Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant recruited a 19- year-old, two 16-year-old girls, and a 17-year-old by false promises of love and money, as well as by violence, and transported them across state lines to engage in prostitution. He was convicted of four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). If the recruit has not attained the age of 18 years the defendant is to be imprisoned “for not less than 10 years or for life.” As to the older girl, the government proved that the defendant used “force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion” against her.. The sentencing range for that offense is 15 years to life. His guidelines range was life imprisonment, but the judge imposed a below-guideline sentence of 30 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that section 1591 reaches only involuntary prostitution akin to slavery and not “ordinary” pimping and pandering. The court vacated the sentence, noting that the district judge apparently did not know that the guidelines range had changed over the course of the defendant’s illegal activity and was “casual” about conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. McMillian" on Justia Law

Taylor engaged in sexual acts in front of a webcam during online chats with a law-enforcement officer posing as a 13-year-old girl. He was convicted of attempting to use the facilities of interstate commerce to engage in criminal sexual activity with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that “sexual activity” under 2422(b) requires evidence of physical contact. Taylor was recharged and convicted for the same conduct for attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor using a means of interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1470. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on the Double Jeopardy Clause; the district court’s handling of strikes for cause during jury selection; limitations on his cross-examination of law-enforcement officers; and the court’s determination that his conviction triggers the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(A)(ii), (7)(I). The court noted that Taylor’s double-jeopardy claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent; that Taylor used peremptory strikes to remove two of the three jurors about whom he complained and did not object to the third; that the relevance of the excluded cross-examination was tenuous at best; and that a procedural impediment prevents review of the SORNA ruling. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Champaign County Detectives executed a search warrant at the Olson home, looking for stolen items. They found nothing. Although they had no reason to believe that the Vinsons were involved in the purported theft and possessed no warrant for the Vinson property, they met a Vermillion County Deputy to search the Vinsons’ Vermillion County home. Vinson is the Olsons’s daughter. The plainclothes officers arrived in unmarked cars as the Vinsons’ 14-year-old daughter, C., was checking the mailbox. C., home with her nine-year-old brother, was alarmed. She went inside, locked the door, and called her mother, who was in a high-risk pregnancy, stating that a man was peering through a window. The man then told C. that he was a police officer and “had to conduct a search.” C. went upstairs with her brother, and, through a window, watched the offices search the attached garage and curtilage. The officers found nothing and left. The Vinsons sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for common law trespass, naming the Counties as responsible for payment under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An average citizen might call the police based on the behavior described. That there was no forced entry and nothing was seized is irrelevant a Fourth Amendment claim. View "Vinson v. Vermilion Cnty, Ill." on Justia Law

Hawkins and Racasi were analysts on the staff of a member of the Cook County Board of Review, when they accepted money from Haleem, a corrupt Chicago police officer acting as an undercover agent to reduce the penalties for his own crimes. The Board hears complaints by property owners who believe that the assessed valuation (which affects real-estate taxes) is excessive. Haleem paid Hawkins and Racasi to arrange for lower assessments. They took his money, and the assessments were reduced, except for one parcel about which the protest was untimely. A jury found that they had violated 18 U.S.C.666 (theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds) and 1341 (mail fraud), plus corresponding prohibitions of conspiracy. Hawkins and Racasi contend that they took the money with the intent to deceive Haleem and did nothing in exchange and that the jury was improperly instructed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the section 666 convictions, but vacated the section 1341 convictions. The jury may have found that defendants intended to be influenced; but if they did not, they intended to be rewarded for the positions they held, if not for services delivered. They were guilty either way. Section 1341 covers only bribery and kickbacks. View "United States v. Racasi" on Justia Law

Bruce’s high-school boyfriend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill herself. The official contacted police. Officer Harris went to the home where Bruce was staying and detained her until a sheriff’s deputy, Guernsey, arrived and took Bruce, against her will, to a hospital where she was subjected to a mental health examination. Guernsey said that he had a copy of a physician’s medical examination, but no doctor had examined Bruce, and wrote that Bruce told him that she was thinking of suicide, but Bruce denies making that statement. Harris and Guernsey took no account of her father’s statements contradicting the report and her calm demeanor. Bruce filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face of Bruce’s complaint and that Guernsey had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of Harris, but reversed and remanded as to Guernsey, who overstepped the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in taking Bruce to the hospital and making false statements that resulted in a more prolonged seizure. View "Bruce v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

O’Gorman worked for Chicago from 1996-2007, as a carpenter and later as a General Foreman, placing city orders with Arrow Lumber, owned by Beal. After an investigation following reports from an Arrow employee, O’Gorman was arrested and charged with theft of city property and violations of City Personnel Rules. The city also pursued a civil case under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Chicago False Claims Act, which remains pending. The city issued a press release announcing the charges that he had diverted $50,000 in goods for his own use and tried to cover the theft. Beal pled guilty. O’Gorman’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the investigation improperly focused on O’Gorman and protected Arrow and Beal for political reasons and that Beal covered up Arrow’s fraud; that the Human Resources Director informed a union representative that if O’Gorman did not resign he would be fired and that any hearing would be a sham; and that supervisors told him that if he resigned, he would be reinstated once he was acquitted. O’Gorman resigned, was acquitted of all criminal charges, and unsuccessfully requested reinstatement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the termination claims untimely and that there is no property interest in rehiring. View "O'Gorman v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Haywood, with help from others, processed bogus applications for mortgage loans and caused $1.4 million in losses to the lenders. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that part of the loss should have been excluded in calculating his offense level under the sentencing guidelines because he disclosed part of his fraud during proffer sessions protected by U.S.S.G. 1B1.8. The court also upheld application of a 4-level, aggravating-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). View "United States v. Haywood" on Justia Law

Sprinkle applied for supplemental social security income. After exhausting administrative remedies, Sprinkle sought judicial review of a final decision that he was not disabled. The district court held that the agency failed to properly evaluate evidence of Sprinkle’s disability and reversed. Sprinkle sought attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. While the EAJA contains a presumptive rate cap of $125 an hour, courts may award enhanced fees if justified because of an increase in the cost of living. The court found that Sprinkle was entitled to fees, but rejected his request for a cost-of-living enhancement. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An EAJA claimant seeking an adjustment need not offer proof of the effects of inflation on the particular attorney’s practice or proof that no competent attorney could be found for less than the requested rate. The claimant may rely on a readily available measure of inflation such as the Consumer Price Index, as well as proof that the requested rate does not exceed the prevailing market rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill and experience. An affidavit from a single attorney testifying to the prevailing market rate may suffice to meet that burden. View "Sprinkle v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff won a judgment in a breach of contract claim. The court’s memorandum opinion and order, held the defendants liable for “$113,500 plus interest accruing and attorneys’ fees.” When entering the judgment on the docket, the court checked the box indicating that no prejudgment interest would be awarded. Plaintiff moved to “quantify interest based on the memorandum opinion and order.” The defendants filed appeals. Because the district court had not quantified prejudgment interest, the Seventh Circuit ordered the parties to file memoranda explaining why the appeals should not be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the district court addressed the motion to quantify, which it construed as a motion to correct the judgment. Explaining that it had checked the wrong box on the judgment, the court directed plaintiff to move the Seventh Circuit for leave to correct the clerical mistake. Plaintiff filed the motion. The Seventh Circuit held that there is no final judgment to appeal. The award of prejudgment interest is part of a plaintiff’s damages and the district court must quantify damages before a judgment can be final. Even if the clerical mistake were corrected, the judgment would not quantify prejudgment interest and the district court did not address how it would quantify the award. View "Dual-Temp of Ill., Inc. v. Hench Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and the heirs of victims sued the Hungarian national railway, the national bank, and private banks for the roles they played in the World War II genocide against Hungarian Jews. In 2012 appeals, the Seventh Circuit held that the national railway and national bank, instrumentalities of the government, could be sued in a U.S. federal court if the plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies or had a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court mandated dismissal of claims against two private banks for lack of personal jurisdiction, but denied requests by Erste Bank to review denial of its motion to dismiss. On remand, the district court dismissed the claims against the national defendants for failure to prove exhaustion of Hungarian remedies and dismissed Erste Bank on forum non conveniens grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, without prejudice. While international law does not require exhaustion of domestic remedies before plaintiffs can say that international law was violated, principles of international comity require that these plaintiffs attempt to exhaust domestic remedies before foreign courts can provide remedies. If plaintiffs find that attempts to pursue remedies in Hungary are frustrated unreasonably or arbitrarily, a U.S. court could hear the claims. View "Albert v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law