Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wright retired after working 1982-2007 as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services after the Department ordered her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. The order was a response to an incident in which Wright’s comments to a child apparently caused an outbreak of violence at a unit in a psychiatric facility for children. Wright filed suit alleging, that the Department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), by causing her constructive discharge. A jury found in favor of Wright on the ADA claim but awarded no compensatory damages. The district court granted the Department’s motion for a new trial. During the second trial, the court granted the department judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Wright had failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wright did not establish that the Department’s conduct communicated that her termination was imminent. View "Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Based on his forcible rape of a 15-year-old, Rengifo was convicted of three counts of first-degree child sexual abuse while armed and one count of second-degree child sexual abuse while armed. After exhausting state remedies, he brought a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied the petition and did not address the matter of a certificate of appealability. Rengifo filed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. For purposes of habeas corpus relief, Rengifo’s petition must be deemed as seeking relief from a detention “aris[ing] out of process issued by a State court,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability is therefore required before he can pursue an appeal, but a certificate of appealability cannot be granted. Because the legislature defined the unit of punishment as each act of child sexual abuse, Rengifo did not suffer multiple punishments for the same crime, so his sentences did not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause and he raised no substantial constitutional question that could serve as a predicate for a certificate of appealability. View "Sanchez-Rengifo v. J. Caraway" on Justia Law

While working as an employee of a contractor at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Rebecca Riker engaged in a romantic relationship with inmate Vest. When the relationship became known, her employment ended. She later requested to be allowed to visit Vest. Prison officials denied those requests because the institution’s policy prohibits visitation by former employees. Riker and Vest later submitted an application to marry, which prison officials also denied, because Riker was not on the visitors list. Riker filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that prohibiting Riker from visiting Vest was reasonable and that this restriction did not unconstitutionally burden her right to marry. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that, based on the summary judgment record, the defendants failed to adequately justify refusal to permit the marriage. Acknowledging defendants’ arguments that a former employee who previously violated Department policies is more likely to engage in other prohibited acts and that a former employee might share with an inmate confidential information obtained while employed at the prison, the court stated that nothing in the record supported equating general visitation with a single marriage ceremony. View "Riker v. Lemmon" on Justia Law

After a night of heavy drinking, Lauren Spierer, a 20-year-old Indiana University student, left the apartment of a classmate and disappeared. Four years later, she remains missing. Lauren’s parents sued three students who were with Lauren before her disappearance, alleging negligence and violations of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act. After some claims were dismissed but before discovery was conducted, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could only speculate about whether the defendants were the proximate cause of any injury sustained. The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed. Despite Lauren’s visible intoxication, the facts do not establish that defendants had the right or ability to control her movement to such degree as to force her to remain in a certain place. Although each defendant tried to assist Lauren in some way, that assistance did not create a legal duty to care for Lauren. View "Spierer v. Rossman" on Justia Law

Boyd was arrested and released from jail pursuant to a bond agreement, subject to bond conditions, including that he not engage in any criminal activity. While on release, Boyd was arrested and charged in Wisconsin state court with 10 counts, including three counts of armed robbery with the threat of force; being a felon in possession of a firearm; possessing a short-barreled shotgun; taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent by the use of a dangerous weapon; battery; unlawfully and intentionally pointing a firearm at another person; operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent; and resisting or obstructing a law enforcement officer. The state charged Boyd in the same proceeding with 10 counts of bail jumping: it charged one bail-jumping count for each of the underlying substantive offenses that Boyd allegedly committed while on bond. A jury convicted Boyd on all 20 counts. He was sentenced to over 40 years’ imprisonment. After he exhausted state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas relief, in which he contended that he was being punished for both bail jumping and the substantive offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Boyd v. Boughton" on Justia Law

In 2004, Seneca and Tari Adams endured vicious beatings by Chicago police officers and prolonged detentions. Along with their sister, Sicara, they sued the city and the officers. The city admitted its liability to all three plaintiffs for false arrest, excessive force, and race discrimination; it also stipulated that it was liable to Seneca and Tari for malicious prosecution in violation of state law. The jury returned awards of $2.4 million to Seneca, $1 million to Tari, and $300,000 to Sicara. The district court entered an order reducing those amounts to $1.17 million for Seneca, $350,000 for Tari, and $125,000 for Sicara The court did not give the plaintiffs the option of a new trial in lieu of accepting the lower amount. Seneca and Tari appealed. The Seventh Circuit vacated for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice: he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or he may opt for a new trial. These plaintiffs never agreed to the reduction in their award and were never offered the option of a new trial; they were entitled to appeal. View "Adams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Miller began work as a technician at Polaris Laboratories in Indianapolis in 2009. About eight months later, Miller was fired for repeated failures to meet an average daily quota of 260 samples processed per day. Miller, who is African‐American, asserts that during her employment at Polaris she suffered from racial discrimination that had an effect on her work performance. Miller had complained to supervisors that she had been called “the colored girl’ and about other derogatory remarks. At one point, a supervisor refused to train or even talk to Miller. There was evidence that Miller was given more challenging work than others. She sued Polaris, contending that it violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted Polaris summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Miller established genuine issues of material fact on discrimination and retaliation claims. View "Miller v. Polaris Labs., LLC" on Justia Law

In both cases, consolidated on appeal, family members called police officers to their home because a family member had locked himself in a room of his home and was threatening suicide. The officers responded to the distress call, but in both cases the situation ended with the person’s death as a result of shots fired by the officers. On behalf of the deceased person, the plaintiffs in each case brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they effected the seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity in one case and affirmed denial of the same motion in the other. Officers responding to a scene in which a suicidal person is locked in a room are faced with the difficult determination as to whether delay in responding will allow the person to further harm himself or to become aggressive toward others. It is clearly established, however, that officers cannot resort as an initial matter to lethal force on a person who is merely passively resisting and has not presented any threat of harm to others. View "Brown v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Jackson was serving an 18-month sentence in Illinois when he was extradited to Wisconsin to face charges of identity theft. In Wisconsin, Jackson sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging the extradition. Jackson’s petition argued that Wisconsin lacked authority to prosecute him because the extradition was invalid, in that he was transferred to Wisconsin before a scheduled hearing in Illinois on the validity of the warrant, in violation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which both Illinois and Wisconsin have adopted. The district court denied Jackson’s petition, finding that he had not shown any “special circumstances” necessitating relief before exhausting state remedies. The court noted that Jackson had been convicted on the Wisconsin charges, was currently serving a sentence there, and could pursue his claims on appeal or in a post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. Jackson was no longer a pre-trial detainee when the district court ruled on the merits of his petition, so relief under section 2241 was no longer available to him. View "Jackson v. Clements" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s hearsay statement; and that his waiver of counsel and choice to represent himself at the sentencing phase of his trial were not knowing and voluntary. The hearsay evidence was not sufficiently reliable to require Indiana courts to disregard long-established rules against using ex parte witness interviews as substantive evidence at trial. His able trial counsel tried hard to have the statement admitted; they were not successful but also were not constitutionally ineffective. As for the waiver of counsel claim, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim in a careful discussion tailored to the facts of this case. Its rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law