Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, nClosures and Block began a business relationship in which nClosures designed and Block manufactured metal enclosures for electronic tablets, such as iPads. The parties signed a confidentiality agreement; nClosures then divulged its designs for the enclosure device to Block for manufacture. The first device, the Rhino Elite, entered the market for sale in October 2011. By March 2012, however, Block developed its own competing device, the Atrio. nClosures sued, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court granted summary judgment to Block on both claims, but denied Block attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable jury could find that nClosures took reasonable steps to keep its proprietary information confidential, so that the confidentiality agreement was unenforceable and that no reasonable jury could find that a partnership existed between nClosures and Block that could give rise to a viable breach of fiduciary duty claim.View "nClosures Inc. v. Block & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Sinclair was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The police found a loaded handgun, a distribution quantity of marijuana, and tools of the drug-trafficking trade in his car. Sinclair was indicted for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Trial was set to begin on a Tuesday. Six days before trial, Sinclair wrote the judge asking for a continuance to allow his family to hire a private attorney. The judge received the letter on Thursday, docketed it on Friday, and scheduled a hearing for Monday, when he denied the request. The jury convicted Sinclair on all counts. Sinclair’s presentence report recommended grouping the drug count with the felon-in-possession count to determine the offense level, U.S.S.G. 3D1.2. The judge rejected the recommendation. Absent grouping, the offense level was 17 instead of 16. The judge imposed concurrent within guidelines prison terms of 57 months on the drug and felon-in-possession counts and tacked on the mandatory consecutive 60-month term for the 924(c) conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by denying a continuance and a challenge to the decision not to group the counts. The guidelines specifically provide that enhancements for firearm possession do not apply when the defendant is also convicted of violating section 924(c), which carries a mandatory consecutive sentence.View "United States v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Horton, a 20-year-old karate instructor who used his iPhone to film himself sexually molesting three of his young students, pleaded guilty to six counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Horton’s guidelines range was life, subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 30 years on each count. The district court imposed a 90-year prison sentence, which Horton argued was substantively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Horton failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded to his within-guidelines sentence.View "United States v. Horton" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police responded to shots fired behind a residence and discovered Moody with a loaded pistol. Moody admitted that the gun was his. He pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Moody had a 1993 Florida conviction for armed burglary of a dwelling, another Florida conviction a year later for robbing a motel with a firearm, and a 2005 Wisconsin conviction for robbing a bank. The convictions brought Moody within the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After thoroughly questioning Moody, the court accepted his guilty plea. The probation officer reported that Moody was subject to a 15-year statutory minimum sentence under the ACCA. If not for that mandatory penalty, Moody’s guidelines range under U.S.S.G. 4B1.4 would have been 135 to 168 months, based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal history category of IV. Neither party objected; the district court adopted the report. The government, complying with the plea agreement, recommended a 15-year prison term. The court imposed a 12-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing before a different judge and agreed with Moody’s counsel that there were no nonfrivolous arguments for setting aside the plea, dismissing his counter-appeal.View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Kolbusz owns and operates the Illinois Center for Dermatology and Skin Cancer and was a participating Medicare provider from 1993 until December 2012, receiving payment directly from Medicare. In October 2012 he was indicted for Medicare fraud. As a consequence, the Department of Health and Human Services imposed fraud prevention procedures on the practice, including payment suspension, resulting in his ultimate withdrawal from the Medicare program. In 2013, Kolbusz filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her contractors, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395; and 28 U.S.C. 1361 (mandamus) to compel review of reimbursement claims he had submitted. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kolbusz’s failure to exhaust Medicare’s administrative appeals process precludes subject-matter jurisdiction of his mandamus action.View "Ctr for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Campbell recruited young women in the U.S. illegally, initially persuading the women to join his “Family” by offering comfortable places to live and jobs in massage parlors with no expectation that they perform sexual services. Later, Campbell required the women to break ties with their relatives and friends and confiscated their identification, immigration documents and money. Campbell renamed them, branded them with tattoos, abused them, and forced them to engage in prostitution. After a victim turned to law enforcement, Campbell was sentenced to life imprisonment. Campbell appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a conviction for harboring illegal aliens requires proof of his intent to shield the alien from detection by law enforcement and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required interstate commerce elements for Hobbs Act extortion and the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Any instructional error did not affect Campbell’s substantial rights. The prosecution produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that extortion of the women had a direct effect on interstate commerce or a threatened effect which never materialized because the women met Campbell’s demands.View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Rollins had driven into a store parking lot and gotten out of his car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his car and show his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that because Rollins pleaded guilty, a finding that the defendant was illegally seized would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction. The judge also ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the police seized Rollins lawfully by ordering him back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest.View "Rollins v. Willett" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

Nayak owned outpatient surgery centers and made under-the-table payments to physicians that referred patients to his centers, including cash payments and payments to cover referring physicians’ advertising expenses. Nayak instructed some of his collaborators not to report these payments on their tax returns. Nayak was charged with honest-services mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346, and obstruction of the administration of the tax system, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). Although the indictment a alleged that Nayak intended “to defraud and to deprive patients of their right to honest services of their physicians” through his scheme, there was no allegation that Nayak caused or intended to cause any sort of tangible harm to the patients in the form of higher costs or inferior care. After denial of his motion to dismiss, Nayak entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to dismiss the mail fraud charge. On appeal he argued that tangible harm to a victim is a necessary element of honest-services mail fraud, at least in cases not involving fraud by a public official. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that actual or intended tangible harm is not an element.View "United States v. Nayak" on Justia Law

A deputy stopped a truck in which Stacy was a passenger, knowing that Stacy and the driver had recently purchased notable quantities of pseudoephedrine pills from local pharmacies, possibly for use in manufacturing methamphetamine. An officer found a glass smoking pipe in the truck. Stacy was charged with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and four counts of possession of pseudoephedrine knowing that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2). The government planned to introduce evidence under Rule 404(b) about Stacy’s 2008 arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The district court stated that it would allow the evidence if the government laid a proper foundation and promised to caution the jury about the limited use of the evidence. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony about Stacy’s efforts in 2010 through 2012 to obtain pseudoephedrine pills for use in making methamphetamine, that police recovered a scale used to weigh methamphetamine from Stacy’s room, and that Stacy had provided the witness with pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. The government presented evidence of the 2008 arrest, claiming that it was to prove that Stacy knew pseudoephedrine was a controlled substance and that it was for the purpose of making methamphetamine. The court did not conduct further analysis, but cautioned the jury to consider the testimony only on the issues of intent and knowledge, not Stacy’s propensity to commit the charged offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and 336-month sentence, finding that admission of the prior acts evidence was harmless error.View "United States v. Stacy" on Justia Law