Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Employees of Instant, an information-technology staffing firm sign agreements in which they promise not to solicit business from Instant’s clients, not to recruit Instant’s employees to other jobs, and not to disclose the firm’s sensitive information to outsiders. DeFazio was Instant’s Vice President until 2012, when she was fired. She was already cofounding Connect, a new tech-staffing firm, and began working there immediately, along with several coworkers she persuaded to leave Instant. Connect won business from several of Instant’s recent clients. Instant sued DeFazio and others for breaching the restrictive covenants and under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. DeFazio counterclaimed, alleging that Instant shortchanged her on a bonus. The court concluded that no one is liable to anyone else. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that defendants did not leak or otherwise misuse Instant’s proprietary data. Defendants admitted breaching the covenants not to solicit and not to recruit, but in Illinois a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is valid only if it serves a “legitimate business interest.” The district court concluded that neither covenant did. Tech-staffing firms do not build relationships with clients that would justify restricting their employees from setting out on their own. View "Instant Tech. LLC v. DeFazio" on Justia Law

Quadri bought an apartment in Chicago at a foreclosure sale. Later, she learned that the police had investigated a disturbance there, and visited the apartment with her real estate agent and a locksmith. Quadri’s agent called 911 after they found Hurem in the unit. Hurem told police he had paid rent to Quadri’s husband, but he failed to obtain a receipt, lease, or any other paperwork. He apparently got keys from a former tenant. He refused to leave. Quadri’s husband denied taking rent from Hurem. Two days later, Quadri again found Hurem in the apartment; her agent again called 911. Hurem still could not produce anything proving he had a right to be there and again refused to leave. The officers arrested him, but he was not charged. Hurem sued the Quadris, the officers, and the city, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful eviction and civil rights violations. After the Quadris and the city were dismissed as defendants, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of all but one officer. Hurem dropped his case against the last one. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hurem did not show that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and waived any due process claim. View "Hurem v. Tavares" on Justia Law

Joseph, a Nigerian citizen, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1991 and was placed in removal proceedings after convictions for theft and bank fraud. He argued his marriage to a U.S. citizen as a basis for adjusting his status and sought a waiver of inadmissibility, arguing that removal would cause his family “extreme hardship,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B). An IJ concluded that any hardship to his sons would be no worse than confronted by any child whose parent is deported. The BIA agreed. Joseph’s current motion to reopen is his eighth, but his third premised on the Violence Against Women Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv), which extends to one year the deadline for a motion to reopen asserting that the alien facing removal is a victim of domestic violence. That longer deadline can be waived if the battered alien “demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” The first of Joseph’s VAWA motions missed the deadline by four years. Joseph claimed that he was a victim of spousal abuse and should be granted a waiver based on hardship to his children. The BIA denied the motion, noting failure to corroborate his claim of spousal abuse and to submit evidence of unusual hardship. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that its jurisdiction is limited to legal or constitutional questions. Joseph presented neither. View "Joseph v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Armed men were robbing Milwaukee businesses, wearing dark sweatshirts and ski masks. Officers saw three men approach a store in dark clothing, with hoods pulled over their faces. One attempted to enter, while the others stood watch. They found the doors locked and fled. As officers pursued them, two jumped into a running car driven by a fourth person. The third man fled on foot. The car, registered to Welch, led police on a high-speed chase before being stopped. Police discovered Welch hiding under a car near the store. In his first trial, Welch was convicted of four counts. In the nine-day second trial, he was found guilty of eight counts of armed robbery, conspiracy, fleeing an officer, and bail-jumping. The jury heard testimony from three accomplices, five others linking him to the robberies, two forensic experts, 12 police officers, and 20 victims. Two officers referred to other criminal charges against Welch. After exhausting his appeals, Welch sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting that admission of those statements violated his right to a fair trial and that his counsel was ineffective for not contesting them. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding reasonable the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that any error in admitting the statements was harmless, given the quantity and quality of evidence against Welch. View "Welch v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Fort Wayne officer Brown went to serve Mackin with a valid arrest warrant. After placing him in handcuffs, Ramon searched Mackin and recovered, from his pocket a loaded handgun. Brown recorded its serial number on an incident report and completed a “continuity slip” to track the gun’s movements in law enforcement’s custody. Brown placed the firearm and the continuity slip in an evidence locker. Later, an ATF Agent examined a firearm bearing the serial number listed on the incident report and determined that it was functional. Mackin was charged as felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought forfeiture of the firearm, identifying it by an incorrect serial number. Before trial, the government turned over discovery materials, including the continuity slip, which contained empty fields. It included Mackin’s name, the date, time, and address, and a description of the firearm. Remaining boxes are blank, and no signatures appear. The court allowed correction of a scrivener’s error concerning the serial number on the forfeiture allegation. The government did not correct or supplement the continuity slip. Mackin objected to the firearm’s admission. The government produced a new continuity slip, conceding that the form had additional information and had not previously been disclosed to Mackin. The court denied Mackin’s mistrial motion and allowed both continuity slips to be presented to the jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Mackin was prejudiced by denial of a mistrial. View "United States v. Mackin" on Justia Law

Burks and Jones were hired as Union Pacific “Signal Helpers.” During orientation in January 2011, they were informed that they would be employed through December 2015, or until the company “moved in a different direction.” The position carried a 90-day probationary period; they were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. They were the only African-American members of their class. On February 9, 2011, Burks was told that “it wasn’t working out.” Burks lodged a complaint with Schop in Union Pacific’s Equal Employment Opportunity department alleging racial discrimination. Schop found no evidence that Burks was fired because of his race, but concluded that he had not been given an opportunity to improve and offered reinstatement in exchange for a general release with a new 90-day probationary period. Burks signed and returned to work. Burks worked for seven days before requesting a transfer. He was transferred and completed his probationary period, but was later notified that Union Pacific abolished the Signal Helper position, effective October 2011. Jones had similar experiences. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting claims that Union Pacific denied an opportunity to take a test that was required for promotion, based on impermissible retaliation for complaints of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that positions within the seniority district became available during the relevant period. View "Burks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

An informant bought cocaine from Davis and introduced him to an undercover agent, posing as a drug courier. The agent recruited Davis to rob a stash house, which he said contained 50 kilograms of cocaine. Davis recruited others. The crew (with semiautomatic firearms) met for a planning session, which was recorded. The seven were charged with conspiring and attempting to possess, with the intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; conspiring and attempting to affect interstate commerce by means of robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Because the prosecution was based on a government-initiated “sting,” the defendants, all African-American, sought discovery of information concerning possible racial profiling and selective prosecution. Announcing its intent not to comply, the government obtained dismissal without prejudice to facilitate immediate appeal. The Seventh Circuit concluded that because the dismissal was without prejudice, it was not a final order. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed the dismissal, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3731 authorizes appeal when a court dismisses an indictment, a count, or part of a count of an indictment, allowing the possibility of a successive indictment on the same charge. The court suggested that remand start with limited inquiries that can be conducted quickly, expanding the probe only if evidence justifies wider discovery; the judge should ensure that required disclosures make no more inroads on prosecutorial discretion than vital to protecting defendants’ constitutional right to be free of race discrimination. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

VDF has trademark and patent rights in “CoffeeBerry” extract and licensed J&J to make and sell CoffeeBerry-based skin-care products. VDF was entitled to “running royalties,” based on the number of sales by the licensee, or by sublicensees. The license permitted J&J to sublicense its rights and required J&J to pay a minimum quarterly royalty if running royalties fell below a specified level. The license could not be assigned without written permission, but it did not forbid a change of control of J&J. J&J sublicensed Stiefel, a manufacturer of dermatological products. Four years later, J&J’s owners sold their interests to Stiefel for $8.5 million. J&J became a Stiefel subsidiary. After buying J&J’s stock, Stiefel engineered amended the sublicence, reducing the alternative minimum royalties that Stiefel owed J&J and diverting part of the license-revenue stream from VDF and J&J to Stiefel. VDF filed suit, alleging de facto assignment and breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to claims that they engineered an unauthorized assignment of the license and that the $8.5 million paid for J&J was really a purchase of J&J’s anticipated sales revenue, so that part of that revenue should have gone to VDF as advance royalties. View "VDF Futureceuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, Ribota was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, after a search revealed 25 kilograms of cocaine and two loaded firearms. Once a $50,000 secured bond was posted, on January 7, 2003, he was released under an order requiring him to report to Pretrial Services and to confine his travel within Illinois. On January 30, 2003, a bench warrant issued after he failed to appear at Pretrial Services. Ribota eluded capture for more than nine years, until he was arrested in Denver, in 2012 and was arraigned on the 2003 indictment. He moved to suppress evidence. The prosecutor, not the one who had obtained the 2002 indictment, agreed that the evidence was inadmissible. The court granted the motion and granted the government’s oral motion to dismiss the indictment. The day after the motion to suppress was granted, the government charged Ribota with contempt of court, 18 U.S.C. 401(3), alleging that Ribota willfully violated the court order by failing to report to Pretrial Services and to restrict his travel. Ribota moved to dismiss that indictment as based solely on vindictiveness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. View "United States v. Ribota" on Justia Law

Procaccio purchased its workers' compensation insurance from West Bend. This litigation concerns three policy years: 2006, 2007, and 2010. Procaccio contends that West Bend’s offset procedure effectively nullified its Illinois Contracting Classification Premium Adjustment Program (ICC) credit for these policy years, resulting in substantial overcharges. The district court agreed and awarded a large sum in damages. The court concluded that the insurance policy contained no agreement to adjust the Schedule Modification credit after the ICC credit became due; West Bend needs parol evidence to prove its version of the parties’ agreement, but the insurance contract was fully integrated so any evidence of an oral understanding with Procaccio’s president is inadmissible; and while West Bend had the unilateral right to issue endorsements, that authority is cabined by contractual and statutory restrictions on its ability to alter its rates. The court further concluded that, even if the Schedule Modification credit was artificially inflated for these policy years, West Bend was not permitted to reduce it based on Procaccio’s ICC credit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Procaccio Painting & Drywall" on Justia Law