Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1971 Milwaukee County provided its employees with health insurance under an ordinance that stated that the “county shall participate in the payment of monthly premiums” and extended coverage to retirees. In 1993, the ordinance was amended to provide that “[t]he County shall pay the full monthly cost of providing such [health insurance] coverage to retired members” as “part of an employee’s vested benefit contract.” Upon her 1991 retirement, Hussey had paid no co‐payments or deductibles for her health care. Her benefit plan booklet explained that with 15 years of service: “the retiree may participate in the health plan in which he/she is currently enrolled on the same basis as … the active employee group. The County will make the full premium contribution.” Until 2012, the plan coordinated benefits so that expenditures not covered by Medicare were paid in full by the County. In 2012 the County increased deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges and modified coordination of benefits so that retirees over age 65 would pay the same deductibles, co‐payments, and co‐insurance charges as active employees. Hussey filed a purported class action, alleging that the failure to provide cost‐free health insurance to retirees constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the County only promised retirees the ability to participate in the same health insurance plan as active employees on a “premium‐free” basis.View "Hussey v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Beverly’s mother, Sarah, was diagnosed with end‐stage heart failure. Beverly lived with Sarah and acted as her primary caregiver; she administered insulin and other medication, drained fluids from her mother’s heart, and bathed and dressed her. Sarah told a hospice social worker that she had always wanted to visit Las Vegas. The social worker secured funding from a nonprofit organization. The six-day trip was scheduled for January 2008. Beverly requested unpaid leave from her Chicago Park District job to accompany her mother. The District denied the request. Beverly claims that she was not informed of the denial before her trip. She and her mother traveled to Las Vegas where they participated in tourist activities, while Beverly served as her mother’s caretaker. At one point Beverly drove her mother to a hospital when a fire unexpectedly prevented them from reaching their hotel room, where Sarah’s medicine was stored. Several months later, the District terminated Beverly for unauthorized absences during her trip. Ballard filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which refers to leave “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition,” 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(C). The district court ruled in favor of Beverly, stating that “where the care takes place has no bearing on” FMLA protections. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ballard v. Chicago Park Dist." on Justia Law

Jordan was released from federal prison in 2011 and began serving a three-year term of supervised release with conditions that Jordan could not leave the judicial district without permission, associate with a felon or person engaged in criminal activity, or commit a crime. He was required to report within 72 hours any arrest or questioning by law enforcement. In 2012 a probation officer sought to revoke Jordan’s supervised release. Jordan had been arrested in Texas for possession of 30 pounds of marijuana. The petition alleged that Jordan left the district without permission; associated with a felon; committed a new offense; and failed to report his arrest within 72 hours. Jordan admitted three violations, but disputed that he had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. Jordan’s lawyer objected to introduction of the police report without the testimony of the arresting officer. The district court overruled the objections without explanation, found that Jordan had possessed marijuana with intent to distribute, and sentenced Jordan to 24 months in prison, without finding that the police report was reliable or making the “interest of justice” finding required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) if a defendant is denied the right to question any adverse witness in a revocation hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that failure to make the finding was not harmless error. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 1983 Bitler leased gas stations to Marathon. The Environmental Protection Agency adopted new regulations so that that underground petroleum tanks and pipes at the gas stations had to be removed, upgraded, or replaced, 40 C.F.R. 280.21(a). In 1992 the parties amended the leases to make Marathon “fully responsible for removing” the tanks and pipes, filling holes created by the removal, complying with all environmental laws, “leav[ing] the Premises in a condition reasonably useful for future commercial use,” and “replac[ing] any asphalt, concrete, or other surface, including landscaping.” Marathon agreed to return the Premises “as nearly as possible in the same condition as it was in prior to such remediation work,” and to be responsible “for any and all liability, losses, damages, costs and expenses,” and to continue paying rent. The properties can be restored as gas stations with above‐ground storage tanks, and may be suitable for other commercial outlets. After completion of the work Bitler sued Marathon, alleging breach of contract and “waste.” The Seventh Circuit vacated to waste regarding Michigan properties, with directions to double those damages. The court affirmed dismissal of some of the contract claims. It would not conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to limit liability for waste or other misconduct by a tenant simply because a lease had to be extended for an indefinite period to allow a response to unforeseen changes. View "Bitler Inv. Venture II v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LP" on Justia Law

Indianapolis requires adult bookstores to remain closed between midnight and 10 a.m. every day and all day Sunday. Other retail businesses are not subject to the restrictions. Indianapolis contended that closure would curtail secondary effects, but the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim. The district court then held a trial and accepted the city’s claim of fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of an injunction prohibiting enforcement. The city did not use a multivariate regression to control for other potentially important variables, such as the presence of late‑night taverns. The difference in the number of armed robberies is not statistically significant. The data did not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets, such as liquor stores and convenience stores, which are not subject to the hours imposed on bookstores. The secondary-effects approach endorsed by the Supreme Court permits governments to protect persons who want nothing to do with adult uses from harms created by adult businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an approach under which governments can close adult bookstores to reduce crime directed against businesses that accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who voluntarily frequent their premises. View "Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

A number of suits have challenged the accuracy of the warning label on Pradaxa, a prescription blood-thinning drug manufactured by Boehringer. The litigation is in the discovery stage. The district judge presiding over the litigation imposed sanctions on Boehringer for discovery abuse. Boehringer sought a writ of mandamus quashing the sanctions, which included fines, totaling almost $1 million and also ordered that plaintiffs’ depositions of 13 Boehringer employees, all of whom work in Germany be conducted at “a place convenient to the [plaintiffs] and [to] the defendants’ [Boehringer’s] United States counsel,” presumably in the United States. The parties had previously agreed to Amsterdam as the location. The Seventh Circuit rescinded the order with respect to the depositions but otherwise denied mandamus. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. v. Herndon" on Justia Law

The Railroad owns the Corwith Rail Yard in Chicago and, until 2010, used an independent contractor, RTS, to operate Corwith. Teamsters Local Union 705 represented RTS employees, who were covered by the union’s health-and-pension plan. The Railroad contributed to the plan, as required by its contract with RTS. In 2010 the Railroad obtained wage-and-benefits concessions from Local 705. But when the Railroad ended its relationship with RTS and moved the Corwith work in-house, it entered into a bargaining agreement with a different union, TCIU. RTS terminated the employment of its Corwith employees. The employees could reapply with the Railroad, but its compensation package with TCIU was not as generous. Local 705 and employees filed a proposed class action, alleging violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 and conspiracy to violate ERISA. The district court dismissed. On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged unlawful interference with the attainment of retirement benefits in violation of ERISA and a related conspiracy claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs alleged only an unlawful “discharge,” which presupposes an employment relationship. Only RTS was in an employment relationship with the membersof Local 705. The complaint alleged that RTS discharged the employees because it lost its contract, not for the purpose of interfering with their attainment of pension benefits. ERISA does not provide a cause of action for conspiracy. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 705l v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC" on Justia Law

Two convicted sex offenders challenged aspects of Wisconsin’s statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring as violating the constitutional prohibition against enacting ex post facto laws. The law was enacted after the plaintiffs committed and were convicted of sex offenses that made them subject to it, but before they’d finished serving their sentences. The district judge ruled that the $100 annual registration fee that the monitoring act imposes on convicted sex offenders is a fine, which is a form of punishment and cannot constitutionally be imposed on persons who committed their sex crimes before the fee provision was enacted, but upheld the other provisions of the act. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the annual registration fee but affirmed dismissal of other challenges to the statutory scheme on grounds of standing. View "Doe v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

Stenson was convicted of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The district court imposed a two‐level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement, finding that Stenson willfully committed perjury when he testified on his own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. Stenson did not just deny that he possessed the firearm, he repeatedly denied even seeing a firearm and testified that it was his cell phone, not a firearm, that the police officers saw in his possession. The court found Stenson’s testimony incredible in light of the other evidence and that this testimony was material and not the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. View "United States v. Stenson" on Justia Law

Fields sued two Illinois prosecutors, charging them with due process violations (42 U.S.C. 1983), malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. He claimed that they coerced witnesses to give testimony that the defendants knew to be false, resulting in Fields’ conviction of two murders and his imprisonment for 17 years until he was acquitted in a retrial. He later received a certificate of innocence. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed dismissal of the federal claims on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The state law claims remained and the district court reinstated one federal claim, which related to a prosecutor’s investigatory work and was not, therefore, subject to absolute immunity. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to one defendant and reversed as to the other. View "Fields v. Wharrie" on Justia Law