Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in 2015
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Defendant was found guilty of multiple counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and sentenced to 70 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the judge did not address one of his arguments for a lighter sentence—that after committing the fraud he landed an honest job and performed it in exemplary fashion, demonstrating that he has been rehabilitated. The court noted that, had the claims of Medicare reimbursement been paid in full, the government would have been out almost $3.5 million between 2006 and 2011; the government paid the fraudulent enterprise only $1.5 million. The judge correctly calculated a guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, and the sentence she imposed was at the bottom of the range. The judge questioned defendant about his rehabilitation claim and unquestionably was aware of it, but the argument bordered on the frivolous and the sentencing judge is not to be faulted for failing to explain why it was not a compelling reason for going below the bottom of the guidelines range. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Mitchell, physically a man, psychologically a woman, sought to compel her probation officers to alter conditions of her probation, by allowing her to reside with her family rather than in the men’s homeless shelter, allowing her to dress as a woman, and referring her to treatment programs for her gender dysphoria. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on grounds that she hadn’t complied with rules governing injunctive relief, that the requested injunctive relief was unrelated to the merits of her claims against prison doctors (the only claims that had survived screening of her complaint), and that she had failed to demonstrate either that she was likely to prevail on the underlying claims or would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. While the appeal was pending, Mitchell was returned to custody, after pleading guilty to theft, prostitution, and resisting an officer. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal of denial of an injunction as moot. Mitchell still has claims pending against the doctors, unaffected by the denial of the preliminary injunction, and should she be released from jail during the litigation and again placed on probation she can renew her objections to the terms of her probation. View "Mitchell v. Wall" on Justia Law

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Lawyer Spicer represented plaintiff Egan in a case that alleged sex discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment. The complaint included allegations that Egan, at her deposition, emphatically denied. Spicer conceded that the allegations in the paragraph were false and claimed “proofreading error.” The case was ultimately dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district judge imposed a $5,000 sanction on Spicer for “bad faith” misconduct/ The Seventh Circuit affirmed, calling Spicer’s excuses “pathetic” and noting that it took six months for Spicer to correct the complaint. View "Egan v. Pineda" on Justia Law

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Vivas-Ceja, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. on three occasions. In 2013, he was arrested at an airport in Madison, Wisconsin, for illegally reentering the country. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The maximum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony can be up to 20 years. The definition of “aggravated felony” is supplied by the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which includes “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The district court concluded that Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin conviction for fleeing an officer was a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 21 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding section 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” unconstitutionally vague in light of the 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. In Johnson the Supreme Court found the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause. View "United States v. Vivas-Ceja" on Justia Law

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Mother and father, Mexican citizens, dated in 2001-2002. In 2002, mother gave birth to a child, D.S., in Mexico. Although mother has had physical custody of D.S., father played an active part in the child’s life. In 2013, mother and D.S. moved to Chicago. Father sought D.S.’s return to Mexico under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, to which Mexico and the U.S. are parties (International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. 9001). Once the child is in a participating country, local courts are empowered to resolve any questions about custody, support, or other family law matters. The Seventh Circuit held that the Hague Convention is no exception to the general rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, that an issue about foreign law is a question of law, not fact, for purposes of litigation in federal court and that father had the necessary custodial right over D.S. at the time when mother refused to permit his return to Mexico. Because D.S.’s habitual residence is Mexico, mother’s retention of D.S. is wrongful under the Convention. The district court had adequate reason to refuse to defer to D.S.’s indications that he prefers to stay in the U.S. View "Salazar-Garcia v. Galvan-Pinelo" on Justia Law

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Alliance for Water Efficiency engaged Fryer to analyze how water agencies’ programs affect elasticity of water demand during droughts. Fryer prepared a draft report. Alliance was dissatisfied, and sued to prevent Fryer from publishing the report. The California Department of Water Resources, a project sponsor, wanted to present his findings under its auspices. After negotiations, Fryer promised to remove Alliance’s name from his report, issue it under California’s sponsorship, and provide his data to Alliance, which would issue a separate report. After a magistrate concluded that a binding settlement had been reached, acrimony resumed. Complete written agreement was never reached. Alliance protested when Fryer circulated a new draft report that identified, as providers of data and assistance, some organizations that had participated through a committee that Alliance had organized. Fryer claimed that the organizations wish to be identified and that a consultant is entitled to name sponsors and collaborators. The magistrate concluded that Fryer must remove any reference to entities that worked with him through or in connection with Alliance, unless those entities take the initiative to contact him and say that he can mention their names. Fryer challenged the order as a prior restraint, violating the First Amendment. Declining to address the constitutional issue, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction as going beyond what the parties agreed. View "Alliance for Water Efficiency v. Fryer" on Justia Law

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Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by Cook County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC) in 2005 as an Administrative Assistant-Hearing Officer, inputting data and creating reports, and serving as a hearing officer for juvenile detainee grievances. In 2009, Carothers had a physical altercation with a detainee during a riot. Carothers injured her hands, went on a leave of absence, and obtained a worker’s compensation settlement. HR acknowledged that Carothers had been released to return with a restriction precluding her from interacting with the detainees, which her job required, and suggested that Carothers review available positions. Carothers replied that she could not find a position that accommodated her restriction. HR replied that she should apply for disability benefits. In March, 2010, Carothers returned to her job. She had to be taken from work in an ambulance following Physical Restraint Techniques training and Deescalation training. In 2011, HR submitted a “Disciplinary Recommendation” because Carothers refused to file for disability and could not obtain a release to return to full duty. A Hearing Officer recommended discharge due to more than 10 unauthorized absences, and failure to follow instructions. The JDC discharged Carothers, who sued, alleging that she had developed an anxiety disorder and that termination constituted discrimination on account of disability, race, and sex, and retaliation for her EEOC claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Carothers v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

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In 2007 Garner was convicted of federal gun and drug crimes and sentenced to 322 months’ imprisonment. Garner appealed, but counsel filed a no-merit “Anders” brief; the Seventh Circuit dismissed. A year later, Garner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2013, new counsel amended the motion, arguing: enhancement of his sentence using a state conviction that was later vacated violated Garner’s due process rights, and his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to evidence that came directly from plea negotiations. The court granted Garner’s motion, finding merit in his first argument and vacating the sentence. Garner filed a pro se notice of appeal, relating to the effectiveness of counsel issue. In the meantime, the district court held the resentencing hearing and reduced Garner’s sentence to 248 months. Garner did not file timely notice of appeal from that judgment, but appealed from the new criminal judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his original appeal, stating that the fact that the court accepted one reason for its outcome and rejected another is of no importance. The court vacated the resentencing, however, and remanded for full resentencing, at which both sides will be free to present all their arguments, including those related to ineffective assistance. View "Garner v. United" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board found that Big Ridge violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158, by threatening employees with mine closure and job loss based on their support of the union and discharging employee Waller because of his union support. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, finding that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the Board’s five members were improperly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In 2014, a validly constituted Board considered the case anew and again found that Big Ridge violated the Act. The Seventh Circuit denied Big Ridge’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order, holding hold that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the case anew with a properly constituted Board. The Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in Waller’s discharge; Big Ridge has not met its burden to show that it would have discharged Waller despite his union activities. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Big Ridge, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 1956, Ephrem, a Catholic nun, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Devotions to Our Lady of America was launched. Ephrem joined a cloistered house, approved by the Pope. Fuller entered the cloister in 1965. In 1979 its three members (including Fuller and Ephrem) formed a new congregation. In 1993 Ephrem founded Our Lady of America Center. Upon her death in 2000, she was succeeded by Fuller and willed her property to Fuller. Most had been created by Ephrem or donated to the cloister or the Center. Fuller registered trademarks for artifacts, including Ephrem’s diary, medallions, and statues. In 2005 McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp, “a Papal Knight,” began helping Fuller promote devotions to Our Lady. Fuller gave them a statue and other artifacts. In 2007, the three had a disagreement that resulted in this lawsuit. The men claim to be the authentic promoters of devotions to Our Lady and the lawful owners of the artifacts. Another layman, Hartman, began a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and Langsenkamp’s reputations. Fuller is no longer a nun. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McCarthy and Langsenkamp. The Seventh Circuit affirmed awards: $150,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages (against Hartman only), plus $295,000 in attorney’s fees and sanctions and $281,000 in costs, to be paid by Fuller, Hartman, and their lawyer. The court vacated an injunction concerning the defamation. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law