Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Based on 2004 Milwaukee muggings, McGhee was charged with armed robbery, theft of movable property from a person, and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. Public defender Thomey was appointed. On the first day of trial, Thomey notified the court that McGhee wished to raise an alibi defense and requested that he be allowed to call two unlisted witnesses. Counsel explained that McGhee had not mentioned it to him until two days earlier. Defense counsel also moved to withdraw because McGhee wished to discharge him andhe believed that McGhee’s alibi defense raised “certain ethical problems.” The court denied the motions. Following the court’s rulings, McGhee stated that “my attorney never asked me about no alibi. … I called his office …. He doesn’t return my phone calls to come see me. How can I tell him I have a alibi if I can’t get in touch with him? I’m in the prison…. and [for him to ]say something about my witnesses as far as perjury … that’s a bunch of BS.” Seeking federal habeas relief, McGhee argued that the state court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial; the state court reasonably determined that McGhee had not clearly and unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation. View "McGhee v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Tetzlaff, age 56, lives with his mother, is unemployed, and owes approximately $260,000 in student loan debt, which is guaranteed by Educational Credit Management Corporation. When Tetzlaff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2012, he sought to have this debt discharged, claiming that repayment constituted an “undue hardship” under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court held that Tetzlaff’s student debt could not be discharged. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the bankruptcy court found that Tetzlaff’s financial situation has the ability to improve given that “he has an MBA, is a good writer, is intelligent, and family issues are largely over” and that “Tetzlaff is not mentally ill and is able to earn a living.” The courts rejected an argument that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to consider Tetzlaff’s payments to Florida Coastal Law School (which were not included in the discharge action) in concluding that he had not made a good faith effort to repay the debt held by Educational Credit. View "Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

McClellan operated T&M Daycare. Nearly all of its clients participated in an Illinois program that reimbursed daycare centers. To qualify, a parent or guardian had to reside in Illinois, be employed or attend school, and have an income below a specified amount. McClellan instructed T&M’s director to falsify records so that T&M could receive state reimbursement. McClellan was also seen changing numbers on sheets submitted for state reimbursement of meals. McClellan purchased Paragon restaurant. The Department of Homeland Security had been investigating information that illegal aliens were working there. Paragon’s manager agreed to record conversations with McClellan and to provide documentary evidence that McClellan was paying wages in cash and was not reporting those wages to the state. McClellan used T&M’s account to purchase a house, where undocumented kitchen staff lived rent‐free. Recorded conversations revealed McClellan’s knowledge of the workers’ illegal status. Agents executed search warrants and found 12 workers without legal status. McClellan was charged with harboring illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii); mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, based on his submission of fraudulent employment tax reports; and engaging in a monetary transaction involving criminally derived property, 18 U.S.C. 1957, based on the transfer of T&M funds for the house purchase. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructions. View "United States v. McClellan" on Justia Law

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

Dugan was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle owned by Rainey and claimed more than $200,000 in damages. Rainey’s insurer, American Family, offered $100,000 (the limit under Rainey’s policy). The Dugans accepted, then sought recovery from Nationwide pursuant to the underinsured motorist provisions of their policy, which insured four vehicles and provided underinsured motorist coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for each of the four covered vehicles. The policy declarations page lists each of the vehicles separately with the separate underinsured motorist limit applicable to each vehicle and the separate premium charged for each vehicle. The Dugans made a demand of $400,000, the aggregate limit of the four underinsured motorist coverage limits. Nationwide denied payment, stating that express policy language limited their recovery to $100,000, less the $100,000 American Family payment. Nationwide sought a declaratory judgment and the Dugans counterclaimed, claiming that, because the policy’s language was ambiguous, they were entitled to aggregate, or “stack,” the underinsured motorist limits applicable to each vehicle, subject to the $100,000 setoff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that, even if the policy permitted stacking, Illinois law entitles Nationwide to apply its setoff four times, once against each “separate, stackable policy” limit, thereby exhausting Nationwide’s underinsured motorist coverage View "Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. v. Dugan" on Justia Law

From 2006-2011, NCO purchased consumers’ defaulted debt and referred collections to its sister corporation Financial, an Illinois-licensed debt collector, and to outside attorneys, who are exempt from the Illinois Collection Agency Act (ICAA), 225 ILCS 425/2.03(5). NCO avoided direct collection activities; did not communicate with debtors or credit-reporting agencies; and did not consider itself a ”collection agency” subject to the ICAA. Financial attempted to collect the debts and outside lawyers filed 2,749 lawsuits on NCO’s behalf. Illinois consumers whose debts NCO bought and referred to Financial or outside counsel, filed a class action, alleging that NCO engaged in unlicensed debt collection and that Financial violated the ICAA because it knew or should have known that NCO was an unlicensed debt collector. The district judge agreed that NCO was not a collection agency, relying in part on testimony from a lawyer in the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, charged with enforcing the ICAA, that the Act did not apply to NCO until 2013, when it was amended to add a definition of “debt buyer.” The court entered judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting a 2015 Illinois Supreme Court holding that a passive debt buyer “clearly qualifies as a ‘collection agency’ as defined in section 3 of the Act.” View "Hawthorne v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Officer Beasley was dispatched and spoke to Hack, who stated that he had been asleep when his neighbor, Howlett, grabbed and threatened him, and thrust a hand down the front of Hack’s pants. Hack guessed that Howlett had entered by prying open a bathroom window. Hack described Howlett as wearing a white t‐shirt. Beasley called Howlett. Beasley recalls that Howlett stated, without prompting, that he did not enter Hack’s bathroom or “g[e]t into his neighbor’s pants.” Howlett says that he never made these statements. When Howlett arrived, wearing a tan collared shirt, not a white t‐shirt, Hack identified Howlett as the person who had assaulted him. Beasley arrested Howlett. Howlett was charged with burglary, criminal confinement, residential entry, intimidation, and battery. He was acquitted. Howlett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the false‐arrest allegations, finding them time-barred, and rejected a malicious prosecution claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beasley had probable cause to arrest Howlett. Beasley and the city are immune from Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim. Howlett’s malicious‐prosecution claim against Beasley and the city cannot survive summary judgment because Howlett did not allege a separate constitutional injury and did not submit evidence that Beasley acted out of malice or lacked probable cause. View "Howlett v. Hack" on Justia Law

Apollo owned Franklin, Wisconsin property, which it rented to DKCLM, for the sale and servicing of boats. DKCLM subleased part of the property to Kreil, an officer of DKCLM, who lived in a house on his leased part of the property. In 2005, Apollo initiated eviction for failure to pay rent. Apollo agreed to dismiss the case and DKCLM and Kreil promised to pay and agreed that in the event of a future default Apollo would be entitled to seek a writ of restitution without notice to Kreil. Apollo asked a Wisconsin court for that relief on August 15, 2005. Nine days later the court issued the writ, but stayed enforcement until September 26. Execution of the writ began on October 5, Kreil was evicted and a judgment of $54,000 was entered against him. Six years later Kreil filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in a federal district court against Milwaukee County and detective Miller, claiming that the entry onto the property was an unreasonable seizure of Kreil’s leasehold because it occurred after the statutory deadline for accomplishing an eviction and that the county removed and destroyed or otherwise discarded private property.The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting state law remedies. View "DKCLM, Ltd. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Taylor’s brother died in an accident. Caiarelli, the decedent’s ex-spouse and guardian of their minor child, obtained a state court declaration that the child was entitled to assets distributed to Taylor ($1.4 million). The estate assigned the judgment to Caiarelli. Taylor sought a probate court declaration that the assignment was void. Before resolution, Taylor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, triggering the automatic stay. Caiarelli initiated an adversary proceeding, objecting to discharge of the judgment. The bankruptcy court dismissed, finding that Caiarelli failed to establish standing. The judgment was discharged, and Taylor’s creditors enjoined from collecting, 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(2). Caiarelli returned to probate court, which ratified the assignment. Taylor claimed that Caiarelli and her attorneys violated the discharge and plan injunctions. The bankruptcy court entered a civil contempt order and issued a damages order and judgment for $165,662.36 in attorney’s fees. While appeal was pending, Taylor notified the district court that he reached a settlement with the legal malpractice insurance carrier for Caarelli’s attorneys. The attorneys denied that a full settlement had been reached. The bankruptcy court indcated that vacatur would be approved if the parties returned to the court, so the district court denied Taylor’s motion to dismiss but reversed the contempt order, damages order, and judgment, finding no violation of the statutory discharge or plan injunctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the appeal was not moot. View "Taylor v. Caiarelli" on Justia Law