Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal."View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

Rucker, Alvarez, and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and other narcotics offenses. Rucker pled guilty attempting to possess, with the intent to distribute, two kilograms of cocaine. Rucker disputed the additional quantity of narcotics that should be attributed to him as relevant conduct. At a hearing the government presented testimony from Alvarez, who had pleaded guilty. Alvarez recounted past narcotics transactions with Rucker; by his estimate, Rucker had purchased two or three kilograms of cocaine from him every 2-3 months since 2007 or 2008. Rucker was present in court at the time. The parties later stipulated that an additional three and one-half to five kilograms of cocaine should be attributed to Rucker as relevant conduct, raising the advisory sentencing range from 63-78 months to a term of 78-97 months. The court imposed a term of 87 months. Days later, Rucker encountered Alvarez in a holding cell. Unlike Alvarez, Rucker was not yet in restraints. Other inmates later testified that Rucker made a remark that referred to a cooperating witness. A security camera recorded Rucker walking across the room to Alvarez (whom he outweighed by 80 pounds) and slamming Alvarez’s head against a concrete wall. Alvarez collapsed and began to convulse; blood ran from his head. Rucker told a guard that Alvarez had fallen and was having a seizure. Alvarez recovered. Rucker was convicted of witness retaliation, 18 U.S.C. 1513(b); the court imposed a sentence of 240 months, the statutory maximum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentence and a claim of ineffective assistance.View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Moore went out to steal a car, armed with a loaded semiautomatic pistol. He had been offered $5,000 for a high-end automobile. Seeing Heliotis getting into a BMW, Moore approached the open driver’s window, and, according to Heliotis, pressed his gun to her temple and told her to get out. She did not immediately comply. Moore repeated his demand and, according to Heliotis, threatened to shoot and kill her. Moore opened the car door; Heliotis ran. Moore sped off in the BMW. Heliotis flagged down police, and a radio alert was issued. Officers spotted the car and gave chase. After colliding with other vehicles, Moore abandoned the car and tried to run. He was apprehended and taken back to the scene of the carjacking, where Heliotis identified him. In the abandoned BMW, police found Moore’s gun and copies of his birth certificate and Social Security card. After being advised of his rights, Moore admitted having stolen Heliotis’s BMW while armed, but stated that he never pointed the gun at her and never intended to harm her. Moore was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the predicate crime of violence: taking a motor vehicle by force or intimidation with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, 18 U.S.C. 2119. The Seventh Circuit vacated the firearm conviction, expressing concern that the jury's inability to render a verdict on the first count indicated that it was not prepared to render a verdict on Count Two. The court’s decision to solicit a partial verdict contributed to the premature verdict. The court upheld Moore’s additional conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Hansen’s employer has an attendance policy, under which employees accumulate points for unexcused absences. When an employee incurs 10 points within a year, his employment is subject to termination. Leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601–2654 is not counted. As of May 2, 2011, Hansen had nine points. He was absent from work from May 3-6 and May 9. On May 3, he requested FMLA leave for depression. On May 11, he provided medical certification, documenting episodic flare-ups periodically preventing him from performing his job. Hansen’s absences earlier that month were approved as FMLA leave. Hansen requested FMLA leave for eight days in June and incurred no attendance points for these absences. Based on the doctor’s faxed response to an inquiry, three subsequent requests were denied. Hansen accumulated 13 points in one year and his employment was terminated because he “exceeded [his] frequency” under which he could “miss 4 times every 6 months.” Later, the doctor sent a letter, modifying his original certification. The letter did not mention the July absences. The company did not retract the termination. Hansen sued under the FMLA alleging interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that without expert testimony Hansen could not show that his serious health condition rendered him unable to work during the absences for which he was terminated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The law does not require a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to his incapacity, and Hansen’s evidence has raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial. View "Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp LLC" on Justia Law

Vargas and Salinas were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841 and 846), and two counts each of using telephones in furtherance of the conspiracy (21 U.S.C. 843(b)).Vargas pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, and was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment. Salinas went to trial and was convicted on three counts and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim by Vargas that the district court erroneously imposed a three‐level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, unduly lengthening his sentence. The court also rejected an argument by Salinas that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to uphold his conviction and that an erroneous "ostrich" jury instruction prejudiced his case.View "United States v. Varga" on Justia Law

McDowell alleges that, after work, he met friends at a bar. They stayed until the bar’s 4:00 a.m. closing time. They exited the front door and were confronted by other individuals, including an off-duty police officer. The groups came to blows. McDowell claims that he attempted to break up the fight, retreated to his car, saw his adversaries attempt to vandalize it, and told his companions to call the police. Rodriguez was dispatched to the scene and found McDowell running around parked cars, trying to evade at least three men who were chasing him. Rodriguez approached McDowell with his Taser drawn and ordered everyone to get on the ground. The chase stopped and everyone lay down, except Morandi, one of McDowell’s antagonists. While McDowell lay prone 10 feet in front of Rodriguez, looking up at him with his hands behind his head, Morandi walked towards McDowell from about 15-20 feet away. Rodriguez did not issue a second warning nor did he point his Taser. Morandi kept coming and kicked McDowell in the face. The impact broke his jaw, which required surgery. McDowell alleges that Rodriguez still failed to handcuff Morandi and did not request an ambulance. McDowell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging substantive due process violations and Illinois common law willful and wanton conduct. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rodriguez’s conduct, even according to McDowell’s depiction, was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as a constitutional tort or to vitiate his state-law immunity.View "McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing" on Justia Law

Harris was charged with identity theft. During voir dire the judge introduced himself and explained the process to the potential juror pool. After the deputy swore the jury in, the judge stated: To protect people’s privacy, we try to refer to jurors by numbers now. Now, there is nothing more difficult than an Irishman that grew up in coal mining country to refer to people by numbers, and I’m going to try. So I’ll talk to Juror Number 1, Juror Number 2, and the like. And I’m going to try not to forget and talk to you like you were otherwise a human being. But we do this just to protect your privacy, which is a very important consideration in the modern world. There was no objection. Harris was convicted. During the appeal, the government obtained leave to supplement the record to include affidavits from the Jury Administrator, the Deputy Clerk, and the prosecutor, all effectively stating that the jury was not anonymous and the jurors knew the parties had their identifying information. The government included a blank juror questionnaire form used during the voir dire, with spaces for prospective jurors’ names, addresses, and other identifying information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that Harris did not show that the parties were kept from knowing the potential jurors’ namesView "United States v. Susan Harris" on Justia Law

Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Graber worked at the Milwaukee County jail and was vice president of the union. A child was killed when a concrete slab fell from a county park structure. Captain Meverden was the incident commander on the scene; he immediately assigned deputy sheriffs at the jail the task of securing the perimeter. The deputies were informed to stay for mandatory overtime even if their usual shifts were over. Meverden ordered Sergeant Mascari to ask for volunteers to comply with the collective bargaining agreement. Graber arrived for his shift as Intake Booking Sergeant; he was not sent to the park and did not have any staffing responsibilities. A fellow deputy who had been assigned to secure the park approached Graber and complained about the mandatory overtime. Graber took the position that the mandatory overtime violated the collective bargaining agreement. Meverden stated that the mandatory overtime was necessary because volunteers could not be mobilized quickly enough. Following a series of subsequent events, Graber received a seven-day suspension, purportedly unrelated to the staffing issue. The suspension was overturned by an arbitrator. Graber sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights to free speech and association and the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Graber failed to establish a causal connection between his constitutionally protected speech and an adverse employment action.View "Graber v. Clarke" on Justia Law

To compensate teaching hospitals for the extra financial burden of providing training, the Medicare program provides additional reimbursement for expenses beyond the immediate costs of patient care, including for “indirect medical education” (IME) costs to account for the time medical interns and residents spend in ways that enhance their ability to provide patient care but that are not connected to the treatment of any particular patient, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(B)(ii). The district court held that time spent by interns and residents in research activities wholly unrelated to the diagnosis or treatment of patients could be counted as part of this indirect-education time and that Rush University Medical Center, was entitled to Medicare reimbursements for these activities between the years 1983 and 2001. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the Secretary of Health and Human Services has interpreted the Medicare Act consistently since 1983 to exclude pure research activities from compensable IME costs. Congress codified this exclusion for Fiscal Years 2001 onward in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, but explicitly declined to lay down a rule for the years 1983 to 2001. The Secretary has now promulgated a regulation excluding pure research from the IME cost calculation for all years since 1983. View "Rush Univ. Med. Ctr v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Gomez was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to concurrent 84-month terms. A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning admission of evidence of his possession of cocaine weeks after the charged crimes, and that the judge did not specify his perjurious statements when increasing his sentencing range for obstruction of justice. The court later considered the case en banc to clarify the framework for admitting other-act evidence and held that the circuit’s four- part test should be replaced by an approach that tracks the Rules of Evidence. The extent to which a proffered “other crime, wrong, or act” is close in time and similar to the conduct at issue in the case may have a bearing on its relevance, but the importance of testing for similarity and recency will depend on the specific purpose for which the other-act evidence is offered. The proponent of the other-act evidence should address its relevance directly, without an artificial checklist. Rule 404(b) allows the use of other-act evidence only when its admission is supported by some propensity-free chain of reasoning. A trial court should not just ask whether the proposed other-act evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose but how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose; these questions will help identify evidence that serves no permissible purpose. Applying a rules-based framework, the court concluded that the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom should not have been admitted, but that the error was harmless, and affirmed.View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law