plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, but later voluntarily dismissed the petition. A credit-reporting agency received a copies from Lexis and reported the petition “dismissed.” In 2009 the plaintiff’s lawyer demanded that the agency remove all reference to her bankruptcy because it had been dismissed at her behest. The agency refused. In 2012 she told the agency: “my bankruptcy was not dismissed. It was voluntarily withdrawn prior to plan approval.” The agency then purged the reference to the bankruptcy from her file, but did so because it was seven years since she had filed the petition. Plaintiff alleged that by failing to report in 2006 that the petition had been voluntarily withdrawn, the agency had willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and sought damages, 15 U.S.C. 1681n(a). The district court granted the credit agency summary judgment in without deciding whether to certify a class. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. An agency must report that a bankruptcy petition was withdrawn “upon receipt of documentation certifying such withdrawal” and must “follow reasonable procedures to as-sure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the” person who had filed for bankruptcy. In 2006, when the plaintiff’s petition was withdrawn, no documentation certifying such withdrawal was submitted to the agency. View "Childress v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Dixon was convicted of two armed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(d), and sentenced to life in prison. A life sentence is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1)(A) because Dixon’s criminal record includes multiple prior convictions for robbery, classified as “serious violent felonies” because each of his prior convictions was for a crime that had the threat of violence as an element and a maximum term of at least 10 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as modified, agreeing that the conviction should have been under 2113(a) (bank robbery by intimidation) rather than 2113(d) (by using a dangerous weapon or device). View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Sprint wanted to expand its access to Illinois Bell’s infrastructure at regulated rates even when Sprint customers make calls to, or receive calls from, persons outside the region (Illinois) in which Illinois Bell operates. Sprint invoked “the duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access,” 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)(A). Illinois Bell refused to make an interconnection agreement, citing a regulation by the Federal Communications Commission. Sprint asked the Illinois Commerce Commission to arbitrate the disputes with the Bell company. The Commission rejected Sprint’s claims, and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sprint’s approach would create an incentive for phone companies to engage in postage-stamp pricing so that they would never have to pay access charges when placing calls from their subscribers to subscribers of other companies. Illinois Bell’s approach, though equally arbitrary, has at least the virtue of not affecting how telephone companies decide to price their services. View "SprintCom, Inc. v. Sheahan" on Justia Law

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission concluded that Battoo committed fraud. Battoo and his companies, all located outside the United States, defaulted in the suits. The district judge froze all assets pending a final decision about ownership. The court appointed a Receiver to marshal the remaining assets and try to determine ownership. The Receiver has been recognized as the assets’ legitimate controller in several other nations, including China (Hong Kong), Guernsey, and the Bahamas. Battoo defied the injunction and transferred control of some investment vehicles, located in the British Virgin Islands, to court-appointed Liquidators, who asked the judge to modify the injunction and allow them to distribute assets located in the U.S. or England immediately. The Liquidators maintain that, because Battoo no longer has control, the justification for freezing the assets has lapsed. The court assumed that the Liquidators are now under judicial control, but declined to modify the injunction, ruling that the funds should remain available so that an eventual master plan of distribution can treat all investors equitably. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not clear whether some investment interests can be disentangled reliably from those affected by Battoo’s frauds against U.S. investors; the Liquidators have not argued that any investor is suffering loss as a result of the Receiver’s investment decisions. View "Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Battoo" on Justia Law