Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Faruki, a computer technology consultant, met Tishfield in 2006 while Tishfield was working as a portfolio manager at SAC Capital, a Connecticut-based hedge fund. In 2010, Faruki informed Tishfield that he had launched his own investment fund, Neural Markets, using mathematically-driven trading strategies. Faruki stated that he was currently investing his own money in the fund to establish a trading history he could pitch to prospective investors. He told Tishfield that in December 2009 his fund had achieved investment returns exceeding 12%, and that his investment return in January 2010 was 32%. Faruki made several other false statement about the fund and about his own credentials. In December 2010, Tishfield received his first account statement, which reported significant losses associated with his $1 million investment. Faruki was charged with seven counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Faruki" on Justia Law

In 1997, Player and his wife established EAR, purportedly to refurbish high-tech machinery . In 2005-2009, EAR defrauded creditors and the couple obtained $17 million in fraudulent transfers from EAR. Before the fraud was detected, they used funds for their personal benefit and spent large amounts at the Horseshoe Casino, Player was known to “walk with chips,” rather than cashing them in, and giving chips to a third party to cash in. Neither is illegal, but are potentially indicative of “structuring” transactions to avoid triggering the $10,000 reporting requirement, a federal crime, 31 U.S.C. 5324. When the fraud was discovered, EAR filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The plan administrator sought to avoid transfers to Horseshoe, alleging that Horseshoe had reasons to believe that Player’s money came from EAR. Horseshoe objected to a motion to compel under 31 C.F.R. 1021.320(e), which governs Suspicious Activity Reports filed by financial institutions, including casinos, to detect money laundering and other violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The district court ordered an ex parte filing by Horseshoe, which was inaccessible to EAR. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Horseshoe accepted the transfers without knowledge of the fraud at EAR and could not have uncovered the fraud if it had investigated. View "Brandt v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, two people were killed when a Seattle news helicopter crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board investigated, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1131(a)(1), “to ascertain measures that would best tend to prevent similar accidents or incidents in the future.” NTSB “does not engage in traditional agency adjudications, nor does it promulgate or enforce any air safety regulations. Rather, it simply analyzes accidents and recommends ways to prevent similar accidents.” No part of an NTSB accident report may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages. In 2015, the Board released a Factual Report concerning its investigation of the Seattle crash; it has not yet released an analysis of the likely cause of the accident. The Illinois company that owned and operated the helicopter involved in the crash asserted that the Report “omits significant information that will make it impossible for the Board to reach an accurate determination of Probable Cause” and unsuccessfully requested that NTSB rescind the Report and refrain from releasing its Probable Cause Report until “errors in the Factual Report are addressed.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition seeking an order requiring NTSB to rescind or withhold reports. The court concluded that the Board’s reports are not final orders subject to review. View "Helicopters, Inc. v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd." on Justia Law

A vehicle search turned up 11.4 grams of heroin that Fields had obtained from Burnett. Fields called Burnett and said the heroin had been seized and asked Burnett to leave guns in a certain trash can in exchange for Fields’s freedom. Officers saw Burnett driving to that trash can and recovered guns from it. Weeks later, video set up by police captured Burnett mixing heroin with a cutting agent in his basement and packaging it. Davis left Burnett’s home with the heroin and sold 60 tinfoil packets (12.1 grams) to an undercover officer. A jury acquitted Burnett on conspiracy and use of a communication facility in furtherance of a conspiracy charges, but found him guilty on two individual distribution counts. The court found Burnett responsible for 100 grams of heroin, assessed a two-level leadership increase, and imposed a 135-month sentence. Burnett separately pled guilty to mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343. Burnett’s sister and infant nephew died in a fire, and a $5.75 million settlement was reached for the benefit of five surviving children. Burnett was appointed guardian of the children, and used part of the settlement to buy himself luxury cars, jewelry, and an apartment building. The court imposed enhancements for vulnerable victims and abusing a position of trust and sentenced Burnett to 90 months. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Darinchuluun, a citizen of Mongolia, has a wife and son in Mongolia. He worked for a railroad that was a joint venture between Russia and Mongolia. In 2004 Darinchuluun discovered guns and ammunition in a box that was supposed to contain coal. He claims that he was threatened, but reported to his supervisor ,and was subsequently attacked and beaten. In 2006 Darinchuluun reported the illegal shipments to the Russian director of the railroad, Darinchuluun claims that he was again attacked and that the director was murdered. He applied for a visa to the United States, stating that he wanted to purchase software. He entered the U.S. in February 2010. In April 2010, Darinchuluun was stabbed by another Mongolian national during an altercation in a bar. Darinchuluun statedthat he had “no doubt” that the man who stabbed him was hired by those who had tried to hurt him in Mongolia. The police report indicated that Darinchuluun knew the assailant and that the incident was prompted by an argument about who had the superior immigration status. Before expiration of his visa, Darinchuluun applied for asylum. His application was denied. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Darinchuluun did not provide evidence that corroborated the key elements of his claim. View "Darinchuluun v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Burton had been treated for back pain, anxiety, acid reflux, herpes simplex, hyperlipidemia, and depression. In addition to other medications, he was intermittently prescribed an opioid pain medication similar to Vicodin. Burton was diagnosed with avascular necrosis, a loss of blood circulation that causes bone death, and one week before his detention, had core decompression surgery. The detention center confiscated all of his medications. He received medications prescribed by a physicians’ assistant at the detention center and saw medical staff 26 times during 18 months of pretrial detention. Burton told a judge that he was not receiving the medications that he had been prescribed before he was detained and that he was experiencing severe pain. The judge ordered that the sheriff provide an extra mattress and furnish Burton with all medicines prescribed for him. The jail did not comply. Burton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, rejecting a defense of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that no reasonable jury could find that Burton was deprived of essential medical care or that staff was deliberately indifferent to his serious needs. View "Burton v. Downey" on Justia Law

Officer Stirmell followed a speeding pickup truck and activated his sirens. The driver, Greg, ignored the sirens and continued driving. Stirmell radioed for assistance. Greg drove to his father’s house, ran from his truck, and jumped the fence into his father’s backyard. Stirmell ceased pursuit and began searching Greg’s truck. Springfield Officers Brown, Warnisher, and others arrived and searched the backyard. The officers knew Greg had refused to stop, but were also under the mistaken impression that Greg had an outstanding arrest warrant. Greg’s father, Dawson, went out and, at an officer’s request, called Greg’s cell phone to locate him. Greg did not answer. Dawson remained outside and answered the officers’ questions. He stated that he was 72 years old, and that his son had no involvement in drug dealing. Greg re-appeared, running toward the side door of Dawson’s house. Dawson claims that while the officers were attempting to subdue Greg, Warnisher kicked Dawson and Brown tackled Dawson from behind. The officers dispute his version of events. Dawson was handcuffed and arrested for resisting arrest and obstruction, but was never formally charged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Dawson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, finding that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances. View "Dawson v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010 Manuel was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 51 months in federal prison, with “credit for not less than all the time he has spent in federal custody” since May 24, 2010. That was the date on which, having been arrested earlier in the year by Michigan law enforcement for a parole violation, Manuel was ordered transferred from state to federal custody. After his Michigan parole was revoked, Manual was returned to that state’s custody, from which he was released on May 4, 2013, and transferred to a federal prison to serve his 51-month federal prison term. In calculating the date of his release from federal prison, the Bureau of Prisons had decided that Manuel was entitled to receive credit toward completion of his federal sentence for the five months from May 24 to October 27, 2010, that he had spent in federal custody. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his habeas petition, with his argument that he should have received credit for May 24, 2010 to May 4, 2013, the date of his release from Michigan’s custody. View "Manuel v. Terris" on Justia Law

Arroyo worked as a Volvo material handler, 2005-2011. Arroyo was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. She deployed twice to Iraq and Kuwait: 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 and took leave for training and other military activities. She received more than 900 days of military leave from Volvo. There is evidence, including internal emails, suggesting that her supervisors were frustrated from the beginning about her absences. After her 2009-2010 deployment Arroyo declined a voluntary severance package and returned to work. Arroyo was diagnosed with PTSD. Arroyo took three months FMLA and disability leave. Volvo granted accommodations, including: a quiet place to meditate; a mentor; time off for counseling; and breaks and support during anxiety attacks. Other requested accommodations—a more flexible schedule, use of earplugs or headphones in both ears, day-to-day guidance, putting all communications in writing, and disability awareness training—were under review when she was terminated for violation of Volvo’s attendance policy. The district court rejected her claims for discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to discrimination claims under USERRA and the ADA, stating that Arroyo raised genuine, material factual issues. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

After serving a term in an Illinois state prison for a sex crime, the plaintiff was committed to a Treatment and Detention Facility, pursuant to the civil Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. He had a job in the Facility’s dietary services department. He alleged, in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was fired in retaliation for previous lawsuits against staff members. He claims disciplinary charges against him were “trumped-up.” The district judge conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) and dismissed the suit with prejudice because it “contained only conclusory allegations. … Plaintiff simply stated he had filed previous lawsuits and assumed people knew about it.” The judge had interviewed the plaintiff by telephone. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that it previously rejected ex parte telephonic interrogation as a method of screening complaints to determine whether they state a claim. It is permissible for the judge to interview a pro se detainee plaintiff to determine, not whether the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, but simply what that case is; the judge must ensure that a transcript or recording of the interview be made to allow appellate review. View "Henderson v. Wilcoxen" on Justia Law