Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate at Stateville prison in Illinois, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the prison’s medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of 11 blood tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from prediabetic to diabetic during the period. He alleges that not until the last of these tests, late in 2010, did he learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred. We need to distinguish between two types of glucose blood test—fasting and random. The Seventh Circuit reversed. For the medical staff of a prison to know that an inmate is diabetic or prediabetic, yet not tell him, let alone do nothing to treat his condition, is to be deliberately indifferent. The defendant now knows that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, but plaintiff may not have known of the cause of his distressing symptoms until November 2010, and the two-year statute of limitations would have been tolled during the interval between that discovery and his filing suit because he was exhausting prison administrative remedies. View "Nally v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

D. Stahl claimed she was the victim of vicious, physical bullying by fellow East Porter students. D. complained to school officials. Apart from witnessing the counselor talk to one alleged bully and seeing the principal call another to her office, D. does not know if officials took any action. D. alleges that some teachers and coaches participated or were complicit in the bullying. Eighth Grade girls, preparing to play basketball, taunted D. D’s mother, Debbie came to the school and yelled at the alleged bullies. D.’s father, George, arrived and confronted the principal. Leaving the gym, George and his father confronted alleged bullies. The girls yelled that the men had attacked them. The principal called the police, who did not issue a citation. Superintendent Gardin stated that Debbie and George were banned from East Porter property until they met with him. The Stahls never arranged a meeting. D voluntarily did not return. The Stahls contacted a neighboring school district. George testified that he was advised that the school had “open enrollment." George told the principal about the ban. That evening, the principal informed them that D. would not be permitted to enroll.The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the Stahls’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no genuine issue of material fact under the state-created danger standard. D. did not identify any similarly situated individuals who were treated differently with regard to her attempt to transfer schools. View "D. S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp" on Justia Law

Child Craft manufactured furniture. Bienias owns Summit. The parties had a long-standing business relationship. Child Craft contracted with Summit to supply raw wood for a planned line of high-end baby furniture, the “Vogue Line.” Summit sourced the goods from an Indonesian manufacturer, Cita. At Bienias’s request, Child Craft did not have direct contact with Cita. In 2008-2009 Child Craft issued purchase orders to Summit, worth about $90,000. Each included detailed specifications, including that the moisture content of the wood needed to be between 6% and 8%. The goods never conformed to its specifications, in spite of Bienias’s assurances that they would. Child Craft identified the goods as defective upon receipt and refused to pay for shipments. It spent considerable time trying to re-work the products. Child Craft was never able to sell the Vogue Line and ceased operations in 2009. Summit sued for breach of contract and conversion based on refusal to pay. Child Craft counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, seeking to $5 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages of $5 million. Only Child Craft’s counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation against Bienias personally was tried. A judge awarded $2.7 million, against Bienias and Summit. The Seventh Circuit reversed the award. Under Indiana law, a buyer who has received non-conforming goods cannot sue a seller for negligent misrepresentation to avoid the economic loss doctrine, which limits the buyer to contract remedies for purely economic loss. There is no basis for transforming the breach of contract claim into a tort claim to hold the seller’s president personally liable. View "JMB Mfg., Inc. v. Harrison Mfg., LLC." on Justia Law

Before Judge Gettleman. Maday pleaded guilty to three 2008 bank robberies. Before sentencing he escaped while being transported to face sentencing for state crimes. He then committed bank robbery, escape from federal custody, carjacking, and using or carrying a gun in connection with the other offenses. He was prosecuted in state court for the carjackings and in federal court (Judge Castillo) for the federal crimes. A state judge sentenced him to 13 years’ imprisonment for the 2008 crimes. In 2010 he pleaded guilty in state court to the carjackings and was given a consecutive prison sentence of 30 years. In 2013 Judge Gettleman sentenced him to 30 years for the 2008 bank robberies, consecutive to Maday’s 30-year state sentence but concurrent with his 13-year state sentence. Judge Castillo later imposed sentence, classifying Maday an “armed career criminal.” Maday’s statutory minimum in that case totaled 47 years. The judge made the sentence concurrent with Maday’s state sentence, and the 15-year ACCA component concurrent with the other counts and with Judge Gettleman’s 30-year sentence, resulting in an aggregate 62-year federal sentence. The Seventh Circuit found the appeal from Judge Castillo’s sentence frivolous, and allowed Maday’s lawyer to withdraw. The other appeal was not frivolous, given incomplete discussion of statutory sentencing factors, and the withdrawal motion of Maday‘s lawyer in that appeal was denied. One judge should have been assigned both cases, to defer sentencing until guilt in each had been determined. View "United States v. Maday" on Justia Law

Zuniga entered the U.S. unlawfully from Mexico in 1989. In 1991, he was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Zuniga, 30 years old, was in a consensual relationship with a 15-year-old girl. Illinois law criminalizes “sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age [if] the person is at least 5 years older than the victim.” He and the girl maintained their relationship and had four children together. After his conviction, Zuniga was deported. He returned, again unlawfully, and remained, without incident until 2007, when he was arrested following an altercation with his eldest child. In 2013, Zuniga pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). According to the plea agreement, Zuniga would receive two criminal-history points and a 16-level upward adjustment because he was previously deported after a “crime of violence” and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a guidelines range of 41 to 51 months, the court sentenced him to 41 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the categorical approach requires a narrower understanding of the generic definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape,” two crimes of violence enumerated under the guidelines, and that the 16-level increase overstated the seriousness of the conviction. View "United States v. Zuniga-Galeana" on Justia Law

Bebo is the respondent in an administrative enforcement proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, alleging that she violated federal law by manipulating internal books and records, making false representations to auditors, and making false disclosures to the SEC. Rather than wait for a final decision in the administrative enforcement proceeding, Bebo filed suit in federal court challenging on constitutional grounds the authority of the SEC to conduct the proceeding. She invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the administrative review scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrative law judge assigned to the case is expected to issue an initial decision within the coming months. If the decision is adverse to Bebo, she will have the right to file a petition for review with the SEC. The SEC will then have the power either to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the agency or to grant the petition and conduct de novo review. If the SEC’s final decision is adverse, Bebo will then have the right under 15 U.S.C. 78y(a)(1) to seek judicial review and will be able to raise her constitutional claims. View "Bebo v. Sec. Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

Schwartz was hired as an executive of Barclays, which lent him $400,000 and promised to forgive the loan in equal installments on the first through seventh anniversaries of his start date. Before the second anniversary, the company fired him, which made the unforgiven principal immediately due. Schwartz refused to pay. An arbitrator sided with Barclays and ordered Schwartz to pay $568,568, which included attorneys’ fees plus interest. In response, Schwartz petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Between the announcement of the arbitration award and the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Schwartzes spent thousands of dollars on inessential consumer goods and services, including tickets to Disney World, private school tuition, and a monthly payment for a Range Rover. Learning of these expenditures, Barclays, the Schwartzes’ principal creditor and the only active opponent of granting a discharge, moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the petition under 11 U.S.C. 707(a), “for cause.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that “for cause” embraces conduct that, while not a violation of required procedures, avoids repayment of debt without an adequate reason. The Schwartzes failed to pay as much of their indebtedness as they could without hardship. View "Schwartz v. Barclays Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Preddie worked as a fifth-grade teacher in the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation during the 2010–2011 school year. After Preddie was absent 23 times, the BCSC did not renew his contract. Preddie, an African-American, is diabetic, and his son suffers from sickle cell anemia. Preddie filed suit, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1991. The case district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BCSC on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except as to Preddie’s FMLA claims. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Yang pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that Yang had three felony convictions that could be classified as violent under the Armed Career Criminal Act and imposed the resulting mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the state court document recording one of the convictions did not clearly identify the statute of conviction and that the district court was not permitted to look beyond the face of the document to identify the statute of conviction to impose the heavier ACCA sentence. The conviction in question was for felony domestic assault under Minnesota Statute 609.224(4), which is a violent felony under ACCA. The district court could consult the relevant sentencing and plea transcripts to identify the statute of conviction without running afoul of ACCA or the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting it. View "United States v. Yang" on Justia Law

From 2004-2007, CUNA purchased residential mortgage-backed securities from RBS. The housing market crashed and the securities declined in value. CUNA commissioned a forensic study of the loan pools underlying the securities and found that 40.8 percent of the loans were materially defective: “they violated applicable underwriting guidelines in a manner that materially increased the credit risk of the loan and that was not justified by sufficient compensating factors.” CUNA alleged that RBS induced it to purchase the securities by materially misrepresenting that the underlying loans complied with underwriting guidelines by repeatedly assuring CUNA that extensive due diligence was conducted on the loan pools and that the relevant prospectuses represented that the loans complied with guidelines related to borrower ability to pay and sufficiency of collateral. The court granted summary judgment in RBS’s favor on all but one of CUNA’s rescission claims, finding claims with regard to nine of the securities time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, finding that rescission claims were not time-barred. A reasonable factfinder could find that CUNA actually relied on the prospectuses' representations and that the representations were material. CUNA was entitled to a trial on the claims and with respect to the claims of due diligence. View "CMFG Life Ins. Co. v. RBS Sec., Inc." on Justia Law