Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, DuPriest pled guilty to “Use of a Telephone to Facilitate a Drug Trafficking Crime.” Judge Stadtmueller sentenced DuPriest to a 48-month term of imprisonment and a 12-month term of supervised release, to run concurrently with DuPriest’s related Wisconsin state sentence. DuPriest was released in 2012. Five months later, while serving his concurrent terms of supervised release, Milwaukee police arrested DuPriest after observing him enter an abandoned house. The officers searched him and found a pistol and 43 small bags of marijuana. He received an 18-month sentence on the state violation of supervised release. DuPriest pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and faced mandatory revocation and a second term of imprisonment for violating his federal supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(g). Judge Adelman sentenced DuPriest to 33 months of imprisonment and 24 months of supervised release, to run concurrently to DuPriest’s state revocation sentence. The government recommended a federal revocation sentence that would run concurrently with his sentence for the underlying crime. Judge Stadtmueller disagreed with that recommendation, emphasizing the need for incremental punishment. On remand, because the government conceded that the 18-month term exceeded the statutory maximum by six months, Judge Stadtmueller issued the statutory maximum 12-month sentence, with three pages explaining his reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Dupriest" on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

Bowman law firm filed suit in Hendricks County Indiana, to recover Bentrud’s credit card debt owed to Capital One. Months later, Bowman moved for summary judgment. Bentrud responded by invoking the arbitration provision in his credit card agreement. The state court granted Bentrud’s election of arbitration and stayed the case, allowing Bentrud 30 days to initiate arbitration. The American Arbitration Association declined to do the arbitration because Capital One had previously failed to comply with its policy regarding consumer claims. Bentrud failed to meet the 30-day deadline, so that the stay automatically dissolved. Bowman filed a second summary judgment motion. Although the state court granted an extension, Bentrud characterized that motion, as an unfair or unconscionable means of attempting to collect a debt, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692f. Bentrud also claimed that the Annual Percentage Rate on his credit card debt was 13.9%, but when Bowman filed its state court complaint, it averred the applicable interest rate to be 10.65%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Bowman, noting that when Bowman filed a second summary judgment motion, it acted consistently with the state court order and that any interest rate violation would be attributable to Capital One, which was not a party. View "Bentrud v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vicia, P.C." on Justia Law

ManWeb, an Indianapolis engineering and installation company, entered into an asset purchase agreement with Tiernan, another Indianapolis electrical contractor. Unlike ManWeb, Tiernan was party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union, under which it contributed to a multiemployer pension fund. After the asset purchase, Tiernan ceased operations. Although ManWeb continued to do the same type of work in the jurisdiction, ManWeb did not make contributions. Counsel for the Plan sent a letter to Tiernan’s former address, stating that the company had effectuated a complete withdrawal from the Plan and, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, the Plan had assessed withdrawal liability against Tiernan of $661,978.00. The letter was forwarded to ManWeb’s address and signed for by a ManWeb employee. No payments were made, nor was review or arbitration requested, despite the availability of both under the statute. The Plan filed a collection action, adding ManWeb as a defendant under a theory of successor liability. The district court granted the Plan partial summary judgment, finding that Tiernanr had waived its right to dispute the assessment of withdrawal liability, but rejected the claim of successor liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed to allow the district court to address the successor liability continuity requirement. View "Tsareff v. Manweb Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Kieffer robbed the Bank of O’Fallon and led police officers on a high-speed chase. Kieffer confessed; police retrieved the $3,330 he had stolen. Kieffer confessed that he had robbed six other banks (five outside Illinois) during the previous two months. At the time of his arrest, he faced charges for robberies in Wyoming and Michigan. The cases were transferred to the Southern District of Illinois and consolidated. Kieffer pleaded guilty to all three robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and stipulated to the four uncharged robberies. The court calculated a total offense level of 28, by separately calculating the offense levels for all seven robberies, U.S.S.G. 1B1.2(c), and then applying a multiple-count adjustment, and criminal history category of V, yielding a guidelines imprisonment range of 130 to 162 months. Kieffer received concurrent 20-year sentences, the statutory maximum on each count, and was ordered to pay $10,615 in restitution to the Wyoming and Michigan banks, plus $21,230 to the banks in the four uncharged robberies. Kieffer relinquished appeal rights except regarding “the reasonableness of the sentence” if “the sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as determined by the Court.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences, except the restitution award to the banks in the uncharged robberies, which it vacated. View "United States v. Kieffer" on Justia Law

Monsanto operated chemical plants and disposed of waste, including PCBs, at sites within Sauget Area 1. In 1999, the government filed suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), to recover EPA costs in removing hazardous substances from Area 1, which follows Dead Creek through Sauget and Cahokia, Illinois. Monsanto (later Pharmacia) and Solutia, original defendants, filed a third-party complaint adding Rogers, which formerly operated trucking depots near Area 1, alleging that Rogers washed trucks after hauling hazardous substances, releasing substances into drainage systems that emptied into Dead Creek. The government added Rogers as a defendant, and other defendants brought cross-claims. In 2003, the court dismissed other claims against Rogers because it had been found not liable on the government’s claim under 42 U.S.C. 9607. In 2007, the Supreme Court decided “Atlantic Research,” establishing that potentially responsible parties that incur voluntary CERCLA cleanup costs may seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties. Four defendants filed an amended cross-claim; Rogers filed counterclaims, alleging that Monsanto had arranged for transport and disposal of hazardous substances without informing Rogers of the nature of the substances involved. The four settled, with Rogers paying $50,000 if it cooperated in efforts to recover the difference from its insurer. The settlement released all claims “brought or alleged, or which could have been brought or alleged” in the EPA action. The agreement contemplated that cleanup of Rogers’s depot would be paid for out of settlement proceeds. Rogers leased that land from ConocoPhillips, which filed a separate action against Rogers, seeking contribution for its voluntary cleanup costs. Rogers filed a third-party complaint against Pharmacia and Solutia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the subsequent dismissal, finding the claim barred, by the settlement, and sanctions against Rogers. View "Rogers Cartage Co. v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Price, an almost illiterate, mentally retarded 44-year-old who also suffers from psychiatric ailments, intermittently received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, having been adjudged disabled in 1988, 1991, and 2007. His benefits should have been terminated in 2005 because he was sent to prison for a felony sex offense, but the record is unclear as to when benefits stopped. Paroled in 2010, he unsuccessfully applied for the same benefits that he had received before he entered prison. After reviewing the history of Price’s mental problems, his inability to function in society, doctor’s assessments, his nocturnal habits, and test scores, the Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the administrative law judge’s reasons for finding that Price was not disabled “unconvincing.” As is common in social security disability proceedings, the administrative law judge inferred from Price’s ability to perform simple household chores, such as cooking food in a microwave oven and mowing the lawn, that he could be gainfully employed, but “it’s easier—especially for someone with an antisocial psychiatric disorder—to work in one’s own home, at one’s own pace, at one’s own choice of tasks, than to work by the clock under supervision in a place of business.” View "Price v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 2013 the Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional a provision of the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, Ind. Code 32-34-1-1 that stated that “property” is “presumed abandoned if the owner or apparent owner has not communicated in writing with the holder concerning the property or has not otherwise given an indication of interest in the property” within a specified period varying according to the type of property. By filing a valid claim, the owner could reclaim the property up to 25 years after it was delivered to the attorney general, but was entitled only to principal and not to any interest. Several months later, the state amended the Act to provide for payment of interest. The district court dismissed the remand as moot and denied plaintiff attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed, opining that the judge was annoyed at the plaintiff because on remand she asked permission to file an amended complaint to convert the suit to a class action, based on intimations that the state would compensate only the plaintiff. She withdrew that request when the state amended the Act. The state’s concession did not deprive the plaintiff of her status as the prevailing party. The court also opined that the amount sought—$258,462.50 for 375.75 hours—is excessive. View "Cerajeski v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

Sergeant Laha stopped Ruiz after a license-plate check revealed that his driver’s license was suspended. The stop was captured by Laha’s dash-mounted video camera and lapel microphone. Laha explained the ticket and asked if Ruiz had any questions. Ruiz said, “no,” and Laha told him, “You’re free to go.” As they walked away, Laha called out, “You don’t have any weapons, drugs, anything like that?” Ruiz said no. Laha asked, “Mind if I search?” Ruiz responded, “You can,” closed his car door, walked behind his vehicle, and opened his jacket. Laha did a pat-down and continued: “Nothin’ in your car that you’re concerned about?” Ruiz did not respond. Ruiz took out his phone. As Ruiz talked to his wife, Laha walked beside the car and asked again if he could search. Ruiz responded, “I guess” and nodded. Laha asked, “So we’re good?” Ruiz did not respond, but did not object when Laha opened the door to search. Laha found handguns and ammunition under the driver’s seat. Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Ruiz entered a conditional plea. Ruiz had convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The court rejected the government’s argument that conspiracy to commit armed robbery is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) “residual clause” and imposed a guidelines term of 37 months. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the government’s ACCA cross-appeal was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress. From the perspective of a reasonable officer, Ruiz’s words and actions manifested consent to search. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Ruiz" on Justia Law

Swanson resigned from the Village of Flossmoor’s police department after suffering two strokes in 2009, six weeks apart, the second of which left him unable to perform as a detective. Swanson claimed that the Village failed to reasonably accommodate him—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act—upon his return to work from his first stroke by not permitting him to work exclusively at a desk. He also claimed that the Village violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and national origin, citing instances in which Village employees made racially offensive comments to him during his employment. He claimed that the Village excluded him from criminal investigations after his first stroke and then contemplated the possibility of moving him out of the investigations division entirely after his second stroke. The district court granted the Village summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Title VII claims time-barred because Swanson failed to lodge a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days after the alleged discrimination and finding the ADA claim deficient in view of his doctor’s recommendation that Swanson work “part-time” following his first stroke. View "Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor" on Justia Law