Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Estrada fled Honduras in 1994 after police there detained and tortured him. An immigration judge granted Estrada relief from removal, finding that he will more likely than not face torture if he is removed to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, finding Estrada not eligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted in an Illinois state court of statutory rape in 1996, a crime the Board deemed “particularly serious.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review. While Estrada may be ineligible for "withholding of removal," under the Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), or the Convention Against Torture, he may be eligible for “deferral of removal” under only the Convention. The immigration judge found it more likely than not that Estrada will be tortured if he is removed to Honduras. The Board was required to review that factual finding only for clear error, not de novo. View "Estrada-Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Brown began working as a United flight attendant in 1991. He suffered from depression and bipolar disorder and was disciplined for absenteeism and unprofessionalism. In 2000, he required psychiatric hospitalization. The Flight Attendants Board of Adjustment directed that he be permitted to return to work if his treating physician and a United doctor found him medically fit. Brown never complied. In 2005, the Board affirmed his termination. Meanwhile, United filed for bankruptcy. Brown filed a claim seeking back pay ($80,000). In 2004, Brown sued United in California state court, seeking more than $500,000. United sought transfer to the Illinois bankruptcy court, which did not lift the automatic stay. For 18 months, Brown did not pursue the case. In 2006, a California bankruptcy court granted transfer of Brown’s lawsuit, calling it an adversary proceeding, to Illinois. Brown had never filed a new or amended proof of claim and had not objected to United’s reorganization plan, which was confirmed in 2006, days after Brown’s lawsuit was transferred. The plan discharged claims “filed by Union-represented employees pertaining to rights collectively bargained for.” The clerk’s office mistakenly returned Brown’s file to California. None of the courts took any further action; neither did Brown. The bankruptcy closed in 2009. In 2013, Brown moved to reopen so that his California claims could be litigated. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected Brown’s arguments. Brown’s years of inaction amounted to abandonment of those claims. View "Brown v. UAL Corp." on Justia Law

Jean-Paul was convicted of state drug crimes and sentenced to 13 years’ confinement. His appointed appellate counsel, Donnelly, told Jean-Paul that he intended to file a “no-merit report,” unless Jean-Paul wanted to proceed pro se, in which case Donnelly would ask to withdraw. Jean-Paul wanted to proceed pro se. Donnelly wrote to Jean-Paul that if he signed a “Statement of Decision to Proceed Pro Se,” Donnelly would withdraw. Days later, Jean-Paul told Donnelly that instead of proceeding pro se, he wanted to respond to the No Merit report, which was due in May 2008. In April, Jean-Paul changed his mind. Donnelly withdrew and submitted Jean-Paul's signed “Statement of Decision to Proceed Pro Se.” Pro se, Jean-Paul voluntarily dismissed his appeal and brought an unsuccessful state post-conviction motion, which in Wisconsin precedes direct appeal. Jean-Paul refiled his direct appeal; the appellate court affirmed his conviction. The state appellate court rejected a habeas petition challenging the validity of his waiver of counsel on direct appeal. Jean-Paul claimed to be illiterate. Other petitions and appeals were unsuccessful. In federal court, Jean-Paul sought habeas relief, renewing his claim that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appellate counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, holding that the state court had applied the right standard and reached a reasonable result. View "Jean-Paul v. Douma" on Justia Law

FirstMerit Bank sued CFE Group in federal court to enforce a promissory note and guaranties. The district court dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend. Rather than amend, FirstMerit filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). FirstMerit then filed a new complaint in an Illinois state court asserting the same claims. CFE moved to dismiss the new suit, arguing that the earlier federal dismissal meant that FirstMerit’s claims were barred by claim preclusion (res judicata). The state trial court denied the motion. CFE filed a new federal action, seeking to enjoin the state court under the relitigation exception to the federal Anti‐Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The district court refused, ruling that the dismissal of the first federal case was not a judgment on the merits and, therefore, did not preclude the state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CFE’s request for an injunction was also barred by the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, and finding the appeal frivolous, so that sanctions on CFE are appropriate. View "CFE Group, LLC v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

During a consensual search for a stolen television, an old gun that had belonged to West's father was found in the attic. No fingerprints were recovered from the gun and there was conflicting evidence concerning whether West lived in the house. West's attorney unsuccessfully moved to suppress West's statement that he owned the gun, citing West's mental illness, low intelligence, and suggestibility. The judge refused to admit expert testimony to challenge the reliability of his statement. The Seventh Circuit reversed his conviction as a felon In possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), stating that the reliability of the confession was a question for the jury and that the expert's testimony was relevant and admissible. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

Inmates, acting pro se, alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment by overcrowding and provision of inadequate mental-health services. The district court denied their “Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel” seeking to certify three classes: (1) “all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined in the [Wisconsin Department of Corrections],” (2) all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at [Waupun Correctional Institution],” and (3) all prisoners with a serious mental illness or disability “who are now or in the future will be confined at” Waupun. The courts then rejected their claim that they “should be appointed counsel to represent the certified classes … pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” The court stated that the pro se plaintiffs could not adequately represent a class and that Rule 23(g), “is only implicated when a class is first certified under Rule 23(a)(4).” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for leave to appeal. View "Howard v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

CEOC, the Chapter 11 debtor, owns and operates casinos. Caesars (CEC) is CEOC's principal owner. CEOC borrowed billions of dollars, issuing notes guaranteed by CEC. As CEOC’s financial position worsened, CEC tried to eliminate its guaranty obligations by selling assets of CEOC to other parties and terminating the guaranties. CEOC's creditors, who had received the guaranties, challenged CEC’s repudiation, seeking approximately $12 billion. CEOC, in its bankruptcy proceeding, asserted claims alleging that CEC caused CEOC to transfer valuable assets to CEC at less than fair value, leaving CEOC saddled with debt (fraudulent transfers) and that the guaranty suits will thwart CEOC’s multi‐billion‐dollar restructuring effort, which depends on a substantial contribution from CEC in settlement of CEOC’s claims, and will let the guaranty plaintiffs take precedence over other creditors. The bankruptcy judge, and a district judge refused CEOC's request to enjoin the guaranty suits until 60 days after a bankruptcy examiner completes his report. The bankruptcy judge’s exercise of jurisdiction over the other suits would have been constitutional, but he thought he lacked statutory authority to enter an injunction under 11 U.S.C. 105(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the judges misinterpreted the statute and that issuance of a temporary injunction could facilitate a prompt wind‐up of the bankruptcy. View "Caesars Entm't Operating Co., Inc. v. BOKF, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Mendoza-Sanchez entered the U.S. at age 18, in 1983, and became a lawful permanent resident. He sold cocaine obtained from members of the violent La Linea cartel, known to work with corrupt Mexican police officers. In 2010 he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. A fellow prisoner who was a member of La Linea attacked him in the prison cafeteria, broke his teeth, and stated that members of the cartel, who had been arrested, believed that he had snitched and that the cartel would have him killed if he returned to Mexico. At his immigration hearing, Mendoza-Sanchez presented evidence that La Linea’s reach is nationwide and that the “law enforcement agencies are infiltrated by the Cartels.” He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge described Mendoza as “a credible witness,” but concluded that he did not establish eligibility for deferral of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, based on Mendoza-Sanchez’s not having “presented sufficient evidence to establish that … a Mexican public official would acquiesce (or be willfully blind) to such harm.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that a petitioner for deferral of removal under the CAT need not prove that the government is complicit in the misconduct of its police officers. View "Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch" on Justia Law