Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Contending that a guard had assaulted him during a pat-down by inserting a finger in his anus, inmate Rivera filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Drake, the guard, moved to dismiss because Rivera had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Rivera provided an affidavit claiming to have filed an administrative complaint on the day after the alleged assault. The judge granted summary judgment to the guard, deeming the events too trivial to justify damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On remand, Rivera testified that he had filed a written grievance. The judge found that the affidavit and testimony were false. Prison records contained more than 100 of Rivera’s grievances, but none relating to assault during a pat-down until August 2009. Rivera conceded in that grievance (which did not mention Drake) that it was untimely and had been filed only “for exhaustion purposes”. Prison officials testified about how grievances are collected and recorded; the judge concluded that there was little chance that a written grievance would be lost. The judge observed that Rivera’s initial allegation had been that he made an oral complaint, not a written grievance. The court dismissed, concluding that by committing perjury Rivera had forfeited his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and issued an order requiring Rivera to show cause why it should not revoke his privilege of litigating in forma pauperis and imposing financial sanctions that, if unpaid, will lead to the entry of a litigation-control order. “Rivera has made deceit the norm in his litigation. He is a frequent plaintiff, and many of his suits entail dissembling.” View "Rivera v. Drake" on Justia Law

At a supervised release revocation hearing, the key substantive evidence against Jordan was a report prepared by a Texas State Trooper (Wilson) who arrested Jordan after a traffic stop. His report said that Jordan had been driving a car containing nearly 30 pounds of marijuana. The court admitted the hearsay report over Jordan’s objection and relied upon it to return Jordan to prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the court admitted the report without making a finding about the interest of justice under FRCP 32.1(b)(2)that could have excused the failure to allow the defendant to cross-examine the trooper. On remand, Wilson testified via two-way video conference and confirmed the events described in the police report. The government also introduced a forensic laboratory report confirming that the leafy green substance found in Jordan’s car was marijuana. Wilson testified that the report was the same one that the lab had provided to him. The district court overruled Jordan’s objection, saying that such reports are generally considered reliable and imposed the original sentence of 24 months in prison and no additional supervised release, within the guideline range for a Grade A supervised release violation of 18 to 24 months for Jordan’s criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the testimony by video conference and to admission of the report.View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Indiana Right to Work Act became law in 2012 and provides that: A person may not require an individual to: Become or remain a member of a labor organization; Pay dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; or Pay to a charity or third party an amount that is equivalent to or a prorate part of dues, fees, assessments or other charges required of members of a labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, IND. CODE 22‐6‐6‐8. Section 3 clarifies which substantive provisions of the Act are to be construed to apply to the building and construction industry; Section 13 provides that Sections 8‐12 of the Act apply prospectively. The Union filed suit, claiming that the Act violated the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution and that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151, preempts sections 8(2)–(3) and 3(2)–(3) of the new legislation. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the legislation is not preempted by the scheme of federal labor law and does not violate any constitutional rights.View "Sweeney v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Olendzki is a psychologist at an Illinois state prison. After he was elected to his union’s Executive Board, Olendzki began to advocate for fellow union members and to voice concerns to management. Olendzki believes that this advocacy led to hostile relationships with his superiors and caused them to retaliate against him by removing him from a hostage crisis team; ordering him to meet with mentally ill inmates without guard supervision in the same room; relocating his office; increasing his workload; filing a harassment claim against him; not providing a written justification to Olendzki’s request for advance leave time, which resulted in the denial of the request; and revising institutional directives that affected Olendzki’s job duties without Olendzki’s input. Olendzki was never fired, disciplined, or denied an employment opportunity. He sued six of his superiors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that they retaliated against him for his union advocacy, a violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Olendzki was acting as a union official, not as a public employee, when he made the statements at issue, so that they were not protected under the First Amendment.View "Olendzki v. Rossi" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, allows each state to craft a state implementation plan to control the levels of certain air pollutants. Most state plans include “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) programs, to prevent backsliding in “attainment areas” that meet or exceed the Act’s air quality standards, while allowing some new sources of pollution. A PSD program prevents designated sources from propelling the region’s aggregate emissions over specified limits. The Act establishes these limits by setting a baseline and a cap on pollutants above that baseline. The Act grandfathers sources operational before 1975: the baseline incorporates their emissions, with post-1975 sources counting against the allowance. Title V of the Act requires each covered stationary source to have an operating permit. In 2002 Georgia-Pacific asked Wisconsin to renew the Title V permit for its pre-1975 paper mill. Meanwhile, Georgia-Pacific modified a paper machine at the plant. The application was unopposed and the modification permit issued in February 2004. In 2011 Wisconsin reissued the plant’s operating permit. Objectors claim that modifications to any part of a plant require all emissions from the plant, including pre-1975 emissions incorporated into the baseline, to count against the state’s allowance, so that the whole plant might need to close for lack of available allowance. The U.S. EPA declined to object, concluding that Wisconsin’s approach is consonant with its understanding of the statute. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. EPA presented a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.View "Clean Water Action Council of NE WI, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

In 2004 Miller was charged with First Degree Sexual Assault of a Child. Miller entered a plea of no contest and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In 2006, Miller filed notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief, alleging that he failed to understand his original plea. The court appointed Grau to represent Miller. Grau filed a post-conviction motion. Miller, however, withdrew the motion during an April 2007 hearing. In May, Grau informed Miller that Grau felt there was no legal basis for pursuing post-conviction relief. Miller did not hear back from Grau for months and wrote to the State Public Defender’s Office, which wrote back that the Office “will not appoint successor counsel when a defendant disagrees with the legal conclusions of appointed counsel or wants a second opinion as to the merits of an appeal” and informed Miller that he could proceed pro se, hire a different attorney at his own expense, or direct Grau to file a no-merit report. Miller directed Grau to file a no-merit report; Grau failed to do so. In January, 2008, Miller filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus in a Wisconsin court, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court granted Miller’s petition and advised Miller to seek assistance from the State Public Defender. Miller never did so. Miller petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After additional proceedings and disputes, Miller proceeded pro se and unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wisconsin court’s denial of Miller’s request for new appellate counsel was not clearly contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and his challenge to the validity of his plea was procedurally defaulted.View "Miller v. Smith" on Justia Law

Brown began his employment with BNSF railroad in 1996 and progressed through jobs as a foreman, track inspector, and machine operator. In 2007 a family physician diagnosed Brown with carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists and cubital tunnel syndrome in his elbow. In October 2007 Brown allegedly injured his right shoulder after lifting heavy bars at work. His family physician could not detect any injury despite conducting tests, but sent Brown to physical therapy. By December 3, Brown reported that his shoulder was pain free, and his doctor cleared him to return to work with no restrictions. The next day, Brown had surgery on his wrist to relieve his carpal tunnel syndrome. Surgery on the other wrist followed in January 2008. He returned to work on March 24 without restrictions. He had surgery on his elbow in October 2009 and was cleared to return to work in January 2010. Brown’s surgeon informed him that all three procedures were successful and resolved his symptoms. Brown remained employed at BNSF without medical restriction until September 2011. In 2009, Brown sued under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that the railway negligently caused cumulative trauma to his wrists, elbow, and shoulder because his duties required him to use vibrating tools that caused or aggravated his wrist conditions and that he was required to work excessive hours without proper equipment while BNSF was short‐staffed. The district court excluded his expert’s reports and testimony as unreliable and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting several flaws in the expert’s reports.View "Brown v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Steak n Shake owns and operates 415 restaurants and grants about 100 franchises for the operation of Steak n Shake restaurants by others. The operators of franchises in Missouri, Georgia, and Pennsylvania claim that since 1939, franchisees have set their own menu prices and participated in corporate pricing promotions at their option. After a corporate takeover in 2010, Steak n Shake enacted a new policy that requires them to adhere to company pricing on every menu item and to participate in all promotions. They also must purchase all products from a single distributor at a price negotiated by Steak n Shake. The policy had an adverse effect on revenues. The franchisees sought a declaratory judgment. About a month later, Steak n Shake adopted an arbitration policy requiring the franchisees to engage in nonbinding arbitration at Steak n Shake’s request and moved to stay the federal lawsuits. The district court refused to compel arbitration. Although each franchise agreement (except one) contained a clause in which Steak n Shake “reserve[d] the right to institute at any time a system of nonbinding arbitration or mediation,” the district court concluded that any agreement to arbitrate was illusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the arbitration clauses are illusory and unenforceable under Indiana law, and declining to address whether the disputes were within the scope of the arbitration agreements or whether nonbinding arbitration fits within the definition of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.View "Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty three members of the Almighty Latin Kings Nation were indicted, prosecuted, and sentenced for their roles in a major drug trafficking ring, linked 19 homicides. Anaya did not appeal his conviction but challenged the enhancement of his sentence based on a finding that Anaya killed Campos, conduct for which he had been acquitted, and the drug quantity attributed to his conspiracy to traffic narcotics conviction. The Seventh Circuit remanded for correction of an error in the judgment, but affirmed the sentence. The recommended sentence for Anaya was life, and he received 360 months. Gonzalez, Bernal, and Reyes pleaded guilty and waived their rights to appeal their convictions and sentences on all grounds except for a claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel relate[d] directly to th[e] waiver or its negotiation.” Appointed counsel for Gonzalez and Bernal concluded that appeal was frivolous. Their clients did not respond to their Anders briefs and the court allowed them to withdraw. Reyes’ counsel argued that the district court failed to have a sufficient colloquy with Reyes before accepting his guilty plea. Rejecting the claim, the Seventh Circuit stated that the lone fact that a defendant responds to the court’s questions with only “yes” or “no” answers does not defeat the presumption that his answers were truthful and that he actually understood the consequences of changing his plea to guilty, noting that Reyes has a master’s degree and speaks fluent English.View "United States v. Bernal" on Justia Law

Chicago police saw Chapman carrying a bag with what looked like the barrel of a rifle protruding from it. As officers approached, Chapman ducked into an abandoned duplex. An officer followed Chapman and saw him drop the bag in the living room; another caught Chapman as he tried to escape through a window. In the bag they found a distribution quantity of heroin and an assault rifle. Chapman was charged with possessing heroin with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm as a felon. The jury returned a factually inconsistent verdict, convicting Chapman of possessing the drugs but acquitting him on the gun-possession counts. The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction because the judge erroneously admitted details of his prior heroin-trafficking conviction for the purpose of proving that he knew how heroin is packaged and intended to distribute the drugs. The relevance to those issues depends entirely on a forbidden propensity inference. Even if the evidence was relevant in a nonpropensity way, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice given that Chapman’s defense was that he did not possess the bag. The error was not harmless. The judge also erroneously precluded him from explaining his six prior felony which had been admitted for impeachment purposes. Chapman wanted to blunt the impact by telling the jury that he had pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility in his earlier cases. The judge properly refused to compel the testimony of an eyewitness who might have supported his version of events. The witness was facing drug charges in a separate case and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law