Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bell was employed as a substance abuse counselor at an Indiana maximum security prison. An investigator, looking for security breaches, discovered that night-shift employees were having sex on Bell’s desk and told her that he was not concerned about night-shift staff having sex but suggested she wash her desk every morning. The superintendent said that, as long as inmates were not involved, he was not concerned. Immediately thereafter, the superintendent discovered that Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody (allegedly involving sex on his desk) and both were terminated. The prison settled the Major’s appeal to the State Employees’ Appeals Commission and called him to testify against Bell at her appeal. Major was able to keep his benefits, including his pension, to quickly get unemployment benefits, and to subsequently begin working at the prison as a contractor. Bell was not afforded similar benefits and opportunities and filed suit, alleging Title VII claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, concluding that Bell was not similarly situated to the Major, that she failed to prove retaliation, and that the sexual tenor of the prison’s work environment was not severe or pervasive enough to qualify as hostile. The Seventh Circuit reversed with regard to the discrimination and hostile environment claims, but affirmed with regard to her retaliation claims. View "Orton-Bell v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Locke and co‐conspirator engaged in real estate fraud. Locke’s presentence report recommended a 16-point addition to the offense level, calculating a loss of $2,360,914.51 based on all of the properties underlying 15 original counts, although 10 counts had been dismissed. She made a written objection. The probation office argued that relevant conduct could be considered in determining the loss amount, but that even if the loss amount was based solely on Locke’s convicted conduct, the loss amount would exceed $1 million. At sentencing, Locke’s lawyer stated that he was withdrawing the objection to the loss calculation. The district court sentenced Locke to 71 months and ordered her to pay $2,360,916.51 in restitution to 13 entities. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the district court did not make the findings necessary when using relevant conduct to increase the sentence and were insufficient under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. On remand, Locke successfully moved to bar any evidence regarding relevant conduct not already in the record at the first sentencing. The district court recalculated without the two‐level enhancement for offenses involving 10 or more victims. Locke admitted that she had withdrawn her objections to the amount of loss in the first sentencing, but asserted that her loss amount should not be greater than the restitution amount calculated without regard to relevant conduct. The district court sentenced Locke to 57 months of imprisonment and ordered her to pay $340,789 in restitution, reduced by the amount recovered from sales of the property. The Seventh Circuit discussed the factors that distinguish loss and restitution, but affirmed Locke’s sentence based on waiver.View "United States v. Locke" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

Spitz, a freelance copywriter, developed a plan to market “pet safe plants” to the burgeoning pet supplies market. She pitched the idea to Amerinova, a company that develops and licenses plant varieties. Although Amerinova expressed interest, the project stalled. When Spitz discovered that Proven Winners, a company partially owned by the owners of Amerinova, had described some of its plants as “pet friendly” on its website and plant tags, she sued Proven Winners and its owner, Euro. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Proven Winners and Euro. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Spitz did not identify any legal theory that would make Proven Winners and Euro accountable for a contract allegedly reached with Amerinova.View "Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

ABA Retirement, a not‐for‐profit corporation created by the American Bar Association to provide its members and their employees with a retirement plan qualified to take advantage of income tax benefits, created master retirement plans for adoption by lawyers and law firms. In 1999 ABA Retirement hired State Street Bank to act as sole Plan trustee. ABA Retirement directors ceased to be trustees. ABA Retirement still maintained the IRS‐approved master tax‐qualified retirement plans and acted as Plan fiduciary, with authority to engage, monitor, and fire its trustee. It was responsible for Plan documents (ensuring that they were tax‐qualified), oversight of vendors, contract negotiations, and approval of State Street’s marketing plan. State Street had authority to engage and fire investment advisors, but was required to consult with ABA Retirement. The Plan paid ABA Retirement a fee for its services in connection with the Program based on a percentage of l invested assets. ABA Retirement received the interest on the funds. In 2000, 2001, and 2002, ABA Retirement reported gross income of $1,601,217 to $1,861,258. Its taxable income for those years was $384,972 to $672,098; it held assets worth $3.5 million. On tax returns ABA Retirement described itself as an employee benefit fund, and its product as retirement plans. In 2004 ABA retirement sought tax‐exempt status. In 2005, the IRS determined that ABA Retirement did not qualify for the exemption. ABA Retirement filed claims for refunds on taxes it paid from 2000-2002; those were denied. ABA Retirement filed suit, arguing that it was a tax‐exempt “business league” under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6), from 2000 to 2002, and entitled to a refund. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "ABA Ret. Funds v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sheth, a cardiologist, pled guilty to a single count of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. As agreed by Sheth, the district court entered an order of criminal forfeiture for cash and investment accounts then valued at $13 million plus real estate and a vehicle. The government represented that the forfeited assets represented the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud, calculated to be about $13 million. Sheth’s plea agreement specifies that forfeited assets would be credited against the amount of restitution, which the district court had determined to be $12,376,310. In 2012, before the government had liquidated all of the forfeited assets or disbursed any of the proceeds, it sought more of Sheth’s assets to apply to restitution. Sheth objected. Without resolving the factual dispute, the district court ordered turnover of the assets, which were held by third parties. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the court erred by ordering turnover of the assets without first allowing for discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Sheth" on Justia Law

Late on a Sunday night, gunshots were fired in northwest Chicago neighborhood. Numerous 911 callers reported from 5 to 9 shots. A dispatcher told officers to check the intersections at Wabansia and Karlov and at Armitage and Kildare, roughly a half-mile apart. Less than two minutes later, based on additional calls, the dispatcher added that shots were fired from a black car traveling south on Karlov near Wabansia. Officers driving south on Kostner Avenue, parallel to and a few streets west of Karlov, passed a black car headed north, and stopped the car. Burgess was a passenger and the officers found a revolver on his seat, five of its six rounds spent. Just over four minutes had passed from the initial dispatch to the officers’ report that Burgess was in custody. Having a 2001 conviction for second-degree murder, Burgess was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing the gun as a convicted felon. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress on the theory that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the car. The court found that, based on what the officers observed regarding the light traffic at that hour and what they knew from the dispatches, and the seriousness of the reported crime, reasonable suspicion justified the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All told, the circumstances provided ample justification for stopping Burgess’s car.. Reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion is not a matter of certainty. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A tip identified Smith as a possible cocaine dealer. With a search warrant, agents arrived at his apartment to discover 806.5 grams of powder cocaine, 148.6 grams of crack cocaine, 603.4 grams of marijuana, and a loaded handgun. Smith admitted that the drugs were his and that he intended to distribute them. Smith agreed to plead guilty to the cocaine count, to cooperate, and to waive his appellate rights. The government agreed to dismiss two counts, not to pursue enhanced statutory penalties based on Smith’s prior narcotics conviction, to recommend that Smith receive maximum credit for acceptance of responsibility, to consider filing a motion to reduce the Sentencing Guidelines range in recognition of cooperation, and to recommend that the court impose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. The court overruled Smith’s objections to the sentencing report, which produced an advisory range of 188 to 235 months, but ultimately imposed a sentence of 168 months. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that a competent attorney would have recognized the problem with a reckless homicide conviction as a predicate for career offender status, and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting. On that basis, he asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. The court relied on Smith’s waiver of his appellate and the thorough colloquy before the court accepted the plea. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Jewel Foods employed Reeves as a bagger from 1997 until his dismissal in 2005. Reeves has Down syndrome and received vocational tutoring from Jewel; a social service agency sent a job coach to work with Reeves. Jewel’s Service Manager provided individual training. Jewel instituted supervision policies that applied only to Reeves. Reeves, unlike the other baggers, was exempted from collecting shopping carts from the parking lot after he was found directing customers how to park their cars. Reeves sometimes had trouble complying with workplace rules. He cursed at a manager when the table at which he usually ate lunch was used for a tasting; he once cursed within earshot of a customer about another customer. In 2005, Reeves took an American flag pin from a store shelf without paying for it, apparently not realizing the pins were for sale. Despite its usual policy, Jewel decided not to fire him. Reeves’s parents asked if Jewel could bring back a job coach. Reeves’s supervisor deemed the extra instruction unnecessary. Reeves was later terminated for cursing at another employee within earshot of a customer and other employees. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe both that Jewel discriminated against Reeves because of his disability and that Jewel engaged in a pattern and practice of denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. The district court dismissed his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, failure‐to‐accommodate claim, citing numerous accommodations Jewel had made and the fact that Jewel did not explicitly reject the Reeves’s job coach suggestion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Baptist is a native of Belize who entered the U.S.as a lawful permanent resident in 1988.In 1992, Baptist pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation. In 1995, Baptist was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was again sentenced to probation. In 1996, Baptist was again convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the time, the offense was considered an aggravated felony and he was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Baptist signed a stipulated removal order in 1998. Afterwards, he illegally reentered the U.S. several times; each time he was discovered, he was again removed to Belize. In 2005, Baptist illegally entered once more and avoided detection until he was arrested in 2010. Charged with being illegally present in the U.S. after having been previously removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Baptist moved to dismiss the indictment, collaterally attacking his 1998 removal as violating his due process rights. The district court denied Baptist’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Baptist failed to establish that his removal proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” View "United States v. Baptist" on Justia Law