Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Tawuo was born in Cameroon in 1986. He entered the U.S. in 2009 with a nonimmigrant student visa to attend school in New York. He registered, but did not attend for long. Tawuo moved to Illinois, and in 2010 applied for asylum and withholding of removal, stating that he feared harm or mistreatment if he were to return. Tawuo’s affidavit described being “arrested, detained and tortured due to my activities with the Association for the Defense of the Rights of University Students in Cameroon (ADDEC).” CIS deemed Tawuo’s application not credible, citing material inconsistencies between his affidavit and other evidence as well as “material implausibility.” At a hearing before an IJ, he submitted an affidavit that was significantly more detailed than his first submission. Tawuo testified extensively about his life in Cameroon, his participation in ADDEC, and his subsequent persecution by police. The judge concluded that Tawuo was not credible and had not produced any other evidence sufficient to corroborate his account. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for reviw. The judge’s finding that Tawuo’s testimony and affidavits were not credible was based upon a detailed analysis of the record. View "Tawuo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Castro-Cortes was working for Astro, a subcontractor of JRJ, when he fell through a hole on the jRJ property. He sued JRJ for personal injury in Illinois state court. After being served in that suit, JRJ’s two members, Panfil and Michelon, filed a report with Nautilus under a general commercial liability policy. Nautilus refused to defend, citing three grounds: that the underlying lawsuit was against JRJ, but the named insureds were Panfil and Michelon; the “Contractor-Subcontracted Work Endorsement;” and the “Employee Exclusion.” The JRJ parties filed a federal suit for breach of contract. On summary judgment, the district court determined that Nautilus breached its duty to defend because there was at least the potential for coverage of the underlying lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it is a close case and that the bar to finding a duty to defend is low. The court construed the language of the exclusions in favor of JRJ, noting that the burden of proving that a claim falls within an exclusion rests on the insurer. View "Panfil v. Nautilus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

While he was an inmate, the Pontiac Illinois prison refused to equip Plaintiff with gloves and a hat when he exercised in the prison yard in cold winter weather. His indoor cell was too small for the exercise he needed to prevent his back muscles from atrophying because of arthritis. The refusal was pursuant to a policy that the prison justified on the ground that offenders have placed feces inside gloves and hats and swung them at staff members or offenders from a distance, and have used them to hide dangerous contraband. Plaintiff in discovery requested incident reports to support the justification but was told that the database is searchable only by date of report, so the demand was too burdensome. The district judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it is difficult to believe that Pontiac prison has no searchable records of inmates’ assaults on guards and that the defendants should at least be required to present testimony documenting the use of gloves and hats as weapons, but that the suit fails for failure to allege indifference to his need for those items. The court noted that prison personnel had very limited knowledge of Plaintiff’s problem. View "Diaz v. Davidson" on Justia Law

When Meza-Rodriguez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in August 2013, he was carrying a .22 caliber cartridge and did not have documentation showing that he is lawfully in the United States, which made his possession of the cartridge a crime under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Meza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that section 922(g)(5) impermissibly infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion on the broad ground that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized aliens. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower court’s rationale swept too far, but that the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by section 922(g)(5). View "United States v. Meza-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to a drug offense in 2001, Ford was sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by supervised release. While on supervised release, he committed an act of prostitution and other violations of the conditions of release, and, in 2013, he was sentenced to new terms of imprisonment and supervised release. In 2014 Ford allegedly committed a substantial battery while serving his second term of supervised release. After holding a revocation hearing, the district court found that Ford had committed the battery and had again violated the conditions of his supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) and the Due Process Clause by allowing the government to introduce statements by a witness, as contained in the police report; that 18 U.S.C. 583(e)(3) and (h) dictate that his statutory maximum sentence is one year, so that his 36- month sentence exceeded the maximum; and that the district court committed procedural error by not adequately examining the relevant factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) at sentencing. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

Watts brought a federal civil rights suit against a police officer whom Watts accused of having broken his arm while arresting him. When the judge announced the verdict, in favor of the officer, Watts stood up, picked up the 44 lb. chair that he’d been sitting on, and swinging it in a 180 degree arc to gain momentum hurled it at the officer, who was sitting only two or three feet away. The chair struck the officer on his head, face, left arm, left shoulder, and back, injuring him. Pandemonium broke out in the courtroom, all recorded on video. Watts shouted “Now we’re even.” Watts was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3). He was sentenced to five years in prison (half the statutory maximum). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, calling Watts a “dangerous person, a dangerous example of a holder of grudges against the police, a person with no regard for the decorum of the courtroom or for the law itself, a scofflaw, a violent person.” The court rejected challenges to the jury instructions and to the sentence. View "United States v. Watts" on Justia Law

In 2010, Southwest Airlines stopped honoring certain in-flight drink vouchers issued to customers who had bought “Business Select” fares. Customers filed suit, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement to provide replacement drink vouchers to all class members, and injunctive relief constraining how Southwest could issue future vouchers. The parties negotiated an agreement on fees for class counsel. The court certified the class and approved the settlement’s class relief components, but awarded counsel a smaller fee than requested. Two class members objected, arguing that the settlement was unfair to the class because it was too generous to class counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The “coupon settlement” provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712, allowed the court to award attorney fees based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed coupons. While the fee aspects of the settlement include troublesome features, the settlement provides class members essentially complete relief. The financial and professional relationship between lead class counsel and one lead plaintiff created a potential conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, but another lead plaintiff had no conflict and the class received essentially complete relief, so there was no basis for decertification or rejecting the settlement. The court instead removed that plaintiff’s $15,000 incentive award and reduced the lawyer’s fee. View "Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Rowe was diagnosed with reflux esophagitis, (GERD), which may cause esophageal bleeding and can increase the risk of esophageal cancer. The prison physician told him to take Zantac pills. Rowe was permitted to keep Zantac in his cell and take pills when he felt the need, until his pills were confiscated and he was told that he would be allowed to take a Zantac only when a nurse gave it to him or buy it at the commissary. He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. No reason was articulated for forbidding him to keep Zantac given him by prison staff while permitting him to keep Zantac that he bought at the commissary. Zantac is not a narcotic. Rowe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. After he filed suit, he ceased receiving Zantac because his authorization to receive over-the-counter Zantac free of charge lapsed. He was told to purchase the drug from the commissary if he wanted it. Rowe claims he could not afford to buy it. A doctor opined that his condition didn’t require Zantac. The doctor later relented. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, noting contradictory evidence and that the claim is “far from frivolous.” The court urged the court to consider appointing a neutral expert. View "Rowe v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In 1988 Jones pled guilty to three counts of attempted sexual battery (the victim was a child) and was sentenced to 12 years in prison plus 10 years of probation. Jones was released from prison in 1994, with a lifelong obligation under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16913 and 16915. His probation conditions required him to undergo sex-offender treatment. Jones began the program, but was terminated in 1996 for refusal to participate. He was subsequently convicted of trespass, destruction of property, unauthorized use of an automobile, and domestic battery. He did not report his arrest to his probation officer—another probation violation. In 2000 he was released from prison again. In 2001 Jones was convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. He was later convicted of: driving with a suspended license, threatening another person, failure to pay child support, failure to appear in court, and the assault and battery of a coworker. In 2010, Jones stopped registering as a sex offender. He was arrested in 2013. Jones was sentenced to 18 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the court ignored his arguments in mitigation and imposed unwarranted conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law