Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Castaldi, involved in fraudulent schemes since high school, operated a Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2008. Net losses to investors and the IRS totaled about $40 million. When the scheme was near collapse, Castaldi turned himself in to the government. He eventually pled guilty to just one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of corruptly impeding the IRS, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The district court imposed the longest prison sentence possible under the plea agreement: consecutive sentences of 20 years on the mail fraud charge and three years on the tax charge, about 50percent longer than the high end of the agreed Sentencing Guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that the court adequately considered the fact that Castaldi told the government about his scheme and cooperated with its investigation, but also considered the devastating financial harm Castaldi inflicted on family members, friends, and neighbors of modest financial means. View "United States v. Castaldi" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Chaib v. Indiana" on Justia Law

The Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), requires health insurance providers (including third party administrators) to cover certain preventive services without cost to the insured, including, “with respect to women … preventive care and screenings,” including all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and patient education for women with reproductive capacity. The University of Notre Dame self‐insures employees’ medical expenses; Meritain administers the employee health plan. For students’ medical needs, Notre Dame has a contract with Aetna. Because Catholic doctrine forbids the use of contraceptives, Notre Dame has never paid for contraceptives for employees or permitted Aetna to insure the expense of contraceptives. Because of those religious objections and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb‐1(a), the government created a religious exemption, 45 C.F.R. 147.130(a)(1)(iv)). New regulations enlarged the exemption, so that Notre Dame came within its scope. To exercise its right to opt out of paying for coverage for contraceptives, the university completed a form that alerts insurers that Notre Dame is not going to pay, so they will have to pay. The government will reimburse at least 110 percent of the third‐party administrator’s costs and Aetna can expect to recoup its costs from savings on pregnancy medical care. Several months after the regulations were promulgated, the University unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the University had not indicated exactly what it wanted enjoined at this stage. The insurance companies were not parties, and, therefore, could not be enjoined from providing the required coverage. A religious institution has no right to prevent other institutions from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution and the University has complied by completing the required form. View "Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Ruhl and Serio were convicted of the first-degree murder of Neubauer in separate trials in Illinois. After exhausting his state court remedies, Ruhl sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his conviction was the result of violations of various constitutional rights. The district court denied his petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate as to Ruhl’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the attorney’s failure to present testimony from two detectives who had voiced concerns about the credibility of a witness; interview and present testimony of several witnesses who would have impeached that witness; investigate telephone records to show that the witness had not called Neubauer’s cell phone; investigate facts surrounding a traffic stop on the morning of the murder; present expert testimony, which counsel had referenced in his opening statement, that would have undermined the state’s case; object to hearsay testimony inculpating Ruhl; and present corroborating witnesses at the pretrial hearing on the state’s motion to exclude testimony that another admitted to shooting Neubauer. View "Ruhl v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Before 1992, Chicago police officers received pension credit for time worked for the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. In 1992, the Retirement Board began denying pension credit to retiring officers for prior service with the Sheriff’s Department. In 2008, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that this practice was improper under the Illinois Pension Code. Officers who had been denied pension credit sought reconsideration. The Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the final rulings after the statutory 35‐day limit. The officers did not seek review in state court, but filed a federal suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated officers, alleging violations of procedural due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. and state constitutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the officers’ complaint is, essentially, that Illinois law provides no procedure for making the appellate decision retroactive Their sole remedy lies with the political branches of Illinois government. View "Rasario v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemens' Annuity & Benefit Fund" on Justia Law

Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.View "Carter v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.View "CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan’s remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain’s commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel’s First Amendment defense, that its ad was “noncommercial” speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel’s ad prominently featured the “Jewel-Osco” logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad’s congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan.View "Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc," on Justia Law

The Halims own named WR Property Management. The company’s predecessor had contracted to buy natural gas from CES for the Halims’s 41 Chicago-area rental properties. CES delivered, but the company stopped paying and owed about $1.2 million when CES cut off service and filed suit. An Illinois court awarded $1.7 million, including interest and attorney fees. The company did not pay; the Halims had transferred all of its assets to WR. CES filed a diversity suit under the Illinois Fraudulent Transfer Act. The district court granted CES summary judgment and entered a final judgment for $2.7 million on fraudulent‐conveyance and successor‐liability claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “If the Halims are wise, they will start heeding the adage: if you’re in a hole, stop digging.” View "Centerpoint Energy Servs., Inc. v. WR Prop. Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law