Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Philos Tech, an Illinois company, sent equipment to Korea for delivery to P&D in connection with an alleged joint venture between the companies. The nature and origins of the joint venture are disputed. Defendant Don-Hee Park visited Illinois twice and met with Philos. Philos Tech filed suit in Illinois in 2008, alleging that P&D, Don-Hee and Jae-Hee unlawfully converted that equipment by refusing to return it after failing to increase Philo’s shares in P&D. The parties presented the court with competing translations of the documents, all of which are in Korean. There were transfers of funds and equipment between Korea and Illinois, but the purpose and details are unclear. The district court granted Philos Tech default judgment and awarded damages. After Philos Tech attempted to enforce this judgment in Korea, Defendants moved to vacate the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(4), asserting that the Illinois court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the request was untimely, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Following a remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and denial of Philos Tech’s motion asking the court to vacate its judgment on account of the Parks’ alleged fraud. View "Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1995, Evans, then nine months pregnant, was fatally shot and stabbed in her Addison, Illinois apartment. The assailants cut open her womb and removed the unborn baby, Elijah. Debra had three older children— Samantha (10), Joshua (7), and Jordan (2). Samantha was killed. Elijah and Joshua were taken. Two-year-old Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sister. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an alley. Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend, Ward, who was the father of Jordan and Elijah; Ward’s cousin, Williams; and her boyfriend, Caffey. Each was tried separately. Caffey received a sentence of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive 30-year term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. In 2003, Illinois Governor Ryan commuted Caffey’s death sentence to life without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Caffey’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the court improperly excluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and Iacullo (the owner of a typewriter used to prepare a false birth certificate for Elijah) and deprived Caffey of the ability to mount an effective defense; counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and another that had been ruled admissible; and the court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements naming Caffey. View "Caffey v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 1920 Peoples Gas and Beazer’s predecessor entered into a contract, Beazer agreed to to operate a plant for coke by-products and carbureted water gas (Chicago Coke), at Crawford Station, Chicago, using its patented coke-oven technology. Peoples agreed to purchase all of the gas and coke manufactured at the plant for distribution to consumers. Chicago Coke opened in 1921. Seven years later, Peoples acquired its assets. Later, Peoples purchased Coke’s stock and took over operations until 1956. Some of the land is still owned by Peoples. Peoples worked with the U.S. EPA and the Illinois EPA to investigate environmental contamination at the Crawford site and entered into agreements with the EPA. For investigation and removal at Crawford, Peoples incurred over $70,000,000 in costs. Peoples sued Beazer to recover costs under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) and 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B). The district court dismissed in part, finding that Peoples had resolved its liability to the government via administrative settlement and, therefore, only had a claim for contribution; that each consent order was subject to the three-year limitations period under 42 U.S.C. 9613(g)(3)(B); and that a contribution claim under the 2011 consent order was barred by Beazer’s operator liability. The court denied Beazer’s motion as to claim ownership liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the 1920 agreement bars Peoples’ contribution claims against Beazer. View "Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co, v. Beazer East Inc." on Justia Law

In 1985 Edwards was convicted of cocaine distribution and sentenced to imprisonment, followed by 10 years of “special parole,” an additional penalty for drug offenses. If an individual was reimprisoned for violating special parole, when he was released he had to serve the entire original term of special parole with no credit for “street time” spent on special parole before the violation. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 eliminated special and regular parole, replacing it with supervised release. The Parole Commission still exercises jurisdiction over individuals, like Johnson, who committed a federal offense before November 1, 1987. In 2000, Edwards began special parole. In 2007, Edwards pleaded guilty to wire fraud. He completed the wire fraud prison term, but remained in prison because the Commission revoked his parole. Because he had been on special parole when he pleaded guilty, the Commission added six years to his sentence to account for the forfeited street time between his 2001 release and his 2007 conviction. He was released on in 2010 but returned to prison in 2013 for violating his wire fraud supervised release. The Commission issued a detainer pending completion of his sentence for violating the supervised release. Edwards sought to compel the Commission to terminate his parole violation status and suspend his supervision. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the Commission could not reimpose special parole following his third violation. Under former 21 U.S.C. 841(c) a revoked special parole term becomes a term of imprisonment that is followed by regular, not special parole View "Edwards v. Cross" on Justia Law

A Cook County Jail pretrial detainee was attacked and stabbed. He cried out for help but was ignored by an unidentified guard standing 10-15 feet from him. The plaintiff regained consciousness three days later in a hospital, having suffered nerve damage and a fracture of an eye socket that may eventually cause blindness. He filed suit, alleging failure to create or enforce policies necessary to protect prisoners from attacks by fellow prisoners. Defense counsel sent the plaintiff, several letters, demanding that he sign a release to permit access to all of plaintiff’s health records since his 1977 birth, including records—of no apparent relevance to his case—relating to venereal disease, AIDS and HIV, and permitting disclosure to parties not connected with the attack, injuries, or resulting medical treatments. Although plaintiff suggested limiting the release to the hospital at which he was treated and that time period, the defense moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Without waiting for a reply and without any explanation, the court dismissed with prejudice and denied plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel as moot. The motion had been pending for two months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, calling the dismissal “a miscarriage of justice.” View "Reyes v. Dart" on Justia Law

Dansberry shot and killed 18-year-old Bass during a 1997 attempted armed robbery. An eyewitness saw the crime and Dansberry admitted his culpability. Dansberry entered a “blind” plea of guilty. The court advised Dansberry about the rights he was giving up, the charges, and the range of possible sentences, stating that Dansberry faced a minimum of 20 years in prison up to 90 years, life imprisonment, or death. Dansberry said he understood. The court was incorrect. Dansberry faced a minimum prison term of 26 years, not 20 and a maximum term of 130 years, not 90. The court sentenced him to a total of 80 years. Dansberry later moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that it was involuntary and unknowing and counsel was constitutionally ineffective. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. The evidence showed that the state had pressed for the death penalty. Dansberry’s main concern, according to counsel, was avoiding execution. After losing his Illinois state-court appeal, Dansberry filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding “harmless error.” It is unlikely, and there was no evidence that Dansberry’s mistaken belief that his minimum sentence was 20 years had any effect on his decision to plead guilty View "Dansberry v. Pfister" on Justia Law

A frightened woman called 911, stating that she was in her car in a narrow alley when another driver blocked her exit, got out of his car, was approaching in a menacing manner, screaming obscenities, and had displayed a gun. A Chicago police officer responded and saw a car parked at the entrance to the alley. The driver (Charles) emerged. He matched the caller’s description, so the officer frisked him. Finding nothing, the officer searched the car and discovered a loaded handgun. Charles was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Long after the pretrial-motion deadline lapsed, Charles moved to suppress the gun. Days later, Charles requested a bench trial. Over Charles's objection, the judge held a combined suppression hearing and bench trial, admitted the gun, and found Charles guilty. Before sentencing Charles changed counsel several times and filed multiple motions. The case was transferred to a new judge, who agreed that the gun should have been suppressed, but found that Charles would have been convicted without the gun in evidence. Charles was sentenced to 15 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The suppression motion was properly denied. The officer had probable cause to search Charles’s car for a gun based on the caller’s report and his own observations. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

Brown, convicted of raping adult women and diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits, was civilly committed to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Brown and 17 others sued the facility’s officials and clinical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that policies restricting their access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing M-rated video games (may “contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content and/or strong language”). The policy was later changed to prohibit 353 specific movies and 232 specific games. Rushville subsequently discovered that two residents were using a video game console to access the internet to view forbidden material and banned residents from possessing video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. Brown contended that the new restrictions were retaliation against him for suing. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that the record did not contain a sufficient basis to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state’s interests in security and rehabilitation, View "Brown v. Phillips" on Justia Law

A judge issued a warrant to search Thompson's house, based exclusively on the affidavit of officer Lane stating that an informant had told him that “a black male” named Sidney “routinely sells cocaine” from his Peoria house; the informant claimed to have gone to Sidney’s house twice, most recently within 72 hours, and both times saw Sidney with “a quantity of an off white like rock substance that was represented to be cocaine.” The informant provided Thompson’s address and physical description. Lane knew from prior investigations that Thompson matched that physical description and the informant had picked Thompson from a photo array. Lane checked Thompson’s criminal history and found 14 arrests involving drugs and four convictions. A state database and Lane’s surveillance verified Thompson’s address. Lane stated that once previously the informant had made a controlled buy of marijuana and another time had given information which led to a suspect’s arrest for possessing a controlled substance. Officers executed the warrant and found 17 grams of cocaine in Thomson’s house. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Even if the affidavit did not include sufficient facts to establish probable cause, the evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Investors in Central Sleep filed suit against the company, Dachman, its promoter, and others, claiming fraud, RICO violations, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, and securities fraud. Dachman was also convicted for his fraudulent conduct. He spent the funds he stole from investors on a tattoo parlor, vacations and cruises, a new Land Rover, rare booksm and to fund personal stock trading and gambling. Goodman represented the defendants. A judge ordered Central Sleep into receivership and issued a stay against “all civil legal proceedings” involving the defendants. The receivership closed; victims received pennies on the dollar. Goodman obtained a judgment for unpaid legal fees and submitted a claim, but also filed a lien against the proceeds of the Dachmans' state court medical-malpractice lawsuit. Neither Goodman nor the Dachmans informed the receiver or the judge of those proceedings. The receiver learned of the malpractice suit and recovered the settlement proceeds. When the receiver proposed a distribution plan, Goodman argued that his lien entitled him to be paid in full from the malpractice suit proceeds, rather than pro rata from the receivership estate like other creditors. The judge offered Goodman the opportunity to post a bond to delay distribution, pending appeal. Goodman did not post a bond. The judge approved the plan and the funds were distributed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the receiver’s motion for sanctions against Goodman. View "Duff v. Central Sleep Diagnostics, LLC" on Justia Law