Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

“Jane Doe” was born in Russia and came to the U.S. at age two when she was adopted by American parents. During her sixth and seventh grade years, male classmates bullied her, sometimes hurling gendered or ethnic insults. The bullying turned violent. Three boys were charged with criminal battery and were expelled or withdrew from school. Doe sued Elmbrook School District and administrators under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the bullying was motivated by her sex and ethnicity, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Although Doe’s classmates’ actions were inexcusable,” the defendants are not legally responsible for those actions. Knowing how thoughtless and cruel children can be to one another, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI and Title IX to impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school officials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of another. School officials must have had “actual knowledge” of harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Even assuming Doe’s harassers were motivated by her sex or ethnicity, once the defendants gained actual notice of behavior that could qualify as severe and pervasive, they took action against the wrongdoers. View "Doe v. Galster" on Justia Law

While a student at University of Wisconsin in 1969, Soglin attended the first Mifflin Street Block Party. Now in his seventh term as Mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, Soglin wants to shut down the annual event. For the 2012 Block Party, Sconnie sold 54 t-shirts and tank tops displaying an image of Soglin’s face and the phrase “Sorry for Partying.” Photographer Kienitz accused Sconnie of copyright infringement. Sconnie conceded starting with a photograph that Kienitz took at Soglin’s inauguration that it downloaded from the city’s website. The picture was posterized, background was removed, and Soglin’s face was turned lime green and surrounded by multi-colored writing. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the fair use statutory defense to infringement, 17 U.S.C. 107. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a shirt is no substitute for the original photograph; Kienitz does not argue that defendants reduced demand for the original work or any use that he is contemplating. Defendants removed so much of the original that, “as with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile remains.” What is left, besides a hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of his face, which cannot be copyrighted. Defendants chose the design as a form of political commentary, not for profit. View "Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC" on Justia Law

Jeudy entered the U.S. from Haiti in 1980 without inspection. He became a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, the government charged him as removable based on his 1995 guilty plea to attempted possession of crack cocaine, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i). An alien found to be deportable at that time could be eligible for discretionary relief. Among other requirements, an alien had to accrue a certain period of continuous presence or residence in the U.S. While conviction rendered him deportable, he continued to accrue time toward a period of continuous residence. In 1996, he reached the required seven years under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). In 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act added the “stop-time rule,” which cuts off the accrual of time toward those years of continuous residence upon service of notice to appear or commission of certain offenses, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1). Jeudy has no family in Haiti, and has three children who are American citizens. The immigration judge found that the stop-time rule applied retroactively to cut off Jeudy’s period of continuous residence in 1995. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted Jeudy’s petition for review. The stop-time rule does not convey a clear intent to govern retroactively, and the stop-time rule would have an impermissible retroactive effect if it were applied to Jeudy’s 1995 drug offense.View "Jeudy v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1998 Kashamu, a dual citizen of Nigeria and Benin, was charged as the leader of a conspiracy to import and distribute heroin. Kashamu never entered the U.S. His location was unknown. The government did not ask that he be tried in absentia. Eleven other defendants pleaded guilty; one was convicted. Months later, Kashamu was arrested in England. There were two unsuccessful extradition proceedings. After the 2003 ruling, Kashamu left England. Six years later, in Chicago district court, he moved to dismiss the indictment based on the English judge's findings, concerning possible confusion between Kashamu and his brother. The Seventh Circuit rejected his arguments. Kashamu remains in Nigeria, a businessman and a ruling party politician. Although there is an extradition treaty, the government has made no effort to extradite him. In 2014 Kashamu sought to dismiss on the grounds that the court has no personal jurisdiction because he has never been in the U.S. and that the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial clause bars prosecution. The Seventh Circuit again disagreed. Even if Kashamu has constitutional rights, they are not violated. The court has no current jurisdiction, but should he come to the U.S., he can be tried. Denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds is a nonappealable interlocutory order; until proceedings are complete, the causes and duration of the delay, the defendant’s responsibility for it, and the harm from the delay, cannot be determined. At any time “he had only to show up” to obtain resolution of his guilt or innocence. View "Kashamu v. Norgle" on Justia Law

McDowell, Cooper, and others were charged with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute one kilogram or more of hero-in in Rockford, Illinois. McDowell was also charged with six counts of distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Cooper was also charged with four counts of distributing heroin, one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Seventh Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. A jury could reasonably conclude that they were co-conspirators given the evidence that McDowell and Cooper coordinated to obtain and sell drugs. Because there was sufficient evidence to support his conspiracy conviction, the district court correctly held McDowell responsible for his co-conspirators’ possession of firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court correctly found McDowell and Cooper responsible for more than one but less than three kilograms of heroin based on a co-defendant’s admission and other reliable evidence and correctly enhanced McDowell’s offense level for being a leader of the conspiracy given the evidence that the conspiracy involved at least five individuals and he organized and exerted control over them. View "United States v. McDowell" on Justia Law

Zuniga was arrested for pointing a gun at his ex-girlfriend outside a bar and was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine. Both the speaker and the person who heard the speaker’s statement that the speaker had seen Zuniga holding the gun testified. Zuniga was convicted and received an enhanced sentence because he had three prior convictions that qualified him as an armed career criminal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statement was properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, but even if it was not, the error would be harmless. Rejecting an argument that the jury was required to find that he had three qualifying felony predicate convictions that made him eligible for an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence, the court stated that prior convictions are sentencing factors that may be determined by a judge. Zuniga did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Illinois Department of Corrections sent him a restoration-of-rights letter, so the court rejected a claim that he should not have been given an enhanced sentence because his civil rights were restored, thereby precluding two of his convictions from being considered predicate offenses.View "United States v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

In 2000 the SEC charged First Choice and others with fraud. The district court appointed a receiver to take charge of the defendants’ assets for victims of the $31 million fraud. The receiver found that some assets had been used to acquire oil and gas leases in Texas and Oklahoma and attempted to sell them and use the proceeds to compensate the victims. Over the next 14 years, third parties sought to establish ownership interests in the leases. In this case, CRM sought to contest the receiver’s proposed sale of oil leases in Osage, Oklahoma, which it claims to have operated since 2002. The district court denied CRM’s motion to intervene and approved the sale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CRM knew as early as 2004 that the receiver was claiming the leases, but waited until the protracted and expensive receivership was finally moving toward an end and the receiver’s assets were dwindling to take action.View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. First Choice Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law

Moultrie, who began working at Penn Aluminum in southern Illinois in1990 and held various positions, was demoted from his position as a forklift operator in 2009. Before his demotion, he had filed a grievance concerning a work assignment. That grievance did not allege racial discrimination. He filed another grievance, after the demotion, again not mentioning race. After his claims were rejected by the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Moultrie sued. Penn asserted that Moultrie was demoted because of performance problems that caused delays and other problems and about which he was repeatedly warned. Moultrie, attributed Penn’s decision to racial discrimination and retaliation and claimed that Penn’s conduct violated the collective-bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed an Illinois state-law claim as time barred and entered summary judgment against Moultrie on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Moultrie failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his discrimination and retaliation claims.View "Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, after coworkers made offensive comments, orally and in graffiti, about Muhammad’s race and perceived sexual orientation, Muhammad complained to management. Caterpillar responded. Walls were repainted and employees were warned that anyone caught defacing the walls would be fired. Six weeks later, Muhammad left his work station during non-break time to use the restroom, and checked the bid board before returning to work. Supervisor Edwards confronted him about use of work time to check the board. Edwards contends that Muhammad responded with disrespectful comments and walked away. Muhammad claimd that he did not act disrespectfully, but did not want to discuss it without a union representative present. Edwards suspended Muhammad and walked him out of the plant, allegedly for insubordination. After an internal investigation, the suspension was deemed appropriate. Muhammad filed a grievance through his union and was allowed to return to work. He was suspended again and later terminated based on his conduct upon his return. Following settlement of his grievance of the termination, he returned to work. He was later laid off in a reduction in force. He was subsequently rehired and remains employed at Caterpillar. Based on the 2006 incidents, Muhammad filed charges of harassment and retaliation with the EEOC. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he sued, claiming hostile work environment and retaliation. The district court entered summary judgment for Caterpillar. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the company reasonably responded to complaints of harassment and no evidence suggested that Caterpillar suspended Muhammad because he complained.View "Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law