Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Nelsons sued Chicago law firm Freeborn & Peters for malpractice, seeking $1.3 million in damages and were awarded more than $1 million. The malpractice claim arose from a transaction that the law firm handled involving acquisition of a shopping center under construction in Algonquin, Illinois. The law firm represented both the contract purchaser and the Nelsons, who invested in the venture, which suffered losses following the downturn of September 2008. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that any error in the allocation of damages did not hurt the law firm or any creditors. View "Nelson Bros. Prof'l Real Estate, LLC v. Freeborn & Peters, LLP" on Justia Law

Price took numerous sexually explicit photographs of his daughter when she was between the ages of 10 and 12. He put some on the Internet; those have been implicated in at least 160 child pornography investigations. Price also kept a large stash of child pornography depicting other children, stored on two computers. He was convicted of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Price has a history of sexually abusing children. He molested his daughter several times and sexually abused his sister regularly when she was between the ages of 8 and 14. The district judge imposed a sentence below the 40-year term recommended by the sentencing guidelines: 18 years on the production count and a concurrent 6-year term on the possession count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the search of one computer and a claim of instructional error. Price consented to the search, and the jury instruction that defined “sexually explicit conduct,” an element of the statutory definition of child pornography, was neither legally improper nor unconstitutionally overbroad. The trial judge expressed disagreement with the guidelines as a policy matter and adequately explained her reasons for finding the recommendation too high. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Herrmann’s application for Supplemental Security Income for benefits for the period before she turned 55 was rejected by an administrative law judge, but because of the less demanding showing of disability, she was deemed to have become disabled when she reached 55. She appealed the partial denial unsuccessfully. Her treating physicians, with three consultative physicians selected by the Social Security Administration, advised the administrative law judge that she suffers from fibromyalgia, spinal disk disease, abnormal sensitivity to light, and other ailments, and that she walks haltingly, has difficulty gripping objects, experiences difficulty in rising from a sitting position, has trouble concentrating in a bright room or when looking at a computer screen, and as a result of this assemblage of impairments cannot do even light work on a full-time basis. The Seventh Circuit reversed, questioning the testimony of the vocational expert concerning available jobs. View "Herrmann v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In opening and closing arguments during his trial on three counts of tax evasion for failing to pay almost $239,400 in income tax between 2005 and 2007, 26 U.S.C. 7201, Stuart’s attorney argued that he believed he owed no taxes. Stuart thought that the United States had no authority to tax income. Stuart had adopted these views after reading a book called “Cracking the Code,” which urges people to resist paying income taxes, but his counsel told the jury that Stuart learned his ideas from his fellow church patrons. Counsel described Stuart as a curious, determined, and “kooky, not criminal” person. Only after he received no response to his inquiries from the IRS, the Secretary of the Treasury, or his accountants about his tax ideas, counsel stated, did Stuart begin to refrain from paying income tax. His attorney did not call any witnesses; Stuart did not testify and the jury found him guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Stuart" on Justia Law

Grenadyor is a pharmacist formerly employed by Ukrainian Village Pharmacy, which with pharmacies that serve similar communities in other states (joined as additional defendants in this suit), is alleged to be controlled by individuals of Ukrainian origin, mainly members of the Bogacheck family. Grenadyor claims that the pharmacy defrauded the government by making gifts to customers (such as tins of caviar), or forgiving their copays, to induce them to have their prescriptions filled by it rather than by competing pharmacies. He also alleged that the pharmacy sought government reimbursement for drugs that were not delivered to the buyers. The district court dismissed his complaint under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, which also claimed retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the kickback claims under the Act, noting that Grenadyor was unable to name any person who had received more than $50 worth of kickbacks in a year, when the court requested that he do so. Allegations about claims for reimbursement for undelivered prescriptions were also inadequate. The court reversed with regard to the retaliation claim. View "Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Vill. Pharmacy" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives planned to recruit individuals to rob a fictional drug stash house. Agent Gomez acted as “Loquito,” a drug courier for a Mexican drug cartel, who was unhappy with his employer and intended to rob a cartel stash house. To find Loquito’s accomplices for the fictional robbery, ATF turned to Moore, a paid informant. Moore had entered into a state court plea agreement, agreeing to assist in the indictment of 10 individuals on controlled substance delivery charges. Moore began recruiting for Loquito’s crew to fulfill this quota. Ultimately, Blitch, Carwell, Washington and Harris were convicted of conspiring and attempting to possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine and of being felons in possession of firearms and carrying firearms in furtherance of a crime. On remand due to problems with jury selection and deliberation, they were acquitted on the attempt charge but convicted on all other counts. Each was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 25 years The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a ruling granting a motion in limine to preclude an entrapment defense; to the sufficiency of the evidence; to evidentiary rulings; and to sentencing. View "United States v. Blitch" on Justia Law

In 2006 Bey was convicted for making false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding and received a below-guidelines sentence of three months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her conviction found that the sentence was too low and remanded for resentencing. After remand by the Supreme Court, the district court resentenced Bey to 24 months in prison and ordered her to self-surrender. After the second extension, Bey’s lawyer, Anderson, mailed her a letter enclosing the court’s order resetting her surrender date to December 2008. When Bey did not surrender, an arrest warrant was issued. After a year, she was arrested and charged with knowingly failing to surrender to serve her sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(2). Bey moved to dismiss her indictment and to suppress evidence that attorney Anderson notified her of the self-surrender date because, she asserted, it was a privileged communication. The district court denied the motion. At trial Bey objected to testimony from Anderson about any conversations they had and to the admission of his letter to Bey. The judged redacted part of the letter, admitting three sentences from it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A lawyer’s communication of the defendant’s surrender date is not a privileged communication. View "United States v. Bey" on Justia Law

In 2011, Jenkins pled guilty in Illinois state court to one felony count of Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1). He received a sentence of probation. Following Jenkins’s conviction, both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of Illinois held the portion of the AUUW statute under which he was convicted to be facially unconstitutional. In 2013, Jenkins pled guilty to aiding and abetting a kidnapping. 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and (2) and received a federal sentence of 168 months. In Jenkins’s presentence report, the probation officer recommended three criminal history points due to the prior Illinois AUUW conviction. The district court adopted those findings and assessed a resultant criminal history category of III, combined with Jenkins’s offense level of 33, for a sentencing range of 168–210 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court erred when it assessed three criminal history points based on Illinois’s constitutionally invalidated AUUW statute. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred. View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review. View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law