Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1981, a drug dealer (TJ) was shot to death in his Chicago home; the gunmen stole a necklace and ring with the initials “TJ” written in diamonds. Witnesses did not know the gunmen and provided general descriptions. On the day of the crime, they viewed mug shots but did not identify TJ’s murderer. During police interviews, Wright stated that on the day of the murder he was trying to coordinate a drug deal with TJ, that he took two men (one was Coleman) to TJ’s house on the night of the murder and that Coleman had tried to sell him TJ’s jewelry. About two weeks after the murder, witnesses separately viewed a lineup that included Coleman and six others. Two identified Coleman. A third witness did not make any identification. The witnesses later viewed another lineup and identified Barnes as the other perpetrator. Coleman and Barnes were tried together, with separate counsel. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Coleman’s first habeas petition, stating that the facts could potentially demonstrate actual innocence. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Coleman had not satisfied the actual innocence standard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Coleman’s evidence that two eyewitnesses were unable to place him at the scene of the crime was not enough to overcome the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified Coleman as the perpetrator and another who implicated Coleman in the murder. View "Coleman v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Woodridge enacted an ordinance that imposes a $30.00 booking fee on any person subject to a custodial arrest and collects the fee without any hearing. It does not offer an opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek reimbursement. Markadonatos was charged with retail theft. He was booked and Woodridge collected its fee. A court sentenced Markadonatos to supervision, which he successfully completed. He therefore received an adjudication of “not guilty” on his record. He sued, on behalf of himself and all arrestees who have been charged the fee, arguing that the lack of a procedure to challenge the fee violated their procedural and substantive due process rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the procedural due process argument failed based on balancing the private interest in the $30; the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards; and the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Markadonatos lacked standing under a substantive due process claim; he was arrested for cause and was adjudicated not guilty only after completing a term of supervision after admitting the factual basis for the charges. View "Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge" on Justia Law

An asbestos survey showed that the Kankakee building contained 2,200 linear feet of asbestos‐containing insulation around pipes. The owner hired Origin Fire Protection, to modify its sprinkler system. O’Malley, who operated Origin, offered to properly remove the pipe insulation for a cash payment ($12,000) and dispose of it in a lawful landfill. O’Malley provided no written contract for the removal work, but provided a written contract for the sprinkler system. O’Malley and Origin were not licensed to remove asbestos. O’Malley hired untrained workers, who stripped dry asbestos insulation off the pipes using a circular saw and other equipment provided by O’Malley. The workers were given paint suits, simple dust masks, and respirators with missing filters. They stopped working after inhaling dust that made them sick. Asbestos insulation was packed into garbage bags and taken to abandoned properties and a store dumpster. The Illinois EPA discovered the dumping; Superfund contractors began cleanup. O’Malley attempted to mislead federal agents. O’Malley was convicted of removing, transporting, and dumping asbestos‐containing insulation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government did not prove the appropriate mens rea for Clean Air Act violations. O’Malley argued that the government was required to prove that he knew that the asbestos in the building was a regulated type of asbestos. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Alexander and Rogers, African‐American women who formerly worked as cocktail waitresses for Casino Queen, claimed race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Their allegations were based on reassignments to less-lucrative floor areas; discipline with respect to absences, tardies, breaks, and eating at work; and requests for days off. The district court granted Casino Queen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the hostile work environment claim, but reversed as to the race discrimination and retaliation claims. The plaintiffs presented adequate evidence that the floor assignments constituted an adverse employment action. View "Alexander v. Casino Queen Inc." on Justia Law

If an owner of Illinois real estate does not timely pay county property taxes, the county may “sell” the property to a tax purchaser. The tax purchaser does not receive title to the property, but receives a “Certificate of Purchase” which can be used to obtain title if the delinquent taxpayer does not redeem his property within about two years. In this case, the property owner entered bankruptcy during the redemption period. The bankruptcy court held that, if there is still time to redeem, the tax purchaser’s interest is a secured claim that is treatable in bankruptcy and modifiable in a Chapter 13 plan. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that the owner’s Chapter 13 plan was a success; because the tax purchaser’s interest was properly treated as a secured claim, the owner has satisfied the obligation, 11 U.S.C. 1327. Because Illinois courts call a Certificate of Purchase a lien or a species of personal property, the court rejected the purchaser’s argument that it was a future interest or an executory interest in real property. In effect, the tax sale procedure sells the county’s equitable remedy to the tax purchaser. View "Alexandrov v. LaMont" on Justia Law

Currie pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and possessing a firearm following a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a prison term of 121 months, at the low end of the range advised by the Sentencing Guidelines and just above what the court and the parties believed to be the statutory minimum of 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument that the district court erroneously denied a motion to suppress evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court ordered a limited remand for determination of whether the district court would be inclined to sentence Currie differently knowing that Currie is subject to the lower statutory minimum term of five years and that its choice of sentence was premised on its mistaken understanding that the new, lower mandatory minimums specified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 did not apply. View "United States v. Currie" on Justia Law

Acevedo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The drug quantity was at least a kilogram, and the district court imposed the statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment after concluding that Acevedo was ineligible for the “safety valve,” 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Application of the safety valve would have lowered the Guidelines range. Acevedo had been caught lying during safety valve debriefings, denying involvement in trafficking and that he dealt with customers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he was entitled to the benefit of the safety valve because, despite his lies, he told the entire truth before sentencing. The court noted that the district court did not believe that Acevedo ever told the entire truth, and that finding was supported by the record. View "United States v. Acevedo-Fitz" on Justia Law

Flores, an alien who returned to the U.S. without permission following removal, was charged with illegal reentry and other crimes arising from his armed drug dealing. Flores, who maintained that U.S. law did not apply to him and that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, refused to consider a guilty plea. He was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to concurrent 96-month sentences on all counts but one. His conviction, for possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, led to a consecutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment, which was compulsory because of Flores’s earlier conviction of the same crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel furnished ineffective assistance by telling the jury that Flores indeed had distributed cocaine after reentering the U.S. without permission, while arguing that the prosecution did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the weapons-related charges. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Gaines questioned the roadworthiness of two different trucks that his employer of five years (K-Five) assigned him. Management took steps to address his concerns, but the trucks never reached the level of safety sought by Gaines. On his last Friday with the company, he informally discussed an alleged steering problem with a K-Five mechanic. He later misreported what the mechanic said. Gaines claims that he honestly believed he was accurately relaying the information but that he botched the details. Citing the false report and instances of alleged insubordination, K-Five fired Gaines. Gaines claimed that he was fired due to his national origin or because he complained about safety issues and that he was owed unpaid overtime. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of K-Five. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded, finding that Gaines presented a triable issue of fact as to whether he was fired for complaining about safety issues. View "Gaines v. K-Five Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

Darif, a citizen of Morocco, married Kirklin, a U.S. citizen and by virtue of the marriage was admitted into the U.S. as a conditional permanent resident in 2001. It was later determined that he had paid $3000 for the marriage and Darif was convicted of marriage fraud and related charges, and DHS initiated removal proceeding. An immigration judge found Darif removable and rejected all arguments for relief. The BIA and Seventh Circuit denied relief. The court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to review his claims of entitlement to an extreme-hardship waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4) and that the IJ was biased and otherwise denied him a full and fair hearing. The determination of extreme hardship was a discretionary decision and Darif’s due-process argument could not succeed because an alien has no protected liberty interest in discretionary immigration relief. Even if the due-process claim was considered as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of Darif’s hearing under the governing, he was not prejudiced because the BIA gave his hardship claim plenary and independent consideration. View "Darif v. Holder" on Justia Law