Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Barr was a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University from the fall of 2007 through the spring semester 2010, when the University declined to retain her for the next academic year. Barr contends that the decision was in retaliation for complaints she made in 2008 about racial discrimination at the school. In March she sued the University alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. Service of this suit was never perfected. Weeks later, in June, Barr filed a second lawsuit, against the Board of Trustees, alleging that the decision not to renew her contract was retaliatory and the product of age discrimination. In the meantime, Barr’s first suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During discovery in the second case, the Board of Trustees learned of Barr’s prior lawsuit and raised res judicata as an affirmative defense. The district court rejected Barr’s arguments her first suit didn’t end in a judgment on the merits and the claims differed in the two cases and dismissed The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b), and Barr’s two suits involved the same parties and core of operative facts. View "Barr v. Bd. of Tr. of W. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Raney was convicted of interstate travel with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), and attempt to manufacture child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). He was sentenced to 145 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. After successfully serving the term of imprisonment, Raney was released and skirmished with three different probation officers. The district court ultimately revoked his supervised release and returned him to prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of supervised release but we vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court did not provide a proper analysis when it imposed a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment, 24 months of supervised release and certain discretionary conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Raney" on Justia Law

Collins was on supervised release when he attempted to buy cocaine and marijuana from an undercover officer. Collins gave a statement about his “wholesale” Illinois drug purchases and “retail” Wisconsin distribution. Collins served a 27‐month term on revocation of supervised release. Based on the same offense, Collins agreed to plead guilty to cocaine possession with intent to deliver. The government agreed to recommend the maximum available reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Collins said he had health problems, so his hearing was delayed. He finally appeared in a wheelchair, with a woman he claimed was his nurse. In reality, it was his fiancée, neither a nurse nor nurse’s aide. After a very thorough colloquy, the judge accepted the plea. The PSR recommended against a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, noting that drugs were found at Collins’ residence while he was on bond. Collins changed his mind. His attorney withdrew, the court appointed new counsel, and Collins moved to withdraw his plea. The judge denied two motions to withdraw the plea because Collins’ claims contradicted his sworn statements during his hearing and sentenced him to 96 months, within guidelines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that withdrawal of the plea was unwarranted and that Collins did not qualify for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Richers filed for bankruptcy. Morehead, who had invested in commercial real estate owned by a trust controlled by Richer, filed an unsecured claim for $945,000 in the proceeding. The Richers filed an adversary action claiming that Morehead’s only lawful interest in the property was to receive a share of the net proceeds of the property if and when it was sold. The bankruptcy judge, the district court, and the Seventh Circuit upheld Morehead’s claim. The 2005 “Equity Participation Agreement” provided no security for Morehead, but did give him “the sole and exclusive option to convert his Participation Interest to a Demand Note payable within one hundred eighty (180) days of conversion.” Four years later, Morehead sent Richer by certified mail, a letter purporting to convert Morehead’s participation interest to a demand note for $700,000 (plus interest), effective the day after the letter was mailed, November 25, 2009—the anniversary date. The court rejected an argument that the letter had to be mailed or otherwise communicated to them on November 25, the anniversary date, neither before nor after. The Agreement provides that “the Conversion Option is exercised on the … anniversary date,” not that communication must occur on that date. View "Richer v. Morehead" on Justia Law

JHM rents commercial laundry machines to Chicago-area apartment buildings. Firestone made four loans to JHM, totaling $254,114.99. JHM defaulted on each. Firestone sued. JHM filed an answer, asserting a counterclaim of promissory estoppel, alleging that after Firestone’s first two loans to JHM, Firestone vice president McAllister had represented that his company “wanted to expand [its] investment in the laundry business,” and that it “would create a $500,000 line of credit” to fund equipment purchases, which “induced JHM into purchasing equipment” that it would not otherwise have purchased and that it was unable to pay for. As a result, JHM’s equipment supplier (Maytag) refused to sell it laundry equipment, resulting in substantial losses. JMH raised affirmative defenses, including promissory estoppel and prior breach of contract. Defense counsel withdrew from the case. JMH did not obtain substitute counsel, so the court granted Firestone default judgment, on grounds that corporations are required to have legal counsel under Illinois law. The court later dismissed the counterclaims as facially implausible and entered summary judgment on a breach of guaranty claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated; the plausibiity standard does not allow a court to question or otherwise disregard nonconclusory factual allegations simply because they seem unlikely. View "Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Burglars stole four desktop computers from Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation’s Illinois administrative offices. The computers contained unencrypted private data relating to approximately four million Advocate patients. Six of those patients brought a putative class action alleging that Advocate did too little to safeguard their information, asserting claims for willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. The district court dismissed the FCRA claims for failure to state a claim. It also found that four of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their injuries were too speculative; the thieves had stolen their information but had not yet misused it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Using information internally does not count as “furnishing … to third parties,” so the Act’s reasonable‐procedures provision did not apply, and the FCRA claims were properly dismissed. View "Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court awarded a fee of $28,030.33 to the bankruptcy trustee, Lanser, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The district court affirmed, over a challenge by the debtors’ principal unsecured creditor, Mohns, which had a state court judgment of $142,899 against the debtors for construction of a house. The bankruptcy proceeding lasted for more than four years; the trustee collected $498,621.56 to distribute to Mohns and the debtors’ other creditors. The amount awarded the trustee was just under the maximum amount allowable; as the result of a mistake in his fee application he had asked for slightly less than the maximum allowable amount, 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(7). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although $370,996.54 went to mortgagees of the debtors’ home, which the trustee had sold to raise money for the creditors, administration of an estate with such secured claims frequently presents complex issues for the trustee. View "Mohns, Inc. v. Bruce Lanser" on Justia Law

The IRS assessed deficiencies against Williams in connection with his income tax for 1996-2005, totaling, with interest and penalties, about $1.3 million. He did not pay. The IRS filed tax liens in Clark County, Indiana, where Williams and his wife Leslie jointly own land. The state and county also filed liens. The district court entered an order that specifies how much Williams owes to each of the three taxing bodies, orders the property to be sold and the net receipts applied to these debts, and details how the money will be divided among the United States, the state, the county, and Leslie. The order states that it is the court’s final decision; the Williamses appealed. The mortgage lender argued that foreclosure governed by Illinois law is not final, and not appealable, because the amount of a deficiency judgment depends on the reasonableness of the sale price, and the validity of the sale itself is contestable to determine whether the outcome is equitable. Illinois provides debtors with multiple opportunities to redeem before a transfer takes effect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The foreclosure sale is governed by 26 U.S.C. 7403(c), which does not provide for deficiency judgments and does not give the taxpayer a right of redemption. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, the EPA sets the maximum permissible atmospheric concentrations for harmful air pollutants, including ozone and classifies geographic areas as “attainment” or “nonattainment.” Each state drafts a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for each pollutant, identifying how it seeks to achieve or maintain attainment. SIPS and their revisions must be approved by EPA. If an area is in nonattainment for ozone, the SIP must include an automobile emissions testing program that meets certain performance standards. Illinois previously tested emissions of vehicles from all model years; that program was included in its SIP. Illinois exempted pre-1996 model-year vehicles that met certain standards, effective in 2007, but did not seek EPA approval until 2012. Indiana objected to the proposed change. EPA approved Illinois’s SIP revision in 2014. Indiana sought review, arguing that the change will decrease the likelihood that the “Chicago area,” which includes two Indiana counties, will achieve attainment with regard to ozone in the near future. Indiana provided analysis, indicating that Illinois’s (unauthorized) relaxation of testing procedures after 2007 caused a Chicago-area violation of the national ozone standard in 2011. The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana had standing, but that EPA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the SIP revision. View "Indiana v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area, containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed, as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs received citations for violating this ordinance and alleged that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance in 2014, but granted rehearing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Reed v. Gilbert, and reversed. The majority in Reed stated: “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” and “a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” The Seventh Circuit opined that the majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation. View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law