Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005 Greene and his wife had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtained a discharge from all their debts except federal student loan debt of $207,000. As part of the bankruptcy case they sought an order that the Department of Education cancel their debt on the ground that having to repay it would inflict undue hardship. The Greenes claimed that the statute of limitations prohibited collection of their loans, penalties and interest on the loans were caused by the DOE’s negligence, and the loans should be discharged as reparations for slavery and discrimination.” The Seventh Circuit rejected the undue hardship defense on the ground that “the Greenes initiated this case and the DOE has not counterclaimed or sought any judgment … there is no actual controversy.” In 2010 the Department began to garnish Greene’s wages and he sought an injunction. The DOE counterclaimed. The district court ordered Greene to pay the debt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that DOE’s counterclaim was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to make a compulsory counterclaim in the bankruptcy proceeding.View "Greene v. U.S. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Zuppardi slipped and fell on the floor of a Wal-Mart store. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, finding that Wal-Mart had not caused the puddle and did not have actual or constructive notice of the puddle before Zuppardi’s fall, and denying Zuppardi’s motion to strike Wal-Mart’s reply for submitting a declaration in bad faith and violating a district court local rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The declaration was not a bad faith filing and the district court was within its discretion in deeming certain facts admitted and in determining that the local rule did not prevent Wal-Mart from replying in the manner it did.View "Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009 defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, as a felon in possession of a gun. After his 2011 release, he failed to submit to drug tests, to attend substance-abuse treatment sessions, and to report to his probation officer. The judge sentenced him to five months in prison plus an additional 30 months of supervised release. In 2012 the probation officer reported that he had twice tested positive for marijuana. The judge ordered 45 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring. After defendant had missed several drug tests, the judge ordered him to enroll in a mental health treatment program. In 2013, the probation officer advised the judge that defendant had committed five traffic offenses in one day. The judge revoked supervised release, imposing a five-month sentence of imprisonment with two more years of supervised release. He was released in October 2013 and in April 2014 his probation officer advised the court that defendant had again used marijuana and violated rules of the halfway house where he lived. Although the recommended custody range was 5 to 11 months, the government asked for 15 months. Counsel noted that defendant now had three small children and that prior employers would be glad to rehire him after his release. The judge sentenced him to 15 months with no more supervised release. The Seventh Circuit suspended decision pending supplemental briefing to determine whether the judge predetermined the sentence based on prior proceedings.View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hinds, with four coconspirators, obtained about 300 counterfeit credit and debit cards. The conspirators’ names were embossed on the front of the cards, but the cards were linked to accounts held by other account holders. They made illegal purchases in four states, rented a car, and booked hotel rooms. Hinds entered an open plea of guilty to conspiracy to use counterfeit devices, possession of forged securities, and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(1)-(b)(2), 472, 1344, and 1349. The district court sentenced Hinds to imprisonment for three concurrent terms of 30 months, at the bottom of his calculated guideline range, applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) (production or trafficking), as recommended in the presentence report. Hinds argued there was no evidence that he actually produced or trafficked the fraudulent credit and debit cards. The district court found the offense involved “the production or trafficking of counterfeit devices,” ordered Hinds to pay restitution of $21,818.89, and imposed special conditions of supervised release requiring him to pay a portion of his court-ordered substance abuse treatment and drug testing and requiring him to submit to suspicionless searches and seizures. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the enhancement, but remanded the special conditions.View "United States v. Hinds" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted for conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846, purchasing a vehicle with currency derived from an unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957; concealing information with the intent to defraud the Social Security Administration, 42 U.S.C. 1383(a)(3); and making false statements on applications for food stamps, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). He signed a proffer agreement and pleaded guilty to each of those charges. After a sentencing and forfeiture hearing, the district court imposed a forfeiture order that included the forfeiture of eight parcels of real property. The government claimed these parcels were proceeds from his illegal activities. Smith contended that, in determining that the properties were subject to forfeiture, the district court had relied improperly on statements that he had made during proffer discussions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in admitting testimony about Smith’s proffer statements. Its determination that the eight properties were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of his drug trafficking was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In the alternative, the properties were clearly subject to forfeiture as substitute assets.View "USA v. Kerry Smith" on Justia Law

After being caught in a 2011 ATF sting operation out of a Milwaukee warehouse, Wamiq was convicted of four counts of knowingly shipping, transporting, receiving, possessing, selling, distributing, or purchasing contraband under the Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA). The same jury convicted Khan, who acted independently of Wamiq, of three counts under the CCTA, 18 U.S.C. 2342(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence. The court also upheld the forfeiture orders and Wamiq’s sentence, rejecting Wamiq’s challenges to the court’s findings as to the loss amount caused by Wamiq’s unlawful conduct and Wamiq’s acceptance of responsibility.View "United States v. Wamiq" on Justia Law

Esparza testified that he came to the U.S. in 1999 and returned to Mexico from late 2001 to early in 2002; again in late 2002; and finally early in 2008. In 2010 he was stopped for driving without a license, which led to the institution of removal proceedings. He applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that he has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less than 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires that the petitioner not have departed the U.S. “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The dates that he gave would have established that his total time in Mexico since 1999 was only 114 days, with no trip lasting longer than 90 days. The IJ denied cancellation of removal, stating that Esparza “simply cannot recall dates with the necessary specificity.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating: “It’s difficult to prove a negative” especially concerning dates years in the past, with no documentation. Esparza presented his evidence, which was weak but not nothing, and all the government did was point out weaknesses. “Some evidence would seem to preponderate over no evidence.”View "Lopez-Esparza v. Holder" on Justia Law

CBD designs and builds restaurants. Its client, Mongolian House, wanted to renovate an upscale Chicago restaurant called “Plan B.” CBD designed the interior and in 2006 filed blueprints to obtain a “repair and replace” building permit. CBD completed the construction work in 2007. In 2008 a CBD employee visited the city’s offices on other business and chanced upon blueprints for Plan B that were labeled with another architect’s name. The city refused to provide a copy, saying the blueprints were exempt from disclosure. Mongolian House defaulted on payments to CBD. In 2009 the city issued a new building permit for Plan B based on the 2008 blueprints. In 2012 CBD sued, alleging copyright infringement and state-law claims. The district court dismissed the claims under the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), reasoning that CBD was on “inquiry notice” of a possible copyright violation when its employee happened upon the 2008 blueprints. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court recently clarified that the Act’s limitations period establishes a “separate accrual rule” so that “each infringing act starts a new limitations period.” CBD’s complaint alleges potentially infringing acts within the three-year look-back period from the date of suit.View "Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House Inc." on Justia Law

Redbox operates automated self‐service kiosks at which customers rent DVDs and Blu‐ray discs with a debit or credit card. Redbox outsources certain functions to service providers, including Stream, which provides customer service when, for example, a customer encounters technical problems at a kiosk and requires help from a live person. If resolution of the issue requires accessing that customer’s video rental history the Stream employee will do so. Redbox has granted Stream access to the database in which Redbox stores relevant customer information. Plaintiffs challenged Stream’s ability to access customer rental histories and Stream’s use of customer records during employee training exercises as violating the Video Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits “video tape service provider[s]” like Redbox from “disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider,” 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). The Act includes an exception for disclosure incident to the video tape service provider’s ordinary course of business, defined as debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of ownership. The district court granted Redbox summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Redbox’s actions fall within the exception for disclosures in the ordinary course of business: disclosures incident to “request processing.”View "Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC" on Justia Law

Berrey was injured in an automobile accident at work. The at‐fault driver, who did not work with Berrey, carried liability insurance, but the cost of Berrey’s injuries exceeded the policy’s limit. Berrey received partial compensation under her employer’s workers’ compensation scheme but, because her employer was not responsible for the accident, state law granted the workers’ compensation carrier a lien on any recovery from the at‐fault driver. The at‐fault driver’s insurer paid its full policy limit directly to the workers’ compensation carrier. Travelers provided underinsured motorist coverage to Berrey’s employer. The policy covered an employee injured by a third-party who did not carry adequate auto insurance to fully compensate for the employee’s loss. Travelers paid Berrey the difference between her total calculated damages and the at‐fault driver’s policy limit. Berrey claims that Travelers improperly deducted the at-fault driver’s insurance payment from the total it owed to Berrey because that payment was made directly to the workers’ compensation carrier rather than to Berrey herself. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the language of the policy supported Travelers’s calculation and that Berrey’s reading would undermine the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.View "Berrey v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am." on Justia Law