Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When the Chicago Board of Education deems a school to be deficient, it implements a reconstitution, replacing all administrators, faculty, and staff. A school may be subject to turnaround if it has been on probation for at least one year and has failed to make adequate progress . Under the collective bargaining agreement, tenured teachers are placed in a pool where they continue to receive a full salary and benefits for one school year. If a tenured teacher does not find a new position within that year, she is honorably terminated. Others are eligible for the cadre pool where they can receive substitute assignments, paid per assignment. From 2004-2011, the Board reconstituted 16 schools. In 2011, the Board identified 74 schools by removing schools that met the objective criteria related to standardized test scores and graduation rates. Brizard chose the final 10 schools. All were in areas where African Americans make up 40.9% of tenured teachers. No schools were selected from the north side, where only 6.5% of tenured teachers are African American. Of the teachers displaced, 51% were African American, despite comprising just 27% of the overall CPS teaching population. Teachers and the Union filed suit. The court declined to certify a class of: All African American persons … teacher or para-professional staff … subjected to reconstitution. The court found that the plaintiffs had not met established a common issue and had not adequately shown that common questions of law or fact predominated over individual claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the class can be certified under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

His aunt and uncle reported to police that Witzlib was making M-80s in the basement of his grandmother’s house, where he and his grandmother lived. A federal license is required for manufacture of the highly explosive devices, 18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1). His aunt stated that Witzlib held “anti-government beliefs,” was unpredictable, and didn’t take the medications prescribed for his “mental health issues.” Local police and a federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agent went to the grandmother’s house and knocked. Witzlib answered. Officers told him that they were “responding to a fireworks complaint” and needed to conduct a “safety check” of the house. He demanded to see a search warrant and stated he would not consent to a search. They ignored him, then spoke to the grandmother, who signed a consent-to-search form, and stated that Witzlib had been making fireworks in the basement. In the basement, they found about 1000 M-80s. They arrested Witzlib; the next day officers removed the M-80s from the basement and, for the first time, obtained a warrant to search the house. They uncovered additional incriminating items. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, noting that the basement was not Witzlib’s private space View "United States v. Witzlib" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

D.Z., a minor, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that, Evanston Police Officer Buell, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when he detained D.Z. in connection with a reported burglary. The district court granted Buell summary judgment, finding that Buell’s stop of D.Z. was supported by reasonable suspicion and that, assuming that D.Z.’s detention amounted to a custodial arrest, Buell was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest D.Z. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Buell had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop. Buell responded to a police dispatch that included five, specific identifying characteristics—race, age, gender, shirt color, and type of shorts. Buell reasonably believed, based on the behavior he observed, that D.Z. was trying to evade the police. View "D. Z. v. Buell" on Justia Law

Taylor entered an online chat room and connected with “elliegirl1234,” identified as a 13–year–old girl. Taylor responded that he was 37, and asked whether Ellie had engaged in sexual acts with her boyfriend. Taylor wanted to see Ellie masturbate and asked her whether she had a webcam. She indicated that she did not. Taylor used a webcam and masturbated so that Ellie could see. The two conversed online several times. The conversations were always sexual in nature. Taylor asked Ellie to fantasize about meeting, but expressed concern because he “could go to jail.” (he had previously called Ellie “jailbait.”) Ellie was actually an online identity assumed by law-enforcement. Taylor was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1470, for transfer or attempted transfer of obscene material to a person under the age of 16 years through a means of interstate commerce. Taylor moved to modify his conditions of probation. The Seventh Circuit vacated, agreeing that the record did not support a ban on viewing legal adult pornography, which did not facilitate Taylor’s offense; there was no evidence that viewing otherwise legal pornography would increase the likelihood of recidivism. The court affirmed a condition requiring Taylor to make his internet-capable devices available for inspection, even without reasonable suspicion that he has committed a new crime. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Chapman, proposed to represent a class, under 47 U.S.C. 227, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, who received faxes from First Index despite not having given consent. First Index responded that it always had consent, though it may have been verbal (during trade shows or phone conversations). Discovery was conducted and experts’ reports submitted. Chapman asked the judge to certify a class of all persons who had received faxes from First Index since August 2005 (four years before the complaint was filed) without their consent. The court declined, ruling that the difficulty of deciding who had provided oral consent made it infeasible to determine the class. Chapman proposed a different class: All persons whose faxes from First Index either lacked an opt-out notice or contained one of three specific notices that Chapman believes violated FCC regulations. The court declined to certify that class, finding that Chapman had known about the potential notice issue from the outset of the litigation but had made a strategic decision not to pursue it earlier. Changing the focus of the litigation almost five years into the case was impermissible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision not to certify a class, but vacated with respect to Chapman’s personal claim. View "Chapman v. First Index, Inc." on Justia Law

Vandenberg, attending a cruise on a chartered yacht, was injured when he fell from the upper deck because the bench on which he was sitting tipped over, while the boat was anchored in Lake Michigan. The bench was not secured to the deck, nor did the upper deck have a railing. The fall left Vandenberg paralyzed from the chest down. The yacht was owned by a closely held corporation. Vandenberg alleged that Rose Paving, a company run by Rose, one of three owners of the corporation, was a booking agent that maintained a marketing relationship for the chartering of the yacht. He filed suit, alleging negligence, and settled with the defendants. The defendants agreed to pay $25 million through the assignment of their claims against their insurers. Westfield was the insurance provider for defendant Rose Paving. Westfield disputed that its insurance policies with Rose Paving covered the yacht accident and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted Westfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that injuries came under the policies’ watercraft exclusion. View "Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2005, a commuter aircraft, operated by Transair, crashed into terrain on its way to the Lockhart River airfield in Queensland, Australia. All 15 people on board died. The estates sued several companies and one individual, alleging that they contributed to the crash. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals in the case against the successor to the plane’s manufacturer and the case against the manufacturer of the plane’s warning system and maker of navigational charts. In both, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The successor had no duty to warn the plane’s operator of the need to install a more enhanced warning system, and the operator did not rely on any alleged voluntary undertaking of a duty to warn. The plaintiffs did not properly present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants’ products probably contributed to the crash, and the warning system’s manufacturer had no duty to alert the customer that an improved system should be installed. View "Thornton v. M7 Aerospace, L.P." on Justia Law

Reaves was suspected of dealing heroin. From an informant, Peoria police learned that Reaves drove to Detroit in a white Chrysler Pacifica to get his heroin supply. Police confirmed that Reaves owned a white Chrysler Pacifica. The informant picked Reaves out of a line-up. Police set up four controlled buys between the informant and Reaves, then obtained a warrant to place a GPS tracker on Reaves’s Pacifica. While the Pacifica was returning from Detroit on I- 74, Officer Leach observed it illegally drift into a different lane without signaling and pulled the car over. Reaves’s girlfriend, Seekins, was driving. Reaves was a passenger. After asking Seekins whether she had been drinking, Leach asked if he could search the vehicle. Both Reaves and Seekins consented. Seekins, driving on a suspended driver’s license, was arrested. At no time did they withdraw consent or limit the search. The police informed Reaves that the vehicle would be towed, impounded, and subjected to an inventory search. Reaves accepted a ride to a gas station. Officers continued searching. They removed a suspicious side panel and discovered 170 grams of heroin and $6,000 in cash. Reaves was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Reaves’s motion to suppress. Although the impoundment and inventory search were invalid, the police had probable cause to pull over the Pacifica for a traffic violation and Reaves’s consent validated the search. View "United States v. Reaves" on Justia Law

At Carter’s trial, for possessing between five and 15 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, an officer testified about his work with an informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing drugs and that he heard the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-of-court statements and actions. During closing argument, the state referred to the informant’s statements and actions, again without objection. Carter sought post-conviction relief, citing the Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding that the testimony was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to explain why the police investigated Carter. Carter filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 asserting the same theories. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s lawyer should have objected to some of the testimony about the informant and its use during closing argument, Carter did not show prejudice. The court noted Carter’s dramatic efforts to flee and then to dispose of the bags in view of officers. View "Carter v. Douma" on Justia Law