Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

PepperBall is a projectile ball filled with a pepper-spray-like irritant. Police departments, private security firms, and comparable organizations are its primary consumers. Advanced Tactical brought a trademark infringement claim against Real Action and its president, Tran. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Real Action, which preserved its objection. There was no evidence that Real Action had the necessary minimum contacts with Indiana to support specific jurisdiction. View "Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc." on Justia Law

The Union represents a bargaining unit at PPG’s plant. PPG informed the Union in April 2009 that it wanted to modify the collective bargaining agreement to reduce labor costs. That CBA states that a party seeking to alter the agreement must provide 30 days’ notice. The parties are required to meet in conference at least 10 days before the agreement expires. Proposed changes must be presented not later than the first day of the conference, by the party seeking modification. The parties attended an informal meeting on May 14. PPG explained that its labor costs exceeded competitors’ by $10 an hour; the parties discussed possibilities for reducing those costs. The Union requested that PPG provide details of one proposal and calculate labor-cost reductions that could be achieved without concessions from current employees. On May 28, PPG sent an e-mail with those details. The official negotiating conference began on June 1. PPG reiterated its proposal. During the next two days PPG put forward other proposals. The Union responded that it was not required to bargain about those proposals and filed a grievance. An arbitrator found some proposals timely and others untimely. PPG put forward its final offer, removing several items that had been proposed after June 1. PPG determined that the parties were at an impasse and unilaterally implemented the final offer. The Union filed suit under 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The district court granted PPG summary judgment, concluding that the arbitrator’s award did not preclude PPG from implementing the proposals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the text of the decision nor the arbitration record supported the Union’s desired interpretation of the award. View "United Steel, Paper & Forest, Rubber, Mfg, Energy Int'l Union v. PPG Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Northern, operated by VanDuinen, was a general contractor on public construction projects, legally required to obtain surety bonds. Hanover was Northern’s bonding agent and required Northern to enter into an Indemnity Agreement, which VanDuinen signed in his individual capacity and as Northern’s President. The Midway Airport Project was financed by the FAA and managed by Parsons. In 2008 Northern won the bid and began subcontracting. in 2009 subcontractors complained that Northern failed to pay them in accordance with the bonds and contracts. Work was halted, resulting in a separate complaint, by Parsons, for failure to complete the Project as required. The FAA opted to retain possession of remaining contract funds, $127,086.00, pending resolution of the disputes and completion of the work. Hanover received claims from subcontractors McDaniel ($127,452.78) and Rex Electric ($78,495.00) and a claim for performance from Parsons. Hanover demanded collateral under the Agreement. Northern refused to post collateral or to indemnify Hanover. In 2009 McDaniel filed for bankruptcy; the bankruptcy trustee sued Hanover seeking payment for work performed. In 2012, Hanover paid the trustee $127,452.78 to resolve both McDaniels’s and Rex Electric’s claims. Hanover resolved Parson’s claim by stepping in as general contractor and arranging for completion of the Project. Parsons paid Hanover the $127,086.00 of contract funds the FAA had withheld. Hanover sued Northern and VanDuinen. The district court granted summary judgment in Hanover’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Agreement is unambiguous. Northern breached it, and Hanover is entitled to contractual damages. View "Hanover Ins. Co. v. Northern Bldg. Co." on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Hernandez picked up a red bag in an alley. Chicago Officers Varchetto and Pierri, patrolling in an unmarked car, saw him pick up the bag and run up the alley. He saw the officers and dropped the bag. As the officers approached, he volunteered, “I just have some dope.” Hernandez handed a key holder to Varchetto, who found five small bags of heroin inside. The officers arrested Hernandez. Pierri asked him what was in the red bag. Hernandez replied that he had “ripped the guys around the corner for dope and a gun.” Pierri opened the bag and found a loaded gun, 61 small bags of crack cocaine, and 55 small bags of marijuana. The officers then gave Hernandez Miranda warnings and took him to the station. During the ride, without prompting, Hernandez volunteered that he had received fake drugs from the owners of the red bag and was beaten when he complained; taking it was retaliation. At the station, Hernandez was again given Miranda warnings. He repeated his story with more detail. Hernandez unsuccessfully moved to suppress his post-Miranda confession on the ground that it was a product of having confessed during a pre-Miranda interrogation. He was convicted of possessing a gun as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the single question asked before Hernandez was given Miranda warnings falls within the “public safety” exception to Miranda.View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Georgieva and her husband Dimitrov, Bulgarian citizens, were admitted to the U.S. in 2002 under the visa waiver program and timely requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Because of continuances, they did not appear before an immigration judge until 2011. Georgieva described bullying she experienced as a Roma child; not being admitted to college because she was Roma; being tricked by her employer and “forced to have sex with a strange man who paid for her like she was meat;” having the police refuse to act; becoming involved Euroroma, which advocates for Roma rights in Europe; receiving threats from associates of her former boss; being abducted outside the Euroroma office and beaten; and being denied medical attention. Dimitrov testified that Georgieva suffered from pain and headaches as a result of the beating. Both testified that they fear persecution if returned to Bulgaria; their families have left that country. They have American-born sons, aged six and 10. The older son has been diagnosed with autism. The immigration judge noted many discrepancies in the testimony, found that there was not enough corroborating documentary evidence, and ordered the couple removed to Bulgaria. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Georgieva v. Holder" on Justia Law

Peterson’s victim, 10-year-old M., claimed that when he was seven years old he slept over at Peterson’s house and that Peterson abused him sexually. Although he regularly saw Peterson after that, M. did not report the abuse until he told two friends and his older sister one day, more than a year later, while Peterson was at the boy’s house. The children told Liethen, an off-duty police officer who was also at the house visiting M.’s sister. Liethen stated that she confronted Peterson with what she assumed were recent events. Instead of denying the allegation, Peterson said, “that wasn’t when that happened.” M.’s friends, his sister, and his mother corroborated details of the boy’s testimony. The court allowed “other acts” evidence concerning three underage girls whom Peterson had abused under similar circumstances. The jury was instructed to consider that evidence only for purposes of establishing motive, opportunity, intent, and absence of mistake. Peterson did not testify and did not call witnesses. The jury found him guilty of first degree sexual assault of a child. Because of his multiple past offenses, Peterson was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. After unsuccessful attempts to obtain state post-conviction relief, the federal district court denied Peterson’s petition for habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, the state court did not unreasonably apply the clearly established law of Strickland v. Washington, in evaluating counsel’s failure to move to suppress the statement Peterson made to Leithen. View "Peterson v. Tegel" on Justia Law

Seven years after Plyler installed a Whirlpool microwave oven and eight hours after using that oven, a houseguest woke him because of a fire in the microwave. Firefighters extinguished the fire. Plyler claims that he injured his elbow and knee while he ran into and out of his house and that he experienced post-traumatic stress disorder. At trial on negligent recall and strict liability claims, a fire department investigator could not identify a specific cause of the fire. Plyler blamed the fire on a product defect that had led Whirlpool to recall microwaves in 2001. Whirlpool’s Director of Global Product Safety testified that the ovens posed a fire hazard only if they contained splattered food. uncleaned for an extended time, and were running at the time of the fire. After Whirlpool discovered that 1.8 million microwaves contained the defect, it issued a recall through the Consumer Product Safety Commission, mailed notices to owners who had submitted a product registration card, and released news announcements. Although the average recall leads to repair or replacement of 10 to 15 percent of affected units, Whirlpool repaired 75 percent of the recalled microwave. Plyler stated that he kept his microwave clean; that he never received notice; that he paid for it with a credit card; and that Whirlpool should have been able to contact him. The jury found in favor of Whirlpool. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings that limited Plyler’s testimony to his observations and that allowed questions about the relationship between the fire and his divorce.View "Plyler v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

Holder was an Illinois correctional officer since 2006. His wife began to suffer from mental health problems relating to opiate dependency. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to 12 work weeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for a spouse with a serious medical condition, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). In October 2007, Holder submitted an FMLA certification form. His wife’s psychiatrist indicated that it would “be necessary for the employee to take off work only intermittently or to work less than a full schedule as a result of the condition,” and that the need for leave would continue for an “unknown” duration. The request was approved. The state never asked for additional medical documentation and paid its share of his health insurance premium until April 18, 2008. About 130 days of absence were recorded on a day-by-day basis. On April 18, 2008, Holder was advised that his FMLA leave had expired and that additional leave would be under the Illinois Family Responsibility Leave program, which allows up to a year of unpaid leave; the state only covers insurance premiums for six months. In April-June 2008, Holder took 29 absences, citing the state program. The Warden disapproved requests for June 8-9 and on the denied form, Holder wrote “last one!!!” Eight months later Central Management Services informed Holder that the state had mistakenly paid for his health insurance premiums beyond his entitlement and began deducting 25% of his earnings until he had refunded $8,291.83. Holder sued, claiming interference with FLMA rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the state, but the judge entered judgment awarding Holder $1,222.10 for January 2008, but entered a judgment for the state for the rest of the months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holder v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law