Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cipra, Gregory, and Konrady ran a cannabis grow operation at in Lee County, Illinois for two years. Shannon Gregory’s brother, Scott, contacted the DEA and provided detailed information about the operation. DEA Agent Washburn contacted an Illinois State Police Inspector, who independently verified much of the information and obtained search warrants. Following a search of the residences— which revealed an extensive cannabis grow operation— the three were arrested and charged with drug and weapon offenses. Defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence from the search, claiming a lack of probable cause. In light of assertions from Scott Gregory that investigators had asked him to lie about the information he provided, they also requested a Franks hearing and filed a motion to compel the identity of the informant. The district court denied the motions. Defendants conditionally pleaded guilty. Following the remand, Scott Gregory’s identity was revealed and the court held a Franks hearing, denied Defendants’ motion to suppress evidence, and held that the search warrants were supported by probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants failed to show that investigators deliberately or recklessly included false information—or omitted material information—that was necessary to a finding of probable cause View "United States v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Price, a convicted felon, was convicted of possessing a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the court concluded that Price had three qualifying convictions and imposed a sentence of 250 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2008. The district court rejected his first collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his prior crimes did not fall within the scope of the ACCA’s residual clause; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Price then asked the Seventh Circuit to authorize a successive collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), to assert a claim under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the clause is too vague to provide adequate notice. Noting that the government had not responded, the Seventh Circuit granted relief. Johnson explicitly overruled a line of Supreme Court decisions and broke new ground by invalidating a provision of ACCA. Johnson rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause, so the new rule concerns constitutional law and was previously unavailable to Price. Price never presented this claim before. The court concluded that the rule is categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review. View "Price v. United States" on Justia Law

Evansville police became aware of Internet threats against police, coming from an IP address at the home of 68-year-old Louise Milan and her 18-year-old daughter. They had an unsecured wifi network. Before they searched, police saw, two doors from the Milan house, Murray, who had been convicted of intimidating a police officer. Two officers thought him the likeliest source of the threats. Some officers thought, mistakenly, that a man named Milan made the threats. Surveillance revealed no man at the Milan house. A search of the Milan house was conducted by an 11-man (all-white) SWAT team in body armor, accompanied by a news team. The team knocked and, without allowing reasonable time for a response, broke open the door and a window, and hurled two “flash bang” grenades. Police rushed into the house, searched, found no evidence of criminal activity, handcuffed the Milans (black women), and led them outside. A day later, police discovered that Murray had used Milan’s network and requested that he come to police headquarters. Murray was arrested without incident and pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Milans’ suit. The police acted unreasonably and precipitately in flash banging the house without a minimally responsible investigation. The open network expanded the number of possible suspects and one extra day of surveillance, with a brief investigation of Murray and the male Milans, would have reassured police that there was no danger in the Milan house. View "Milan v. Bolin" on Justia Law

Bulk, a gasoline distributor with gas stations in Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee, leases stations and equipment to tenant-operators. Bulk receives monthly rent plus payment for gasoline. The Kentucky Department of Revenue (KDOR) revoked Bulk’s license as a gasoline and special fuels dealer after it asked Bulk to post additional security and Bulk failed to do so. The change affected only the way in which Kentucky collected its fuel tax. Bulk kept track of the separate line-item for the tax in the invoices it received from its suppliers (Marathon and BP) and sought refunds from KDOR for those payments. A KDOR employee emailed Bulk that “only a licensed dealer is allowed to purchase product without the Kentucky tax for export. If your license is reinstated and all outstanding tax liabilities are satisfied, consideration will be given to your refund request.” Bulk regained its license, then sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Bulk filed an adversary proceeding, seeking refund of the taxes. Kentucky filed a proof of claim. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Bulk, finding that Bulk had paid the taxes, which were not appropriately collected for gasoline that was consigned to destinations outside Kentucky. The district court disagreed, concluding that Bulk just paid a higher price to its suppliers. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the decision in favor of Bulk. View "Bulk Petroleum Corp. v. Ky. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Bulk, a gasoline distributor with gas stations in Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee, leases stations and equipment to tenant-operators. Bulk receives monthly rent plus payment for gasoline. The Kentucky Department of Revenue (KDOR) revoked Bulk’s license as a gasoline and special fuels dealer after it asked Bulk to post additional security and Bulk failed to do so. The change affected only the way in which Kentucky collected its fuel tax. Bulk kept track of the separate line-item for the tax in the invoices it received from its suppliers (Marathon and BP) and sought refunds from KDOR for those payments. A KDOR employee emailed Bulk that “only a licensed dealer is allowed to purchase product without the Kentucky tax for export. If your license is reinstated and all outstanding tax liabilities are satisfied, consideration will be given to your refund request.” Bulk regained its license, then sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Bulk filed an adversary proceeding, seeking refund of the taxes. Kentucky filed a proof of claim. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Bulk, finding that Bulk had paid the taxes, which were not appropriately collected for gasoline that was consigned to destinations outside Kentucky. The district court disagreed, concluding that Bulk just paid a higher price to its suppliers. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the decision in favor of Bulk. View "Bulk Petroleum Corp. v. Ky. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Cocrofts acquired a home in Country Club Hills, Illinois. In 2007, they refinanced their mortgage. As part of the transaction, the Cocrofts’ mortgage and loan were pooled into a mortgage loan trust. A year later, the Cocrofts ceased making payments. The lender became aware that the property was vacant and was “a mess” and entered to winterize. The Cocrofts claimed to have the right to rescission because the lender committed various unspecified disclosure violations in contravention of several federal statutes. The trustee initiated a foreclosure action. The Cocrofts filed suit, raising claims against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing, and HSBC Bank. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants on all claims. An alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was based HSBC Bank’s letter, in which it indicated that it was unable to locate an account for the Cocrofts; the Cocrofts offered no evidence that this was deceptive. The court rejected a wrongful possession claim; the lender was entitled to enter the property to winterize. The Colcrofts lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the property into the trust. View "Cocroft v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

The Cocrofts acquired a home in Country Club Hills, Illinois. In 2007, they refinanced their mortgage. As part of the transaction, the Cocrofts’ mortgage and loan were pooled into a mortgage loan trust. A year later, the Cocrofts ceased making payments. The lender became aware that the property was vacant and was “a mess” and entered to winterize. The Cocrofts claimed to have the right to rescission because the lender committed various unspecified disclosure violations in contravention of several federal statutes. The trustee initiated a foreclosure action. The Cocrofts filed suit, raising claims against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Bank of America, BAC Home Loans Servicing, and HSBC Bank. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants on all claims. An alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act was based HSBC Bank’s letter, in which it indicated that it was unable to locate an account for the Cocrofts; the Cocrofts offered no evidence that this was deceptive. The court rejected a wrongful possession claim; the lender was entitled to enter the property to winterize. The Colcrofts lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the property into the trust. View "Cocroft v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

Stepp, a former correctional officer, training secretary and coordinator, and parole probation officer, applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401. Stepp was 47 years old, 5’6” tall, and weighed 237 pounds. She primarily claimed degenerative disc disease and depression. An ALJ denied Stepp’s claim, acknowledging that Stepp suffered from chronic pain, but finding that surgery, medication, and therapy had resulted in improvement such that she retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work. Stepp submitted to the Appeals Council additional evidence in the form of medical records created just before the ALJ’s denial of her claim. This evidence, the treatment notes of pain management specialist Dr. MacKay, tends to suggest that Stepp’s condition did not improve over the course of the adjudicative period to the extent that the ALJ estimated. The Appeals Council declined to engage in plenary review and did not address Dr. MacKay’s notes. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the ALJ properly analyzed a range of conflicting testimony and medical opinions and reached a conclusion adequately supported by the record, but that the Council erred in not accepting Dr. MacKay’s treatment notes as new and material evidence. View "Stepp v. Carolyn Colvin" on Justia Law

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law