Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

H-1B visas allow U.S. companies to hire noncitizen workers with specialized skills. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for their issuance. Rubman sent USCIS a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552) seeking “copies of all documents reflecting statistics … about H-1B visa applications” from the last four years. USCIS responded with a single document: a data table that the agency had created to respond to his request. Rubman doubted the table’s accuracy and insisted that USCIS provide the documents he originally asked for: “‘ALL documents reflecting statistics’” about H-1B visa applications, including internal statistical reports and e-mails. CIS refused, insisting that additional records would not be helpful and would “only create additional confusion.” Rubman sued. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An adequate search is one that was both performed in good faith and reasonably designed to uncover the requested records. USCIS failed to conduct an adequate search as required by law when it unilaterally narrowed Rubman’s request for “all documents” to a single, newly generated statistical table. View "Rubman v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs." on Justia Law

In 2011, the two companies signed an agreement under which Life Plans would broker and Security Life would insure life insurance policies financed through arbitrage. Four months later, Security Life terminated the agreement. Life Plans then sued for breach of contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for refusing to offer the policies. The district court granted summary judgment, reading the contract to grant Security Life the right to terminate at any time. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence presented genuine disputes of material facts. The language of the agreement was ambiguous as to whether Security Life could terminate at will during the first three years. The extrinsic evidence of meaning was in conflict, so summary judgment was not appropriate on the breach of contract claim. The facts are also disputed concerning whether Security Life’s review and approval of the product was required and whether approval was received. The implied covenant claim under Delaware law also should not have been resolved on summary judgment. A reasonable jury could find that Security Life’s conduct was arbitrary and unreasonable and had the effect of denying Life Plans the fruits of its bargain. View "Life Plans Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

Seifer was convicted of four counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of theft of government property, 18 U.S.C. 641. At Seifer’s trial the district court empaneled 13 jurors without designating the alternate, who then was chosen randomly just before deliberations. The government conceded that this method of selecting the alternate violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c), which requires that alternate jurors be selected separately and sequentially before the presentation of evidence. Seifer never objected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Seifer’s claim of prejudice speculative View "United States v. Seifer" on Justia Law

In 2005, Mutual Bank of Harvey, Illinois, made loans to the defendants, evidenced by promissory notes. As security the defendants executed mortgages. Mortgage I applies to four properties in Appleton, Menasha, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Mortgage II applies to a property in Grand Chute. Mortgage III applies to seven Milwaukee properties. The notes went into default in 2008. In 2009, regulators closed Mutual Bank. The Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation (FDIC) was appointed receiver. Ultimately UCB became the owner and holder of the notes and mortgages on the Wisconsin properties. In 2011, UCB commenced mortgage foreclosure. Defendants argued that under the Illinois “single refiling” rule, 735 ILCS 5/13-217, UCB was barred from enforcing the promissory notes underlying the mortgages since UCB had twice formerly filed an action against the defendants to recover on the notes and voluntarily dismissed each of these prior actions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that Mortgage I, was governed by Illinois law and that UCB was precluded from foreclosing on Mortgage I. The defendants did not appeal a holding that Wisconsin law applied to Mortgages II and III and that Wisconsin law permitted UCB to foreclose. View "United Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1974, Kelley robbed a sandwich shop of $28, using a gun. He was also charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. Kelley claims to have struck a deal: he would plead guilty and upon successful completion of a seven-year federal sentence, his federal conviction would be expunged under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5021(b) (repealed 1984). Kelley claims that Indiana authorities agreed to “set aside” his robbery conviction. There is no evidence of such an agreement. Kelley was paroled; his federal conviction was set aside. He never served a state sentence. Within a year, he was charged with robbery and with murder in the course of another robbery and was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment for murder. Kelley became aware that the 1975 robbery was still on his record by 1983. Released in 2000, he was convicted in 2003 of felony check fraud, and, in 2005, of felony theft. In 2011, he was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm and distribution of a controlled substance. The court enhanced the sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Kelley began attacks on the 1975 conviction, arguing that the state breached the terms of the plea agreement. Unsuccessful in Indiana courts, Kelley sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Indiana did not have an expungement statute until 2013. View "Kelley v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

In 1986, Packer, a Ph.D. in physiology, began work as a post-doctoral fellow at Indiana University’s School of Medicine. She was appointed to the tenure-track position of assistant professor in 1994. Packer’s 1999 application for tenure on the faculty was denied, but Packer successfully grieved the denial, and in 2001, was awarded tenure. Faculty members are evaluated based on teaching, research, and service. A faculty member’s overall performance is deemed satisfactory if she meets the minimum requirements in all three areas or if she is rated excellent in either teaching or research. The University represents that Packer, in the years leading up to her termination, repeatedly failed to meet expectations with respect to publication and external funding. Packer contends that her research performance is better than the University claims; that any deficiency was because the department chairman assigned her insufficient and inappropriate lab spaces and interfered with her efforts to obtain grant money; and that male faculty members whose research performance also fell short of expectations suffered no adverse consequences. In her suit, alleging sex discrimination, the University moved for summary judgment. Packer’s counsel did not properly support the elements of her claims with specific citations to admissible record evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. View "Packer v. Trs .of Ind. Univ." on Justia Law

The Hospital had to pay a Hospital Assessment Fee (HAF) as part of an Indiana program designed to increase Medicaid reimbursements to eligible hospitals. After it failed to pay its HAF, the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) began withholding Medicaid reimbursements. On June 19, 2012, the Hospital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. FSSA continued to withhold reimbursements in satisfaction of its HAF debt. The Hospital filed an adversary complaint against FSSA claiming that the HAF was a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court agreed, ruling the HAF was an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,” 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6), and was subject to the stay. FSSA was ordered to repay the full amount it had withheld. The district court reversed as to the HAF for fiscal year 2013. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the 2013 HAF, like the 2012 HAF, is a pre-petition claim subject to the automatic stay. FSSA was aware of its claims against the Hospital—for both fiscal years 2012 and 2013—well before it filed for bankruptcy View "Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Ind. Family & Soc.Servs. Admin." on Justia Law

In 1996 Gladney was convicted in Wisconsin of murdering Wilson. Wilson died of gunshot wounds, following a struggle for a gun during an argument about money. At trial, Gladney did not dispute that he intentionally killed Wilson, but he argued unsuccessfully that he should not be found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide because he acted in “imperfect self-defense,” which, unlike perfect self-defense, does not serve as a complete defense to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide but instead mitigates that charge down to second-degree intentional homicide. Over a decade later, Gladney filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his due process rights were violated because subsequent state case law cast doubt on whether he was convicted under the correct imperfect self-defense standard and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to interview a witness who would have corroborated his self-defense theory. The court concluded that the petition was untimely, noting Gladney’s 2010 discovery that his lawyer failed to interview that witness and rejecting Gladney’s theory that the statute of limitations did not apply because he had demonstrated actual innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gladney’s federal petition was filed far too late and he did not demonstrate actual innocence. View "Gladney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, federal authorities investigated a drug conspiracy headed by Freeman at the Cabrini-Green housing projects. Ultimately, 15 persons were charged, 10 pleaded guilty, and five went to trial, including Wilbourn and Sanders, who conceded that they sold drugs at Cabrini-Green but claimed to do so as small-scale, independent dealers and not as part of Freeman’s organization. The jury convicted them of multiple charges, including participation in the conspiracy. On remand, the government abandoned vacated counts. The district court sentenced Wilbourn to 184 months and Sanders to 160 months on the undisturbed counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversing denial of Sanders’ motion to suppress evidence from a car search and remanding for a new trial Sanders’ conviction under one count; vacating Wilbourn’s conviction for telephone facilitation, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), because of the failure of the underlying count, and remanded it for a new trial; and vacated Wilbourn’s sentence and remanded for new findings regarding the applicable drug quantity. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law