Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000 an almost totally deaf 73‐ year‐old, the federally licensed owner of a gun store in Hammond, Indiana, was shot to death and the store robbed of many of its guns. Taylor and Thomas, drug dealers, were indicted for the murder and robbery and in 2004 convicted and were sentenced to life in prison. The convictions were vacated in 2011 because of a possible violation of Batson, arising from the government’s striking a black juror in the first trial. Retried in 2012, both defendants were again convicted and again sentenced to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated Thomas’s sentence and otherwise affirmed. The facts regarding Taylor’s personal history, if true, are possible grounds for mitigation—for reducing his sentence from life to a term of years. They suggest that external forces beyond his ability to control created cognitive and psychological impairments that greatly diminished his ability to resist engaging in serious criminal activity. When substantial grounds for mitigation are presented, the sentencing judge must explain his reasons for rejecting them. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Higginses visited an Indiana amusement park. The filter pump connected to the park’s lazy river malfunctioned. As staff worked to fix the problem, pool chemicals—bleach and hydrochloric acid—accumulated in the pump. When the pump restarted, the chemicals discharged into the water and a cloud of chlorine gas released into the air. The Higginses were not nearby, but their niece was, and they received a cell phone call, prompting them to head in that direction. When they arrived, Kent Higgins inhaled an unspecified amount of chemical fumes that lingered. Complaining of chest tightness, burning eyes, shortness of breath, and nausea, Higgins visited the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with “mild chemical exposure” and discharged with instructions to follow up with his primary care physician. Higgins saw a pulmonologist later that summer, but waited more than a year before consulting his primary physician. He was diagnosed with reactive airways dysfunction syndrome and chronic asthma more than 14 months after the incident. In his negligence suit, the court disqualified Higgins's expert concerning causation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and agreed that the causation issue was too complex for an unassisted jury and that Higgins’s treating physician’s qualifications and methodology were too uncertain to permit her to opine on such matters. View "Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, hackers attacked Neiman Marcus and stole the credit card numbers of its customers. In December 2013, the company learned that some of its customers had found fraudulent charges on their cards. On January 10, 2014, it publicly announced that the cyberattack had occurred and that between July 16 and October 30, 2013, and approximately 350,000 cards had been exposed to the hackers’ malware. Customers filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The district court dismissed, ruling that the individual plaintiffs and the class lacked Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs identified some particularized, concrete, redress able injuries, as a result of the data breach. View "Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Two Milwaukee police officers on bicycle patrol were investigating gunshots around 16th and Center Street. They saw Smith crossing 16th Street as he prepared to enter an alley. The officers rode ahead of Smith into the alley and when they were five feet from Smith, they stopped and positioned their bicycles at a 45‐degree angle to him. One officer dismounted, approached Smith, and asked whether he had a gun or any other weapon in his possession. When Smith indicated that he had a gun, the officers confiscated it and arrested him. Smith was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Smith’s encounter with the officers was consensual, and no seizure had occurred. Smith entered a conditional plea agreement and was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed,reasoning that Smith's encounter with the officers cannot be treated as consensual because a reasonable person in his situation would not have felt free to ignore the police and go about his business. Since he was seized without reasonable suspicion, Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Giri, a citizen of Nepal, was living in the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Tammy, until USCIS terminated his conditional resident status after finding that his marriage was entered into for the purpose of remaining in the U.S. On the day of his merits removal hearing, after the court granted his request to advance the date of that hearing, he sought a continuance on grounds that he had not been fingerprinted, as required, and was not able to timely submit documentation to support the validity of his marriage. The IJ denied the request finding that Giri had ample time to get fingerprinted and submit his petition for relief and evidence supporting the bona fides of his marriage, but he was not diligent in completing these tasks, and ordered him removed to Nepal. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the ruling. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that the immigration courts provided a reasoned explanation for the IJ’s decision not to grant a continuance that did not depart from established policies or rest on an impermissible basis and that the record indicated that Giri conceded removability and was removable to Nepal. View "Giri v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Townsend signed a note and a mortgage to purchase a condominium. After Townsend defaulted, HSBC sought foreclosure under Illinois law. Representing himself, Townsend answered the complaint. HSBC moved for summary judgment, submitting evidence of default; that Townsend owed $141,425.65; and that HSBC owned the note and mortgage. Townsend failed to respond. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure, an order finding that Townsend owed $143,569.65, and an order providing for judicial sale if Townsend did not pay before the redemption period expired. The court wrote that the judgment was “a final and appealable order” that was “fully dispositive” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), but retained jurisdiction to enforce or vacate (in the event of reinstatement) the judgment. The court acknowledged that it might have to hold a hearing to confirm the judicial sale under Illinois law and could decide not to confirm, if appropriate parties did not receive proper notice, if sale terms were unconscionable, if the sale was conducted fraudulently, “or … justice was otherwise not done.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The judgment of foreclosure and judicial sale posed no imminent threat of irreparable harm to Townsend. His interests are protected under Illinois law. Because entry of the Rule 54(b) judgment compelled Townsend to appeal when he did, the court ordered that costs on appeal be assessed against HSBC. View "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend" on Justia Law

In 2010, while Hinkle was finishing his elected term as Sheriff of Wayne County, his 14-year-old step-daughter accused him of sexually abusing her while helping her apply chigger medicine. A Charleston police officer interviewed the girl and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services notified state police. White, a state police investigator, interviewed the step-daughter and she repeated her claim. Her sister (another stepdaughter) said that Hinkle had also helped her apply chigger medication and that it was nonsexual. She said she thought her sister was lying because Hinkle and her mom were too strict. Hinkle denied the allegation. The step-daughter later recanted her claim of sexual abuse several times. A prosecutor declined to press charges, but the accusations became well-known in the community. White talked to a lot of people with whom he had no business sharing details of the investigation. The rumors grew to include a story that Hinkle was an arsonist. Hinkle filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against White and his supervisor, alleging denial of his right to liberty in the occupation of his choice without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Hinkle had not established a protected liberty interest. View "Hinkle v. White" on Justia Law

The defendant claims that he does not molest girls, but solicits, obtains, views, and distributes videos and images of very young girls in lewd poses. He pleaded guilty to two counts of transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The judge imposed consecutive sentences of 240 months and 55 months. The presentence report had calculated the guidelines sentencing range to be 151 to 188 months on the basis of U.S.S.G. 2G2.2., but the judge employed U.S.S.G. 2G2.1, designed for violators of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), who induce a minor to engage in “sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct” and on section 2G2.2(c)(1), concerning offenses that “involved … seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that transcripts of defendant’s chat-room conversations in indicate that he sought minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing the live type of visual depiction that gratified his sexual tastes. View "United States v. Nicoson" on Justia Law

Defendant, age 35, was sentenced to 420 months in prison for possessing 1.2 grams of crack cocaine with intent to sell; possessing a gun as a felon; and using the gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A), (e)(1). He was a career offender, with two previous drug offenses. The statutory minimum sentence for all his offenses combined was 20 years: 15 years for being a felon in possession and 5 years for carrying a firearm in furtherance of a felony. There is no minimum statutory sentence for possession of 1.2 grams of crack with intent to sell, but the firearm-in-furtherance sentence was required to be consecutive to the sentence imposed on any other count. His guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life; had he not been a career offender, it would have been 160 to 185 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the judge may have thought he was imposing a bottom-of-the-range sentence, but could have imposed a sentence of 360 months by apportioning 60 months to the gun-in-furtherance count and the remaining 300 to the drug and felon-in-possession counts. The judge also failed to justify nonmandatory conditions of supervised release under the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Poke" on Justia Law

In 2011 Faulkner pleaded guilty to two counts of the use of a communication facility in facilitation of a drug-related felony; he was sentenced to a 91-month term of imprisonment. Two years later, he and other members of the Imperial Insane Vice Lords gang, were indicted on conspiracy, firearms, and drug charges. Faulkner moved to dismiss the new indictment, arguing that the judge enhanced his 2011 sentence based on the same conduct that the 2013 indictment covered and that the charges included in the 2011 indictment (which were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement) are the same as those in the later indictment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Faulkner’s multiple punishment claim is precluded by precedent. His effort to show that he is the victim of multiple prosecutions for the same offense failed because he did not establish that the offenses with which he was charged and to which he pleaded guilty in 2011 are identical to those alleged in his later indictment. View "United States v. Faulkner" on Justia Law