Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Harper was arrested, under a warrant for a parole violation, in the back house bedroom on a two-house property. Agents recovered a loaded pistol from under the nightstand and suspected cocaine base from the top of that nightstand. Fingerprint analysis revealed Harper’s fingerprints on the weapon. In the closet, they found more suspected cocaine base. Agents also found a loaded Glock semiautomatic pistol, ammunition, clear plastic bags of controlled substances, a digital scale, and $368 in cash. Laboratory analysis identified the controlled substances as 148.6 grams of heroin, 105.4 grams of cocaine base, and 1 gram of marijuana. Harper claimed that he resided at the front house with his aunt and used the back house only when he had women visiting and that others lived in the rear house and were responsible for the drugs, but later pled guilty as a felon in possession of a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Applying the enhancement in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(c), for offenses involving unlawful receipt, possession or transportation of firearms or ammunition and prohibited transactions involving firearms or ammunition, rather than section 2X1.1, which applies to use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony, the district court sentenced Harper to a term of 100 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Harper’s argument that application of 2K2.1 was improper for lack of reliable evidence of any connection between the firearms offense and any drug offense.View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

A Chester, Illinois grain bin exploded, injuring three workers. A jury awarded almost $180 million in compensatory and punitive damages against ConAgra, which owned the facility, part of a flour mill, and West Side, which ConAgra had hired about a month before the explosion to address problems in the bin. The injured workers were working on the bin’s problems. On appeal, West Side did not contest liability to the workers but claimed that it did not have to reimburse ConAgra for the cost of repairing the facility. Both maintained that damages were excessive. The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment against ConAgra and the award of punitive damages against West Side, but affirmed awards of compensatory damages against West Side and remanded for consideration of indemnification and contribution. West Side was an independent contractor in a commercial relation with ConAgra and normal rules of contract and tort law apply. Having hired an expert in hot bins, ConAgra was entitled to assume that West Side would ask for whatever information it needed. Admission of evidence that referred to insurance was harmless; the verdicts so far exceeded $3 million that the jury’s belief that West Side carried that much insurance cannot have played a material role.View "Jentz v. Conagra Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Washington Group, an engineering, construction and management services company, offered Abraham a position as a “lead scheduler” for a project in Wisconsin. After negotiations, Washington Group sent Abraham a letter offering him the title of “project control manager,” a higher position higher in the chain of command. Abraham, who worked for the company for about a year, pursuant to his written contract before leaving the company and filing suit, claimed that Washington Group and its parent, URS, also promised him that he would perform the duties of a project control manager and then breached that promise. The defendants claim that Abraham understood that it would give him the title of project control manager for purposes of increasing his salary but he would perform the functions of a lead scheduler on a day-to-day basis. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Abraham received all of the promises set forth in his unambiguous written contract.View "Abraham v. Washington Grp. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

A government informant bought cocaine and heroin from Davis. Davis expressed an interest in robbery; the informant introduced him to an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, posing as a disgruntled drug courier. The agent recruited Davis to rob his employer’s stash house, which he said contained 50 kilograms of cocaine and was protected by armed guards. Davis recruited six others. On the day of the intended robbery, the crew (with semiautomatic firearms) met the agent in a parking lot and followed him to a warehouse for a planning session, which was recorded. The seven were arrested and charged with conspiring and attempting to possess, with the intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; conspiring and attempting to affect interstate commerce by means of a robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Because the prosecution was based on a “sting” initiated by the government, the defendants, all African-American, sought discovery of information relevant to potential racial profiling and selective prosecution. After announcing its intent not to comply with the order, the government sought dismissal without prejudice to facilitate an immediate appeal. The district court granted the request. The government filed an appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3731. The Seventh Circuit concluded that because the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the government to re-file regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it was not a final order.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 25-year-old woman of 25, was denied Supplemental Security Income benefits. She claims to be mentally retarded and to suffer from knee and hip pain in one leg, caused by a defect in the hip joint resulting from a childhood disease. A psychologist administered an IQ test when she was 18. Her IQ was 68. The psychologist thought her more intelligent than her IQ score of 68 implied, and concluded that she could function in “typical work environments.” Three years later two other psychologists evaluated the plaintiff and concluded that despite her serious mental deficiencies she would be able to work, although one referred to work in “sheltered workshops.” She does not use a computer and cannot obtain a driver’s license because she can’t read the test that one must pass to obtain a learner’s permit. Her work history consists of three hand-packager jobs. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with instructions to remand the case to the Social Security Administration, noting multiple errors in the agency’s assessment of the plaintiff’s condition and of employment possibilities.View "Browning v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Because of inaccurate information about time served in the county jail for two theft convictions, Armanto’s release date was recalculated. After receiving orders from the court that entered his convictions and concerned about the conditions for releasing Armanto, who was previously convicted as a sex offender, employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) sought advice from the Office of the Attorney General. Because the court had not imposed mandatory supervision, IDOC “violated him at the door,” so that he was not released as he expected. After his release, Armato sued five IDOC employees, claiming violation of Armato’s constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and false imprisonment.. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that no rational trier of fact could find that Armato was unlawfully detained beyond his court-ordered release date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Armato did not suffer any injury because he was released prior to the precise date in an “Agreed Order,” the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Armato’s incarceration, but diligently pursued relief from the AG’s Office for clarification, and Armato’s due process claims failed as a matter of law and were precluded by the remedies available to him in state court.View "Armato v. Grounds" on Justia Law

Durham, Cochran, and Snow took control of Fair Finance Company, a previously well-established and respected business, and used money invested in Fair to support their lavish lifestyles and to fund loans to related parties that would never be repaid. When auditors raised red flags, the auditors were fired. When Fair experienced cash-flow problems, it misled investors and regulators so it could keep raising capital. One of the company’s directors, under investigation in a separate matter, alerted the FBI that Fair was being operated as a Ponzi scheme. The FBI seized Fair’s computer servers and, after an investigation uncovered more than $200 million in losses to thousands of victims, many of them elderly or living on modest incomes, arrested the three. A jury convicted them of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to Durham’s wire fraud convictions. The government failed to enter into the trial record key documentary evidence supporting those counts. The court rejected arguments relating to sufficiency of the evidence; sufficiency of the wiretap application; the court’s refusal to give a proposed theory-of-defense jury instruction on the securities fraud count; alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument; and claimed sentencing errors.View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed district court decisions invalidating Indiana and Wisconsin laws that did not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, whether contracted in those states or in states (or foreign countries) where they are lawful. The states gave no “reasonable basis” for forbidding same-sex marriage, but more than a reasonable basis was required because the challenged discrimination is “along suspect lines,” being against a minority and based on an immutable characteristic of the members of that minority, against an historical background of discrimination against the persons who have that characteristic. These circumstances create a presumption that the discrimination is a denial of the equal protection. The discrimination does not confer an important offsetting benefit on society as a whole and is not appropriate to its stated objectives. The court stated that: “Formally these cases are about discrimination against the small homosexual minority,” but at a deeper level, they are about the welfare of children. Children adopted by homosexual couples would be better off emotionally and economically if their adoptive parents were married. With respect to the states’ arguments about governmental interest in the welfare of children, the court noted that infertile heterosexual couples are allowed to marry. View "Wolf v. Walker" on Justia Law

Khan is a Mohajir: his parents were immigrants into Pakistan when it was partitioned from the British Indian Empire in 1947. Some Mohajirs formed a political party—the Mohajir Qaumi Movement—in response to perceived repression by nonimmigrant locals. Khan joined in 1992 when he was 14 or 15 years old. He distributed flyers, attended meetings, and recruited people to the cause. The group became increasingly violent, however, and many Mohajirs, including Khan, left to join a new, supposedly more peaceful group, MQM-Haqiqi. But this party too resorted to violence, so Khan eventually left. Khan became a target and was repeatedly attacked, kidnapped, and tortured by members of the first party. He fled to the U.S. on a visitor visa, and when it expired, sought asylum and other forms of relief from removal. While his case was pending, he married a U.S. citizen, making him eligible for permanent residency through his marriage. An immigration judge accepted the government’s position, rejecting Khan under the “terrorism bar,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I); the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, declining to interpret the “knowledge exception” to the terrorism bar because Khan did not raise it before the BIA.View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

After being caught establishing a fraudulent worker’s compensation insurance program, , Neal was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 327 months’ imprisonment. He is incarcerated in Terre Haute, Indiana. Prison administrators discovered that he had signed a court document with an alias. They disciplined him for violating a prison rule which forbids forging any document, identification, money, or official paper by revoking his commissary and telephone privileges for 180 days. Neal sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241, claiming denial of due process. Neal moved three times to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, submitting a purported arbitration agreement, executed by a representative of the Bureau of Prisons and himself, under his assumed name. The district court denied the motion, noted that the only penalties Neal suffered were the loss of privileges, neither of which affected custody, so that relief under section 2241 was unavailable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there is no basis for an arbitration claim. Neal's documents are obvious fabrications and the Federal Arbitration Act governs only maritime contracts and contracts involving interstate commerce. The court imposed an additional fine of $500 on Neal. Until he pays all outstanding fees and sanctions, clerks of all federal courts within the circuit must return unfiled any papers he submits in any habeas corpus action unless the petition attacks a state-court criminal judgment. The court also ordered Neal to show cause why not to sanction him under FRAP 38 for filing a frivolous appeal and forwarded the file for consideration of prosecution for perjury.View "Neal v. Oliver" on Justia Law