Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bryant, a cocaine‐running “general” in the Black P. Stones gang, was indicted in 2007 for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and 500 grams or more of cocaine; possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a felon. Due to Bryant’s two prior drug felonies and the allegation that at least 50 grams of crack were involved, he faced mandatory life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Bryant pled guilty in an effort to avoid that sentence. An agreement set forth Bryant’s plea and the government’s sentencing recommendation; a letter from the assistant U.S. attorney to Bryant’s lawyer immunized Bryant from the direct use of the statements he would provide in cooperating. Bryant also provided information to Illinois authorities under a separate agreement to which the U.S. was not a party. Illinois promised that his statements would not be used against him directly in “any criminal prosecution,” but required that he tell the truth. Bryant confessed to state authorities that he participated in a triple murder. Illinois shared Bryant’s statements with the U.S., which used the confessions directly, over his objection, to convict him of three murders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his pretrial motions, noting that the plain language shows that the U.S. never immunized statements Bryant would make in cooperation with other authorities.View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Saldana entered the U.S. at age 7, became a lawful permanent resident at 20, but was charged with removability at 34, in 2003, for committing an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and a controlled-substance offense. He argued that mere possession of cocaine was not a drug-trafficking crime, and thus not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) that would render him ineligible for discretionary relief. The IJ denied his application for cancellation of removal. Saldana did not appeal and was removed to Mexico. The agency precedent on which the IJ relied was overturned three years later by the Supreme Court. By then Saldana had reentered illegally and was again convicted of possessing cocaine. After his 2011 release Saldana was charged with illegal presence in the U.S. after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(1), but sought dismissal based on deficiencies in the underlying removal order. The district court denied the motion, finding that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that his lawyer never promised to appeal; that Saldana did not take advantage of remedies available at the time (habeas corpus) and did not justify these failures other than asserting lack of legal knowledge; and that he could not show that removal was fundamentally unfair because he had no due-process right to apply for discretionary relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Despite being informed of his rightsl, he did not file an appeal or ask his lawyer to do so, nor did he exhaust available remedies by a motion to reopen. View "United States v. Alegeria-Saldana" on Justia Law

The petitioner uses two names (Tarsem Singh and Simranjit Singh) and has used different birth certificate translations, listing birthdates that differ by as much as four years. He has passports showing both identities and has claimed three different dates of entry. In 1997, Singh was detained by INS. Singh asserts that he then spoke very little English and did not understand the agents. Charging documents indicate that he had counsel, but he claims that that and other information on the documents was incorrect. After his release, Singh’s father created a new identity for him. INS mailed notice of his immigration hearing to his employer’s address, but there is no evidence that Singh ever received it. Singh was ordered deported in absentia. In 2010, the immigration court granted Singh’s motion to reopen. Singh argued that, contrary to the I‐213, he was only 15 in 1997 so that his detention violated INS regulations and his due process rights and that he had been inspected and admitted into the U.S., so that he was eligible for adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). The IJ ruled that Singh was removable. The BIA agreed, reasoning that even if Singh was 15 when he was detained, he was properly served with notice. INS regulations do not require service in the respondent’s native language, and personal service is effective for minors over age 14. The Seventh Circuit denied review. His claims hinged on establishing that he really was Tarsem and was 15 years old in 1997, which he could not do. Singh also could not establish that he was inspected and admitted when he entered this country.View "Singh v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1998 Ambrose was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1)), based on his alleged sexual penetration of his five-year-old daughter and her friend. In 1999, the state successfully sought civil commitment of Ambrose under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01-205/12, which allows for the indefinite commitment of a person who had not yet been convicted of a sexual offense by establishing that the person has a mental disorder that renders him sexually dangerous. Ambrose sought release by filing a recovery application in 2005. The state court denied that application in 2008. Ambrose filed a federal petition for habeas relief in 2010, alleging that his due process rights were violated when, at the hearing on his recovery application, evidence was admitted of allegations of abuse made against him in Arizona and Indiana, and that the ruling compromised his right to a fundamentally fair trial. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given that Ambrose failed to acknowledge the history that formed the basis for the commitment, and refused to participate in treatment for that disorder, there was no basis to conclude that, absent the reference to the out-of-state abuse allegations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. View "Ambrose v. Roeckeman" on Justia Law

Rymtech, a mortgage reduction program, purported to provide financial assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Daniel, its Vice President, recruited homeowners to place their properties in the program and instructed them to sign over title to straw purchasers called “A buyers.” Homeowners were told that title would be placed in trust, that A buyers would obtain financing to pay off the mortgage, and that they would regain clear title in five years. Daniel instructed loan officers to prepare fraudulent loan applications on behalf of A buyers. Even if Rymtech had invested all of the owners’ equity, implausibly high rates of return would have been required to make the mortgage payments. The equity was actually primarily used to operate Rymtech. When its finances started to disintegrate, Daniel continued to recruit homeowners. After the program failed Daniel was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction, requiring the jury to agree unanimously on a specific fraudulent representation, pretense, promise, or act. Unanimity is only required for the existence of the scheme itself and not in regard to a specific false representation. View "United States v. Daniel" on Justia Law

South Bend police responded to a report that Davis was being held against her will at the Henderson house. Winfield showed Sergeant Wolff text messages from Davis. Wolff confirmed that the woman sending the texts was in Henderson’s house, called the SWAT team, and set up a perimeter of officers and spotlights. Winfield got a text: “he’s got the door bolted, I can’t get out.” The officers did not attempt direct contact, but set up a loudspeaker and demanded that Henderson exit the house. Several minutes later, Davis came out and stated that all the exits had keyed deadbolts and the keys were in Henderson’s possession and that Henderson threatened her with a handgun. About 30 minutes later, Henderson voluntarily left the house, locking the door behind him. Officers did not find any weapons in his possession. Unable to unlock the door, officers forced entry and conducted a five-minute protective sweep. They did not find anyone else in the house, but saw remnants of a marijuana growing operation and firearms in plain view. Police then obtained a warrant and found crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and five firearms. Charged as a drug user in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), Henderson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearms. Convicted, he was sentenced to 39 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Conrad, the “Banana Lady,” a self‐employed singer and dancer, performs in a giant banana costume. After performing a “singing telegram” at a credit union trade association event, she sued, charging infringements of intellectual property rights. Although Conrad claims that she stated that her performance was not to be recorded, except for “personal use,” photos were posted on websites. The district judge dismissed, finding most of the claims precluded by an earlier Wisconsin state court suit, also dismissed. The judge rejected a claim of copyright infringement, over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first questioning Conrad’s copyright on the costume, because similar costumes are a common consumer product. The performance was not copyrightable, not being “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” 17 U.S.C. 102(a). While she has the exclusive right to create or license reproductions of and derivative works from works that she has validly copyrighted, 17 U.S.C. 106(1), (2), it is unlikely that the photos and videos were derivative works. The Act forbids unauthorized recording of a musical performance, 17 U.S.C. 1101(a), and unauthorized display of copyrighted musical or choreographic work, section 106(5), but she did not cite either provision. The court noted Conrad’s “incessant filing of frivolous lawsuits” and suggested that the lower courts “consider enjoining her from filing further suits until she pays her litigation debts.” View "Conrad v. AM Cmty Credit Union," on Justia Law

Aurora hired Gosey as a chef’s assistant in 2008. In September 2009 she applied for an open position as food-services manager at the hospital. The job posting stated a preference for someone with “five to seven years of progressively responsible experience in managing a food service operation,” including experience in managing “staff, budgets and multiple human resources functions.” There were more than 150 applicants. Aurora interviewed Gosey, but ultimately hired a white woman. Gosey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging that she had been denied the promotion, was assigned extra duties, and disciplined for sham infractions because of her race. She accused Aurora’s managers of trying to manufacture an excuse to fire her by altering her attendance records. Two months later, Aurora fired her. Gosey sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The district court granted Aurora summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to claims of harassment and failure to promote, but concluded that further proceedings are necessary on claims that Aurora fired Gosey because of race and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.View "Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Bey and three others conspired to rob Associated Bank, where one of them (Thompson) worked. Bey gave Schoenhaar a pellet gun for use in the robbery and waited in a getaway car with Gregory, while Schoenhaar entered the bank, displayed the gun, and demanded money. Thompson and a (coerced) coworker retrieved $221,000 from the vault and gave the money to Schoenhaar, who led the two to a bathroom while pointing the gun and saying he would kill them if they left the bathroom. He left the bank, but found that Bey and Gregory had gotten cold feet and fled. All four conspirators were apprehended, and charged with bank robbery and with conspiracy to commit that offense, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2113(a). Bey, entered an “Alford plea,” maintaining his innocence, but hoping for a lighter sentence. The district judge imposed a 92‐month sentence. After his lawyer advised the court that he could find no nonfrivolous ground for appealing the sentence, the Seventh Circuit allowed him to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. View "Unted States v. Bey" on Justia Law

VLM, a Canadian agricultural supplier, sold frozen potatoes to Illinois Trading, a reseller. VLM sued Illinois Trading for $184,000 owed on the contract, with counts based on the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, which creates a trust in favor of the seller when a buyer purchases agricultural goods on short-term credit, 7 U.S.C. 499e(c)(2). To protect the trust assets, VLM sought a preliminary injunction. Illinois Trading had obtained loans from TAB Bank, giving a security interest in its assets. By the time VLM filed suit, TAB had seized Illinois Trading’s assets. The PACA-created trust made VLM’s claim superior to TAB’s security interest. VLM added a claim against TAB for seizing PACA trust assets. Before the amendment, VLM had successfully moved for consolidation of the preliminary-injunction hearing with trial on the merits. The consolidated hearing pertained only to counts against Illinois Trading, not Count V, pertaining to TAB. The court, however, issued an opinion resolving Counts I through IV and also entered judgment for TAB on Count V, because VLM had not presented evidence on that claim. The district court awarded VLM attorney’s fees and interest on the unpaid balance based on provisions in VLM’s invoices. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to Count V; held that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, was controlling not the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code; and reversed and remanded with respect to attorney’s fees and interest View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Transp. Alliance Bank,Inc." on Justia Law