Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lawson sold computer maintenance and support services for StorageTek. He was paid a base salary and commissions on his sales under the company’s annual incentive plan. Sun Microsystems acquired StorageTek in 2005. At the time Lawson was working on a large sale to JPMorgan Chase, but the deal did not close until 2006. If StorageTek’s 2005 incentive plan applied, Lawson would earn a commission, as high as $1.8 million. If the sale fell under Sun’s 2006 incentive plan, his commission would be about $54,000. Sun determined that the 2006 plan applied. Lawson sued for breach of contract and violation of Indiana’s Wage Claim Statute. The district court rejected the statutory wage claim but submitted the contract claim to a jury, which awarded Lawson $1.5 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sale did not qualify for a commission under the terms of the 2005 plan. Although the original plan documents said the plan would remain in effect until superseded by a new one, a September 2005 amendment set a definite termination date for the plan year: December 25, 2005. To earn a commission under the 2005 plan, sales had to be final and invoiced by that date. View "Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, unknown assailants shot and killed Marty, who had sporadically provided intelligence to narcotics officers in Belvidere, Illinois, since 2006. Marty’s mother, Flint, filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The constitutional claims boil down to allegations that Marty was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as a police informant, and that the defendants are liable for failing to protect him. The day defendants moved for summary judgment, about a month after discovery closed, Flint moved to reopen discovery and for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Officer Dammon and Berry (Marty’s primary police contacts) lied throughout discovery. The judge denied both motions. Flint’s response to the summary judgment motion did not comport with Local Rule 56.1, which guides how parties must marshal evidence at the summary judgment stage. Applying that rule, the district court deemed admitted most of defendants’ factual assertions, ignored additional facts raised in Flint’s response briefing, and granted summary judgment against her. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge acted within his discretion to deny Flint’s tardy motions and Flint’s procedural gaffe left an evidentiary record insufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Flint v. City of Belvidere" on Justia Law

Tilstra (an Ontario business) sued a Wisconsin manufacturer of dairy equipment, BouMatic. Tilstra had been a BouMatic dealer for about 20 years. Tilstra’s territory included “arguably the richest dairy county in Canada,” on which 55,000 dairy cows grazed. His dealership was making a profit of $400,000 a year. The dealership contract reserved to BouMatic “the right to change, at its sole discretion, the assigned territory,” but provided that “BouMatic shall not terminate this Agreement or effect a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of this Agreement without good cause and only upon at least ninety (90) days’ advance written notice …. The term ‘good cause’ means Dealer’s failure to comply substantially with essential and reasonable requirements imposed upon Dealer by BouMatic.” Tilstra claimed that by devious means, BouMatic forced him to sell his dealership to a neighboring BouMatic dealer at a below-market price. The jury awarded Tilstra $471,124 in damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that BouMatic never gave Tilstra written notice of any alleged failure to comply. View "Tilstra v. BouMatic LLC" on Justia Law

Intercon, which provides electronic recycling services, engaged BAN to evaluate its business for certification as environmentally friendly. BAN concluded that Intercon shipped hazardous waste to companies in China that use disposal methods that violate policy in Illinois, where Intercon operates and were inconsistent with Intercon’s public representations. BAN reported its conclusion to state and federal agencies. Intercon sued for defamation. BAN asserted an Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) defense. The district court declined to dismiss, the remedy under the state Anti-SLAPP law, reasoning that a special motion to strike was inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Washington State Anti-SLAPP law cited by BAN would require the judge to resolve jury questions. View "Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Puckett" on Justia Law

Bell, a lawyer and photographer, alleged that three small Indianapolis business owners violated federal copyright laws and an Indiana theft statute by publishing on the internet a photo that he took of the Indianapolis skyline without his authorization. In August 2013, the district court set a deadline for filing motions for leave to amend the pleadings. Bell sought to amend his complaint (for a fourth time) eight months after the cut-off after learning that defendant Taylor had not actually used the photo at issue but had displayed a different photo belonging to Bell. The district court denied Bell’s motion, citing undue delay and his own carelessness. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on the damages issue, finding that Bell cannot demonstrate how they caused him financial harm and was not entitled to monetary recovery. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although the court purported to issue a “final judgment” after ruling on the summary judgment motion, it did so in error; the issue of injunctive relief was never adjudicated. Because Bell’s copyright claim was not entirely disposed of by the ruling, the judgment was not final. View "Bell v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Kielar, a pharmacist, got many patients from Dr. Barros, whose office was in the same building, and began defrauding two insurance companies. Kielar forged prescriptions for Procrit under Barros’s name and submitted them for payment, knowing that Procrit had neither been prescribed, nor provided, to the individuals under whose policies he sought reimbursement. The insurers lost $1,678,549. Kielar was indicted for health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, with a forfeiture allegation, 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(7) that identified properties subject to forfeiture, including a Florida property. Kielar asserted that he needed the proceeds of its sale to pay legal fees. The court granted a motion to release lis pendens and ordered that the proceeds of the sale be placed in escrow with the U.S. Marshals Service. Kielar unsuccessfully requested that the court allow him to use the sale proceeds “for taxes, legal fees and other expenses.” He was convicted of six counts of health care fraud; three counts of aggravated identify theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1); and of using false records to impede a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. 1519. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on his request to release his escrowed funds, by limiting cross-examination of Barros, and by preventing Kielar from calling a former patient as a defense witness. View "United States v. Kielar" on Justia Law

In 2009, CE filed a class action suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, against King. King had commercial general liability and umbrella policies from three insurance companies, but all three disclaimed any obligation to defend or indemnify, based on provisions in the policies that appeared to exempt liability under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act from coverage. The district court certified the class. On remand, CE and King agreed to settle the case for $20 million, the limit of the insurance policies. Their agreement, approved by the district court, provided that only one percent of the judgment ($200,000) could be executed against King. Upon learning of the proposed settlement, the insurers sought a state court declaratory judgment. A state court ruled that the insurance policies do not cover liability under the Act, but CE is appealing that decision. After the settlement agreement in the federal case, but before its approval, the insurers moved to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), (b), hoping to delay approval of the settlement until there was a state-court determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to intervene as untimely. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. King Supply Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Stanbridge is confined in a secured facility under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1, which allows for civil commitment of individuals who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to future acts of sexual violence. Stanbridge sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2005 criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Stanbridge had already served his full sentence for his 2005 conviction. The district court, therefore, dismissed Stanbridge’s petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims related to Stanbridge’s criminal conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Stanbridge’s argument that he remains “in custody” pursuant to his sexual abuse conviction because that conviction serves as a necessary, though not sufficient, predicate for his current confinement. Stanbridge’s civil commitment is merely a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, insufficient to render Stanbridge in custody pursuant to that conviction. View "Stanbridge v. Scott" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a Milwaukee police officer from 1995 until 2011, was discharged from his employment after, in January 2011, he failed to report for work. Gonzalez is Caucasian and worked in District 4, a predominately African-American police district. He had seven earlier disciplinary actions within two years and his request for leave during the time in question had been denied. Gonzalez alleges that he was discharged because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city after denying Gonzalez’s motion to compel discovery, in which he specifically requested that the city turn over a District 4 “climate survey.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting he lateness of Gonzalez’s request, his lack of diligence in obtaining information about the climate survey, and his inability to show how he was prejudiced by the district court’s ruling,. View "Gonzalez v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Phillips and Arch violated the conditions of their supervised release and were returned to court for revocation proceedings. The district judge sent them back to prison based in part on the need to “hold [them] accountable for [their] actions.” Although their cases are otherwise unrelated, their cases were consolidated on appeal. They argued that because “accountability” is not a factor listed in the revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the judge committed reversible procedural error. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and affirmed. Accountability is an obvious concern whenever an offender has violated the conditions of supervised release— so obvious that it may not reveal the judge’s rationale for the revocation decision—but there is nothing improper about considering it. The judge considered the statutory factors in these cases, albeit in summary fashion. View "United States v. Arch" on Justia Law