Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Viktor Barengolts was driving a tractor-trailer on Route 30 in Wheatland Township, Illinois when he rear-ended the Bernals in their pickup truck, causing serious injuries and property damage. The Bernals sued Unlimited Carrier, the company whose placard appeared on the tractor at the time; Viktor Barengolts; and Michael Barengolts, who owned the tractor. Viktor contacted Artisan, his insurance provider, which denied coverage, stating that the Contingent Liability Endorsement excluded coverage because he was driving the tractor on behalf of Unlimited Carrier at the time of the accident. The policy lists Viktor as an insured and Michael as an additional insured. Michael’s tractor is covered. Counsel for Unlimited Carrier wrote to Artisan, demanding that it defend the Barengoltses. Artisan refused. Michael disclosed that he did not sign a lease with Unlimited Carrier for use of the tractor until eight days after the accident. Counsel for the Barengoltses again unsuccessfully tendered the defense and sought indemnity. NAICO, the insurer for Unimited Carrier, defended the Barengoltses under a reservation of rights and paid settlements totaling $98,750 to the Bernals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that Artisan had a duty to defend, that it breached that duty, and that Artisan was estopped from asserting defenses under its policy, stating that Artisan gambled and lost. View "Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, McGuire was charged her with concealing and laundering drug proceeds (about $141,000), 18 U.S.C. 1956, based on her receipt of proceeds of marijuana and cocaine sales from her nephew that she deposited into her checking account and used to pay the nephew’s living expenses, 2006-2008. In 2012, she signed a plea agreement, admitting that she deposited $2,200 of drug proceeds into her account on December 1, 2008. She acknowledged that she faced maximum penalties of 20 years’ imprisonment and a $500,000 fine. The agreement specified that McGuire would receive a sentence of 12 months’ probation and that if the court did not accept the recommendation, McGuire could withdraw her plea. The agreement waived McGuire’s appellate rights. At her hearing, she acknowledged that she was giving up her appellate rights and stated, “Guilty.” The prosecutor asked the judge to withhold judgment until sentencing. Defense counsel explained: McGuire is a firefighter with the City of Gary. If you find her guilty, that could trigger employment consequences. The judge ultimately stated: Her guilty plea is accepted, but I do withhold adjudication of guilt. McGuire hoped to remain employed as long as possible. In 2014, McGuire moved to withdraw her plea. The Seventh Circuit upheld denial of the motion, finding that the waiver encompassed appeal of denial of a plea-withdrawal motion. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

When sentenced in 2009 for unlawful reentry by an alien, 8 U.S.C. 1326, Medina-Mora was serving undischarged terms in an Illinois state prison on a drug charge and a weapons charge. In open court, the judge said that Medina-Mora was “committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a concurrent term of 77 months on Count One.” In its written judgment, however, the court said nothing about a “concurrent” sentence. The Bureau of Prisons has used the written judgment to measure Medina-Mora’s imprisonment and has treated his federal sentence as consecutive to the state sentences, so he did not begin earning credit toward his federal sentence until he finished his state sentences. Medina-Mora moved, under FRCP 36, to correct a clerical error in the written judgment. The judge denied the motion, concluding that his “use of the word ‘concurrent’ when imposing the sentence was in error.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. When a court pronounces sentence orally, that is the defendant’s sentence, if the oral pronouncement is unambiguous. View "United States v. Medina-Mora" on Justia Law

Purham pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Purham agreed to the quantity and acknowledged the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court denied Purham’s subsequent request to withdraw his plea and sentenced Purham to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit held that the court erred in counting 2008 drug transactions as “relevant conduct” absent evidence establishing a link between that conduct and later distribution activity. Recalculating the sentence, the court added: two levels because Purham had a coconspirator purchase a firearm for him; two levels because conspiracy members threatened witnesses; two levels because he employed multiple residences for the sole purpose of distributing crack cocaine; and four levels because Purham acted as the conspiracy’s manager. It subtracted two levels for the “Drugs Minus Two” amendment. Purham’s guidelines range was 360 months to life in prison. The court noted the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, sentenced Purham to 324 months, and imposed special conditions of supervised release, that Purham not associate with any member of any street gang, “not wear or carry on your person colors or any sign, symbol, or paraphernalia associated with gang activity. Only gang tattoos received prior to incarceration are not considered a violation,” and “If you’re unemployed … perform at least 20 hours of community service work per week.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the term of imprisonment, but vacated the community-service and gang-association conditions. View "United States v. Purham" on Justia Law

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law

Timmermann’s sued its former employee, Pace, for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment, claiming that Pace had stolen merchandise and money from the company. Pace filed her answer and a counterclaim, then filed a separate action against Timmermann’s and individual employees, alleging that they had conspired to facilitate Pace’s false arrest and that, as a result, she had suffered severe and extreme emotional distress. Pace later moved to consolidate the actions. The court granted the motion with respect to discovery, but denied the motion with respect to trial and instructed Pace that she should request consolidation for trial after the close of discovery. During discovery, the court dismissed Pace’s action, concluding that her claims were actually compulsory counterclaims that should have been filed with her answer to the company’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that Pace’s claims against parties other than Timmermann’s were not compulsory counterclaims because FRCP 13 and 20, in combination, do not compel a litigant to join additional parties to bring what would otherwise be a compulsory counterclaim. Because Pace’s claim for abuse of process against Timmermann’s arose before the filing of her counterclaim, it was a mandatory counterclaim. View "Pace v. Timmermann's Ranch & Saddle Shop, Inc." on Justia Law

Two men committed four armed robberies of Peoria, Illinois businesses. They left a plastic bag at the scene of the final robbery. Officers sent it to the State Bureau of Forensic Science. A latent fingerprint impression from the bag matched to Sturdivant (age 18), who was arrested. Sturdivant made a video recorded statement admitting to his involvement in the robberies and was charged with armed robbery and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. Sturdivant pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress his confession. Officers and Sturdivant’s mother testified at a hearing. Evidence indicated that Sturdivant informed the officers that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic and that he was feeling “real tired.” After receiving his Miranda warnings, Sturdivant agreed to talk. After Sturdivant confessed, he agreed to take officers to the location where he discarded the firearm that he discharged in each robbery. After a suppression hearing, consideration of Sturdivant’s age and level of education, and viewing Sturdivant’s video recorded statement, the court denied Sturdivant’s motion, finding that Sturdivant did not appear “in any way to be physically ill” or “to be in a mental state that was any kind of weakened condition.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sturdivant" on Justia Law

Pons was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and equity skimming, 12 U.S.C. 1715z-19, and was released from custody pending trial. Two months before trial was to begin, he fled the country. He eventually turned himself in to U.S. authorities in Brazil and pleaded guilty to the two offenses. At sentencing the court applied a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, refused to apply a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a within-guidelines prison term of 78 months. The court rejected Pons’s claims that he did not wait to get caught, but instead self-surrendered in a country where there “is no extradition treaty,” that he apologized to the judge for fleeing, and decided to come back “to do what is right.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Pons’s circumstances were not so extraordinary as to warrant credit for acceptance of responsibility; before Pons fled, he did not spare the government the time and expense of preparing the case for trial, he violated a court order in obtaining a passport and “let the marshals run around” for a year looking for him. View "United States v. Pons" on Justia Law