Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Caterpillar bought a South Milwaukee factory that manufactures strip-mining equipment and became the employer party to a collective-bargaining agreement with a United Steelworkers local union. Two months later, a crane operator (a member of the bargaining unit) was killed when a 36-ton crawler crushed him after shifting while being rotated by the crane. He had been lying underneath the crawler to unhook chains attaching it to the crane. Police officers, OSHA agents, company executives, and local union officials, converged within hours on the accident scene. The local union’s officials were not safety specialists. The president of the local union informed Caterpillar’s regional manager that a member of the national union’s emergency response team would come to inspect the accident site. The manager promised to cooperate but changed his mind and, the next day, refused to allow the union investigator to enter the factory. The company stated that because it was cooperating with the police and with OSHA, no further investigation was warranted. The Seventh Circuit enforced the National Labor Relations Board’s order requiring Caterpillar to allow the union’s investigator access to the site. The materials shown the investigator were not an adequate substitute for on-site investigation, and the investigation itself would impose trivial costs on the company. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

An inmate of a Wisconsin state prison filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Schneider, a guard, had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him. The district court dismissed the complaint at “screening,” 28 U.S.C. 1915A, before any response by the defendants. The magistrate stated that “standing alone, verbal harassment of an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation.” The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that attempting to draw a categorical distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary. The alleged pain sufficient to constitute cruel punishment may be physical or psychological. While most verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, some does. View "Beal v. Foster" on Justia Law

The insurer operates a preferred-provider system that offers patients better benefits, or lower co-payments, for patronizing medical providers who have agreed with the insurer to accept lower reimbursements (per procedure) in exchange for a better flow of business. The chiropractor plaintiffs signed such “participating provider” or “network” agreements. Providers bill the insurer directly regardless of whether a patient obtained coverage as part of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) welfare-benefit plan or through some other means, such as an affinity-group policy or an insurance exchange under the Affordable Care Act. Chiropractors sued, contending that, when determining how much to pay for services rendered to patients, the insurer failed to use the procedures required by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1133. The district court concluded that plaintiffs are beneficiaries under ERISA and awarded damages and injunctions requiring the insurer to follow section 1133 and Department of Labor regulations. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that plaintiffs concede that they are not participants under the ERISA definition and that a network contract between a medical provider and an insurer does not make that provider a “beneficiary” under ERISA. View "Pa. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Independence Hosp. Indem., Inc." on Justia Law

Daniels, Dean, and Jones were indicted for several 2005 armed bank robberies in the Chicago area. Dean moved to sever the cases. The prosecution argued that joinder was appropriate because the defendants participated in a ‘same series of acts or transactions, involving the same modus operandi, and the same crew. Some of that crew cooperated and testified. The court denied the motions. Before trial Jones pleaded guilty. Dean and Daniels were tried jointly. Daniels was not in the courtroom; the court barred him based on his pretrial conduct and his refusal to promise that he would behave appropriately during trial. Both were convicted of armed robbery and related gun offenses. The jury was polled and each juror agreed with the verdict. However, a juror later informed the court that she had felt bullied and wanted to change her vote. The Court Officer informed Daniels’ attorney that he had observed the juror in the hallway outside the jury room and that she had complained of having a panic attack. The court learned that the juror had left the room after deliberations, concluded that the juror merely expressed concerns related to internal deliberation, and found that further inquiry was not appropriate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, to the exclusion of Daniels from the courtroom, and to the handling of the juror’s concerns. View "United States v. Dean" on Justia Law

Brown filed a class action complaint, alleging that she contacted Defender by telephone in response to its advertisement for a home security system; that, during several calls, she provided Defender with personal information; and that Defender recorded those calls without her permission and without notifying her of the recording. Brown claimed violations of California Penal Code 632, which prohibits the recording of confidential telephone communications without the consent of all parties. Defender owned a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by First Mercury, covering “personal injury” and “advertising injury.” In a separate definitions section, the policy defined both “advertising injuries” and “personal injuries” as those “arising out of … [o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.” The parties eventually reached a settlement. Defender provided First Mercury with timely notice of the Brown suit. First Mercury denied coverage and refused to defend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Defender’s suit against First Mercury. Defender’s Policy requires “publication,” which was neither alleged nor proven. View "Defender Sec. Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings determined that Discount Inn had violated city ordinances, providing that “any person who owns or controls property within the city must cut or otherwise control all weeds on such property so that the average height of such weeds does not exceed ten inches” and that “it shall be the duty of the owner of any open lot ... to cause the lot to be surrounded with a noncombustible screen fence … . P. The owner shall maintain any such fence in a safe condition." Both ordinances provide for fines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of constitutional challenges to the ordinances.The fencing of vacant lots is important to enable the identification of such land as being owned rather than abandoned, and to discourage squatters and the use of vacant lots as sites for the sale of illegal drugs. While expressing concern about the lack of a definition of “weed” and enforcement of the average height limit, the court stated that taken to its logical extreme, Discount Inn’s defense of the weed would preclude any efforts by local governments to prevent unsightly or dangerous uses of private property. View "Discount Inn, Inc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Smith filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Smith, as a pretrial detainee and Army veteran, was enrolled in a special program for veterans. Under that program, Smith worked in the jail laundry and could live in a special wing for veterans, apart from the general population. Smith claimed that he was paid only $3 a day, not the federal minimum wage; that he was subjected to inhumane conditions, required to stand in a “hot, smelly room” several hours each day; and that he had insufficient food, was subjected to rodents and insects, had no mirrors, lacked outdoor recreation, and had to drink filthy water. The court conducted preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1951A) and summarily dismissed Smith’s work- and wage-related claims, finding that Smith had no constitutional right to be paid for his jail job assignment, let alone minimum wage, and that his allegations were insufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court determined that Smith stated colorable conditions of confinement claims, but ultimately dismissed without prejudice, advising Smith of the deficiencies in his pleading and twice instructing him to file an amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ultimate dismissal (with prejudice) of the inadequate food and contaminated water claims and remanded, but otherwise affirmed. View "Smith v. Dart" on Justia Law

Boutros worked for Avis Rent A Car as a courtesy bus driver at O’Hare Airport. He had worked for Avis before a short stint in the military. After he was honorably discharged for unsatisfactory performance, Avis did not want to rehire him, but did so. One night in May 2008, Boutros informed his supervisor that the fire extinguisher on his bus inexplicably discharged, spraying fire retardant near the driver’s seat. He reported no injury at the time, but the next morning he claimed that chemicals from the discharge had harmed him. Avis launched an investigation and eventually fired Boutros for dishonesty and insubordination in connection with his shifting accounts of the fire-extinguisher accident. Boutros sued, claiming that Avis fired him because of his race and subjected him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the appeal was frivolous and issuing an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules. View "Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Cook committed a home robbery in 2005 and was arrested nine days later in the apartment of a girlfriend, later his fiancée, Thede. Convicted in a Wisconsin state court of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in the animal’s (a dog’s) death, and false imprisonment, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Cook filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Marinette County (Wisconsin) Sheriff’s Department detectives arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and seeking $25,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages for the arrest and detention, seizure of personal property that he claims was worth $10,000, and infliction of emotional distress. Thede had testified in Cook’s criminal trial that she had admitted the officers to her apartment, but in the civil case she submitted an affidavit which states that when she had testified that she “let them in” she had meant that she “did not tell them to leave or did not object directly to them, but let them remain.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. At worst the entry was a harmless error because of the existence of a warrant. View "Cook v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law