Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Continental and United Air Lines merged, they needed to produce unified seniority and longevity rosters for pilots. The Air Line Pilots Association represents all of the pilots. In 2012 the new United and the Union reached an agreement that sets pilot pay based on: rank (captain vs. first officer), type of aircraft flown, and longevity, defined as all time since the date a pilot was hired, including time spent on furlough. Pre-merger, pilots on furlough accrued seniority but not longevity. Plaintiffs challenged ancillary Agreement 25, under which pilots in active service longer than four years and seven months would receive no credit for furlough time; pilots who had four years and six months of service could claim only one month of furlough; and so on. Plaintiffs claimed that the provision slots 475 former United pilots into the table behind former Continental pilots who were hired before May 6, 2008, in violation of the main agreement, and accused the Union of inadequate representation (DFR claim). Defendants replied that the main agreement governs the future, after Agreement 25 determines the pilots’ starting positions. The district judge dismissed United as a party because disputes about the meaning of an airline industry collective bargaining agreement are within the exclusive authority of an adjustment board under the Railway Labor Act, leaving plaintiffs unable to establish both that United violated the contract and that the union did not represent workers fairly. They then argued that the Union negotiated a bad contract. The district court concluded that Agreement 25 is not irrational. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, with pilots on different sides of the issue, a compromise that favored some over others was inevitable.View "Cunningham v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l" on Justia Law

Lodholtz, injured in 2011 while working at a Pulliam plant in Indiana, filed suit against Pulliam in state court. Pulliam asked Granite State, its insurer, to defend and indemnify. Granite State declined, believing that Pulliam was not liable because Lodholtz could claim workers’ compensation. Lodholtz argued that he was employed by another firm although he was injured on Pulliam’s premises and obtained default judgment for $4 million. Pulliam assigned him its rights against Granite State, which had unsuccessfully moved to intervene in Lodholtz’s suit, then sought a federal declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify. Meanwhile, the Indiana court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that Granite State had sought leave to intervene under a reservation of rights. Indiana courts forbid the insurer to control the defense of the insured without acknowledging coverage. The Indiana Supreme Court declined review. The federal district court subsequently ruled that because Lodholtz’s employer had “leased” Lodholtz to Pulliam, he had been Pulliam’s employee, and that the Indiana judgment should be “disregarded.” The Seventh Circuit granted a petition under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and dismissed Granite State’s suit. The U.S. Supreme Court is the only federal court with appellate authority over state courts, but would have had no authority in this case because it involved no issue of federal law.View "Lodholtz v. Granite State Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Since 2005 Indiana has required voters to present photographic identification at the polls. In 2008, the Supreme Court (Crawford decision) held that the statute is compatible with the Constitution. In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a similar statute, 2011 Wis. Act 23. A district court held that Act 23 is unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation. The Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction, but subsequently reversed, holding that the district court’s findings do not justify an outcome different from Crawford, in which the Justices concluded that prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in the integrity of elections justify a photo ID requirement, even though persons who do not already have government-issued photo IDs must spend time to acquire necessary documents (such as birth certificates) and stand in line at a public agency to get one. Wisconsin’s law differs from Indiana’s, but not in ways that matter under the analysis in Crawford. View "League of United Latin Am. Citizens of WI v. Deininger" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2003, Matz and others were on the porch of a Milwaukee apartment when officers assigned to the warrant squad were driving through the area in an unmarked squad on an unrelated matter. On the porch they saw and recognized Salazar, who they believed was a suspect in two homicides and several shootings. By the time Klotka made a U-turn and approached, everyone on the porch was leaving. Matz admits seeing the police, who were in uniform, but claims that he had already left the porch. He acknowledges hearing someone say “detects” as he was leaving. The officers pursued the individuals into an alley, drawing guns while shouting, “Police! Stop!” Eventually, Matz was handcuffed and put into a patrol car; the car he was driving was stolen. Salazar was arrested. According to Matz, he was questioned for several hours after stating that he did not want to talk and wanted an attorney; was kept in a cell and never provided with medications he had been taking for psychosis and depression; and was recovering from pneumonia when he admitted his involvement in two homicides. He later recanted his inculpatory statement and named Salazar as the shooter, although he admitted being present. Matz nonetheless pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide and felony murder with robbery as the underlying crime and was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment. Matz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2010. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Matz v. Klotka" on Justia Law

In 1987, two men were wrongfully convicted of arson and the brutal murders of two residents of Paris, Illinois and were sentenced to death. After years of pursuing post-conviction remedies, they were released in 2004 and 2008. They filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 and malicious prosecution claims against the city, police officers, and prosecutors. Defendants sought defense and indemnification from their insurers, which sought a declaratory judgment to clarify the duty to defend. In 2010, the district court granted two insurers summary judgment, but denied a motion by an excess insurer, which had issued policies that were in effect from 1985 to 1996--encompassing the wrongful investigations and prosecutions but not the exonerations. The district court held that malicious prosecution claims “occur” for insurance purposes when prosecution is instituted. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that, under Illinois law, a claim for malicious prosecution “occurs” for insurance purposes on the date that the underlying conviction either is invalidated or terminated. In 2012, 33 months after the judgment, Defendants sought reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants were too late to use Rule 59(e), and “Rule 60(b) cannot be used to reopen the judgment in a civil case just because later authority shows that the judgment may have been incorrect.” View "Selective Ins. Co. v. City of Paris" on Justia Law

Edwards was pulled over on suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle and the police found a sawed-off shotgun in the car. Moments before the stop, his girlfriend had called 911 to report that Edwards had just stolen her car. A nearby officer heard dispatch, spotted the car, and initiated a traffic stop. Edwards was driving, did not have a valid driver’s license, could not produce the vehicle’s registration, and was evasive about whether he had his girlfriend’s permission to drive the car, so the officer placed him under arrest. A search of the car revealed the sawed-off shotgun on the floor behind the front passenger seat. Edwards admitted the gun was his. Edwards was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon and possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun. The district court granted a motion to suppress the gun. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A warrantless search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of one of its occupants requires reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Edwards was arrested for driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent; it was entirely reasonable to believe that evidence of the car’s ownership—its registration or title—would be found in the car. The search was validView "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Gerdau leased a locomotive from Titan for use in switching at its Knoxville mill. Titan shipped the locomotive in 2008, but it was damaged in transit and sent for repair. It did not reach Gerdau’s plant until 2009. Gerdau rejected it, stating that it needed further repairs. While the locomotive was being repaired, Titan assigned the lease to Leasing, an affiliated business, which then used the lease as security for a loan from Wells Fargo. The loan is nonrecourse: Wells Fargo agreed to look for repayment exclusively from the stream of rentals expected from Gerdau. Leasing made several warranties. Gerdau has never made a payment on the lease. Wells Fargo has taken control of the locomotive and is attempting to sell it. The district court granted summary judgment against Wells Fargo, ruling that Leasing had kept its promises. The court looked to the lease, and then to the Uniform Commercial Code, to see whether the locomotive had been “accepted” when the lease was assigned. Gerdau had an opportunity and the lease required Gerdau to inspect before shipment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gerdau did not acknowledge the locomotive’s receipt; Leasing did not live up to its warranties. It must repay Wells Fargo. Titan must perform the guarantees.View "Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Titan Leasing Inc." on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

White Feather killed his cellmate, Running Bear, in their federal prison cell by disemboweling the victim using a disassembled Bic razor, having first choked him into unconsciousness during a late-night fight. White Feather was charged with murder by a federal prisoner, 18 U.S.C. 1118. Before trial the government moved to preclude him from offering a defense of self-defense. The district judge deferred ruling and permitted White Feather to present evidence in support of the defense at trial. Ultimately, the judge concluded that White Feather was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction because the evidence did not support it. The jury found White Feather guilty, The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that, even accepting that Running Bear was the initial aggressor, as a matter of law that Running Bear “was not imposing an imminent threat of … harm or deadly force” when White Feather sliced into his abdomen with the razor.View "United States v. White Feather" on Justia Law

Richardson, apparently a lawyer who has been suspended several times, incurred educational debt in 1988 but did not pay. Indiana University, the creditor, sued in 1998. Richardson filed a bankruptcy petition days before trial but did not tell the court, the University, or its counsel. Nor did he appear for trial. The state judge entered a default judgment, which the law firm tried unsuccessfully to collect. After learning about the bankruptcy, the law firm stopped collection efforts. The bankruptcy ended in 2001, and the firm resumed collection efforts, relying on 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8), which makes most educational debts nondischargeable. Richardson filed a second bankruptcy in 2002 that lasted until 2007. Again the law firm ceased its efforts until after its end. The post-2007 efforts resulted in Richardson’s claim that the law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e, 1692f, by trying to enforce a judgment that had been entered in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay. The district court treated the suit as a collateral attack on the state court’s judgment and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should be on the merits, noting that the state court judgment was vacated at the request of Indiana University.View "Richardson v. Koch Law Firm, P.C." on Justia Law