Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but, on rehearing en banc, reversed, holding that the correct interpretation of “judicial district or similar legal entity” in section 1692i is the smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed. View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Townsend applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2003, at age 44, claiming that she had become incapable of full‐time gainful employment in May 2002 when she had stopped working as a result of multiple physical and psychiatric ailments, including fibromyalgia. In 2012 an ALJ decided that she had become totally disabled in November 2008. By the time that decision was rendered she had died (of pulmonary diseases apparently unrelated to the ailments alleged to have made her totally disabled). Her father was substituted for her. The district court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting multiple errors in determining the onset of total disability. View "Williams v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Arrellano was convicted of one count of conspiring to possess heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and two counts of using a cell phone to facilitate that conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). At trial, the government introduced Arrellano’s cell phone, as well as several wiretapped telephone conversations involving Arrellano’s alleged co-conspirators. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the co-conspirator statements were properly admitted, so that any error in admitting Arrellano’s cell phone was harmless, and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Arrellano" on Justia Law

Chychula and her codefendants engaged in a fraudulent investment scheme, involving more than 60 investors who lost almost $4.5 million. The scheme lasted several years and took various forms, including investment in companies that Chychula and her codefendants incorporated; dissemination of false information to investors by electronic mail and facsimile; and receipt of wire transfers of funds from investors’ bank accounts. Convicted of nine counts of participating in a scheme to defraud by means of interstate wire communications, 18 U.S.C. 1343, Chychula was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in applying a two‐level enhancement to her offense level for obstruction of justice because it failed to make the necessary findings. View "United States v. Chychula" on Justia Law

Gambino filed a state lawsuit to clear his title to three properties, claiming that defendants (including Koonce) used forged deeds and other fraudulent documents to improperly gain title. An Illinois state court found that Koonce acted with fraud and malice and ordered him to pay compensatory and punitive damages. After the state appellate court affirmed, but before Koonce satisfied the judgment, Koonce filed for bankruptcy. Gambino filed an adversary action against Koonce in bankruptcy, seeking to have the state judgment declared non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6). The bankruptcy court found that Gambino had conclusively established that Koonce’s debt was non-dischargeable and that Koonce was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of his intent. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the issue of fraudulent intent was not actually litigated in state court. The state court could not have decided that Koonce slandered Gambino’s title or assessed punitive damages without first deciding whether he did so with fraudulent intent. View "Koonce v. Gambino" on Justia Law

Anderson alleges that he was sexually abused by priests and other employees of the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s and that, as a result of the abuse, he requires continuous psychological counseling and spent most of his adult life in penal institutions. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint explicitly acknowledged that the claims were barred by the Illinois statute of limitations or statute of repose. A 1991 statute of repose for actions based on childhood sexual abuse requires that all such claims be brought within two years of the date that the victim discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the abuse occurred, “but in no event … more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years,” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Although the statute was repealed effective January 1, 1994, the repeal does not avoid the impact as to Anderson because his claims were extinguished prior to the repeal. The court rejected claims of estoppel and waiver. View "Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago" on Justia Law

Jennifer’s seven-year-old daughter, Liza, was diagnosed with a rare brain tumor that is almost always fatal. Jennifer learned that marijuana oil might be beneficial; some medical evidence supports the belief. The legal status of cannabis oil was unclear, but Jennifer decided to grow her own marijuana and extract the oil. Her father-in-law, Curtis, a Chicago police officer, advised her of the legal risks, but supplied specialized light bulbs and periodically checked the crop. Liza died on July 10, 2012. The funeral was held three days later. Jennifer kept Liza’s body at home, so that the family, including three younger siblings could grieve as Jennifer thought appropriate. Curtis objected. There was conflict about the obituary, who could attend services, the display of religious symbols, and Curtis attempting to take possession of the ashes after Liza’s cremation. After the funeral, Curtis and another officer prepared an affidavit for a warrant to search Jennifer’s house, based on Curtis’s observation of marijuana plants in Jennifer’s basement. The affidavit did not disclose the relationship between them. On the fourth day after the funeral, 12-15 DEA officers searched Jennifer’s home. They found no marijuana. Jennifer had discarded the plants upon Liza’s death. No criminal proceedings were brought. Jennifer sued the officers and the city, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights by including falsehoods in the affidavit and by failing to train officers to prevent irresponsible behavior. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing Curtis’s behavior as “atrocious,” but noting that there was no allegation that he knew the marijuana was gone. The application was misleading, but candor would not have undermined the existence of probable cause. An officer’s motive in applying for a warrant does not invalidate the warrant. “Illinois might be wise to require slightly more information in affidavits in support of warrant applications.” View "Scherr v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Purchasers of organic asphalt roofing shingles in many states sued IKO and affiliated firms, contending that it falsely told customers that the shingles met an industry standard (ASTM D2250 and that compliance had been ascertained by use of a testing protocol (ASTM D228). What distinguishes an “organic” asphalt tile is inclusion of a layer made from felt or paper; tiles that include a fiberglass layer are not called organic, even though asphalt itself has organic components. In 2009 the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of the federal suits to the Central District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 1407. Plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class that would cover IKO sales in eight states since 1979. The court declined. After determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed despite the district court’s error in transferring the matter to a judge without approval of the Panel, the Seventh Circuit vacated, While not required to certify the proposed class, the district court denied class certification under a mistaken belief that “commonality of damages” is legally indispensable. View "Zanetti v. IKO Mfg Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Pollock was convicted of aggravated stalking and was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition. After an alleged attack on his next girlfriend, he was charged with battery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault; he was later acquitted. While in jail, Pollock called a friend and told him to remove the guns from Pollock’s car. The call was monitored. The friend led police to the nine guns, which had been moved to Pollock’s mother’s home. Convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and attempted witness tampering, Pollock was sentenced to 240 months in prison, finding that Pollock’s threat of killing himself and his girlfriend with one of the guns mad the possession “in connection with” aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction, to certain remarks made by the prosecutor, and to the below-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Pollock" on Justia Law