Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Textron began operations at its fastener manufacturing plant in Rochester, Indiana, in 1954; it remained in operation through 2006. The plant released vinyl chloride, a toxic gas, which eventually seeped into the groundwater, contaminating nearby residential wells. One of those wells belonged to the Woods. Both Textron and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management performed testing on the Woods’ well. The family left immediately. While living at the Rochester house, their adopted children, C.W. and E.W., experienced gastrointestinal issues (vomiting, bloody stools), immunological issues, and neurological issues. Both children were younger than two years old when the family left the house; their health improved after leaving. The parents sued on behalf of their children, alleging negligence, negligence per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and willful and wanton misconduct. The court excluded their three expert witnesses, finding they did not use reliable bases to support their opinions, and granted Textron summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly applied the Daubert framework to the experts and, without the experts, the plaintiffs could not prove causation. View "C.W. & E.W. v. Textron, Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick discovered a Medicaid fraud scheme in which the government paid more than $75 million in phony billings. Patrick and an associate filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act against Kyphon, alleging that the company induced hospitals to file claims for Medicare reimbursement “for unnecessary inpatient hospital stays.” The United States intervened and settled the case. For his role in initiating the suit Patrick received a relator’s share of the government’s recovery, totaling $5.9 million. Patrick also received $900,000 from the settlement of related qui tam actions against hospitals that overbillled Medicare. Patrick filed tax returns for 2008 and 2009 reporting his share of the qui tam recoveries as capital gains. The IRS issued deficiency notices, notifying Patrick that the relator’s shares must be reported as ordinary income. The Tax Court upheld that determination. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the relator’s share of a qui tam recovery is not the result of a “gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.” Patrick’s relator’s shares are a reward for filing the suit against Kyphon and the hospitals and must be treated as ordinary income. View "Patrick v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Pendell claimed that a city inspector illegally entered her yard, used information from that unauthorized inspection to swear out an affidavit, and obtained an administrative search warrant. City employees then removed litter and inoperable vehicles and razed her yard with a bulldozer. Pendell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but made little progress with her suit. Her deposition was set for December 2013, but Pendell never appeared. She claimed to have had a stroke, but provided no evidence. The court denied a motion to dismiss, but ordered Pendell to appear for deposition before March 14, 2014, and warned that he would dismiss her case if she failed to appear again. By agreement Pendell’s deposition was reset for April 17, but after 90 minutes of questioning Pendell said that her “brain was fried.” The parties agreed to adjourn and resume on May 9. She did not appear. At a conference two weeks later, the court sua sponte revived and granted the motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pendell put opposing counsel to needless expense and delayed the court’s calendar. Because she lied in asserting that she did not know about the resumed deposition, she gave the court no reason to believe that she would respect the judicial process. View "Pendell v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

Meyer, the manager of a company that acquired distressed loans guaranteed by Dvorkin, filed suit in Illinois to recover on the debt. The state court entered judgment for $8.2 million. The parties were unable to negotiate a settlement of the debt. The judgment became enforceable. Dvorkin subsequently called Bevis, who operated a firearms store, which leased space from one of Dvorkin’s companies. Bevis also worked as a private detective and process server. Dvorkin was seeking a hitman to kill Meyer. Bevis gave him a “referral” and called police, who arranged subsequent communications and meetings to gather evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dvorkin’s convictions on five counts of using, or causing another person to use, a facility of interstate commerce with the intent to commit a murder for hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958, and on one count of soliciting another to commit a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 373. The court rejected claims of insufficient evidence; that he had renounced his criminal intent with respect to his solicitation charge; that the court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Bevis; and that the court erred by allowing the government to make an improper argument during its rebuttal at closing. View "United States v. Dvorkin" on Justia Law

In 2012, Harden, a Caucasian, sued the Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African-American police officers in a race discrimination investigation. The Department claimed that he was terminated for taking money from a detainee’s wallet. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. Harden now appeals that decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence of harassment after Harden’s testimony says something about the context in which the theft investigation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an inference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory. No reasonable jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation into the theft was pretextual. View "Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

In 2008 Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. His presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender based on two convictions for assault. Despite the fact that his convictions were for “intentional, knowing, or reckless” assault, counsel did not object. The court sentenced Ramirez as a career offender, treating the Texas convictions as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Ramirez retained new counsel and moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender designation. The judge denied the motion and, because postconviction counsel failed to keep Ramirez informed about the postconviction proceedings, Ramirez did not timely request a certificate of appealability. He tried filing a late request, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He moved under FRCP 60(b)(6) for relief from the judgment. The district judge denied the motion, on the belief that there is a rigid rule under which there is no right to counsel on collateral review. The Seventh Circuit remanded. noting that the Supreme Court significantly changed its approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at initial review collateral proceedings in 2011 and 2013, so that Ramirez’s argument is cognizable under Rule 60(b), View "Ramirez v. United States" on Justia Law

Stinson spent 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. He was exonerated by DNA evidence and sued the lead detective and two forensic odontologists who investigated the murder and testified at trial. The odontologists were the key prosecution witnesses. They testified that bite marks on the victim’s body matched Stinson’s dentition. In his suit for damages, 42 U.S.C. 1983, Stinson alleged that the odontologists fabricated their opinions, the detective put them up to it, and the three suppressed evidence of the fabrication, in violation of his right to due process. The district court denied the defendants’ claim of absolute or qualified immunity from suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While absolute immunity does not apply because Stinson sued the defendants primarily for their investigative misconduct, not their testimony at trial, the defendants remain protected by qualified immunity, which is lost only if Stinson presents evidence showing that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. He did not do so. Stinson’s evidence, accepted as true, shows at most that the odontologists were negligent; it does not support his claim that they fabricated their opinions. An error in forensic analysis—even a glaring error—is not actionable as a violation of due process. View "Stinson v. Gauger" on Justia Law

Olson worked for Bemis at its Neenah, Wisconsin factory, and was a member of the Union. He was injured on the job and later fired. The Union filed a grievance on Olson’s behalf as permitted under its collective bargaining agreement. Bemis and the Union entered into a settlement under which Bemis agreed to pay Olson $20,000 in exchange for a waiver of all legal claims against the company. Olson did not accept the deal and sued Bemis and the Union, challenging his discharge and the legitimacy of the settlement. He lost on summary judgment. Olson later filed a second suit against Bemis and the Union, this time in state court, arguing that if the settlement was a valid contract, he was entitled to the $20,000 payout. The defendants removed the case. The district court held that it had federal-question jurisdiction over Olson’s state-law claims, which were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), then dismissed for failure to state any valid claim. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Olson breached the waiver-of-claims clause in the settlement agreement by filing his first suit against Bemis, so the company had no obligation to pay him. View "Olson v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Dill was placed on supervised release after serving 10 years in federal prison for bank robbery. He was twice returned to prison for multiple violations of conditions of release relating to drug testing and use and travel without permission, the latest time for 14 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district judge erred by having decided irrevocably before the revocation hearing that he would impose a new term of at least 12 months in prison—the term Dill received after the first revocation—without first considering the applicable sentencing guidelines, his arguments in mitigation, or the pertinent factors under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3) and 3553(a). The judge had obviously prepared for the decision and had some strong views at the beginning of the hearing, but did not cross the line into an irrevocable commitment such that his mind was closed to what happened in the hearing. View "United States v. Dill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff produced the motion picture The Merry Gentleman, which was released in 2009. Despite some critical acclaim, the film was a commercial flop, for which the plaintiff blames Michael Keaton, the film’s lead actor and director. It filed a breach of contract action against Keaton and Keaton’s “loan-out company” that he uses for professional contracting, alleging that Keaton failed to timely prepare the first cut of the film; submitted an incomplete first cut; submitted a revised cut that was not ready to watch; communicated directly with Sundance Film Festival and threatened to boycott the festival if it did not accept his director’s cut instead of the producers’ preferred cut; failed to cooperate with the producers during the post-production process; and failed to promote the film. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Keaton, agreeing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Keaton’s alleged breaches caused the damages sought: all $5.5 million spent producing the movie. View "Merry Gentleman, LLC v. George & Leona Prods., Inc." on Justia Law