Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Campbell pleaded guilty in state court to first degree sexual assault of a child (his 10-year-old daughter). The maximum sentence was 60 years. The state agreed to dismiss three other counts and recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years, with no more than five to seven years’ initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision. The presentence report recommended 20-40 years’ initial confinement and seven to 10 years’ extended supervision. The state recommended a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The court sentenced Campbell to 30 years’ initial confinement and 10 years’ extended supervision. On remand, the prosecutor did not refer to the plea agreement not did defense counsel object to the omission, but the court was made aware of the agreement. The prosecutor spoke of the need to protect Campbell’s daughter and the public. The court imposed an initial term of 34 years. The state appeals court affirmed. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding that Campbell could not establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object because the prosecutor had not materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.View "Campbell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Evansville detectives received a tip from Hutchinson that Hutchinson’s neighbor, Schmitt had acquired a semi-automatic assault rifle in exchange for $200 and two grams of methamphetamine. Hutchinson had arranged the deal and stated that Schmitt had the gun at home. With an arrest warrant, SWAT officers entered Schmitt’s residence the next day and immediately found Schmitt and Wyatt, and, in plain view, marijuana, methamphetamine, and pills containing controlled substances. Less than five minutes later, an officer in the basement saw a semiautomatic rifle and loaded magazines. They obtained a warrant to seize the drugs, firearm, and related evidence. Schmitt was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The district judge denied a motion to suppress, finding that the gun was in plain view during a protective sweep. Schmitt, who pled guilty in state court to possession of the drugs, also moved to exclude the drugs. Finding that the drug evidence was “inextricably intertwined with the charged act,” and “would be a motive for the defendant to have a firearm,” the federal court concluded that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. At trial, the judge allowed introduction of Schmitt’s state conviction record. Schmitt was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court should not have admitted Schmitt’s conviction; Schmitt did not open the door to that evidence and it was not relevant except to impeach the government’s own witness, but the error was harmless.View "United States v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

In 1981 the plaintiff began working as one of two hairdresser-manicurists at a nursing home. Mondays and Tuesdays the plaintiff would transport residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the nursing home’s beauty shop, do their hair, then return them to their rooms. Other days she mainly did the hair of ambulatory residents and of residents confined to their rooms. She had unrelated duties, such as helping in the laundry and carrying trays. In 2010 the plaintiff had a hysterectomy. Her doctor gave her permission to return to work eight weeks later, with the notation that she could not push over 20 pounds, raised to 50 pounds five months later. The doctor advised “you can’t be pushing and lifting” people in wheelchairs, because, over time, that would tear loose the mesh lining “and you’ll be back in for bladder repair.” The plaintiff notified her supervisor, who stated that he would not accommodate her disability. She quit. Until she was replaced, the remaining hairdresser received assistance from other staff in transporting residents. There was no indication that this diversion of staff from their normal duties was costly or impaired the care provided the residents. The district court rejected plaintiff’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the employer would have a difficult time establishing that a reasonable accommodation would be a hardship.View "Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC" on Justia Law

The Wiggintons receive Social Security disability benefits. They applied to Bank of America for a mortgage to be repaid using those benefits. The Bank asked for information from their physicians, or the SSA, showing that the benefits would last for at least three years. When no such information was forthcoming, the Bank declined to make the loan. An administrative complaint and negotiations followed; the seller pulled out of the transaction. The Wiggintons sued, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, noting that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691(b)(2), provides that it does not constitute discrimination (for purposes of that statute) for a bank to collect information about “whether the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program if such inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit-worthiness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege that the Wiggintons were treated worse than other applicants. The court noted that the Bank has since settled a suit by the Department of Justice and promised not to ask for the sort of information it sought from the Wiggintons.View "Wigginton v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Whirlpool purchased injection-molded plastic knobs and decorative metal stampings from Grigoleit. In 1992 Whirlpool told Grigoleit that it would start using products made by Phillips. Grigoleit believed that Phillips was using a method protected by its patents. Ultimately Grigoleit licensed its patents to Whirlpool and Phillips; instead of royalties Grigoleit got Whirlpool’s business for the “Estate” and “Roper” brand lines and a promise of consideration for other business. The agreement and the patents expired in 2003. An arbitrator concluded that Whirlpool had failed to consider Grigoleit’s parts for some lines of washers and dryers and was liable for payment of money royalties or damages. Grigoleit demanded the profit it would have made had Whirlpool purchased its requirements of knobs exclusively from Grigoleit. The district court concluded that a reasonable royalty fell in the range of 1¢ to 12¢ per part and the parties then agreed that royalties would then be $140,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that lost profits differ from royalties. The caption on the contract is “LICENSE AGREEMENT” and the heading on paragraph 3 is “Royalties.” The agreement is a patent license; the court was not obliged to treat it as a requirements contract.View "Grigoleit Co. v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

After a sports-related injury, Bluestein, an M.D., took intermittent time off for several months, then requested open-ended leave. She was termnted and sued Central Wisconsin Anesthesiology, for discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court concluded that Bluestein, a full partner, shareholder, and member of the board of directors of Central Wisconsin, was an employer rather than an employee at the service corporation, and was ineligible for the protections of those statutes. The court also found that Bluestein’s claims would fail as a matter of law on the merits and ordered Bluestein and her attorney to pay attorneys’ fees to Central Wisconsin for pursuing a frivolous lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment and the award of fees and declined to award additional attorneys’ fees.View "Bluestein v. Cent. WI Anesthesiology, S.C." on Justia Law

South Water Market and Local 703 of the Teamsters Union had a collective bargaining agreement that ran from 2004 through April 30, 2007. On September 12, 2007, they reached a new agreement. Abramson, Market’s bargaining representative, was supposed to draft the agreement. Murdoch, the Union’s president reminded Abramson repeatedly. By February 2008 Murdoch was worried that pension and welfare funds covering the employees would cut off participation or sue. In March, Abramson begged off, stating: “I’m having trouble with my notes.” On April 3 Murdoch sent Abramson a document with terms from Murdoch’s notes. Abramson did not reply, but Market began paying wages, and making pension and welfare contributions specified in Murdoch’s text. Murdoch also sent the document to the pension and welfare funds, which submitted bills calculated according to those terms. In July 2009 Castillo retired. He had been one of two workers in the highly-compensated “driver classification. The Murdoch document stated that Market would employ at least two drivers. After Castillo retired, it refused to provide more than one worker with the wages and benefits of the driver classification. The pension and welfare funds sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1145, seeking delinquent contributions for a second driver position. The district judge found that Market had not agreed to the terms. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Labor Management Relations Act makes a written agreement essential to participation in a pension or welfare plan, 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B), and Market does not contend that it wants to drop out of the plans or that it did withdraw Whatever reservations Abramson had were not conveyed to the funds until August 2009, much too late.View "Russ v. South Water Mkt, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaining that during nine months while he was a pretrial detainee in a Porter County, Indiana jail he was denied medical care for a bullet wound to his abdomen, and other essential medical care. The district court, while fully crediting his testimony, dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. There was no record in the jail’s grievance log of the plaintiff filing a grievance. He testified that he never received, or been given access to, a copy of the jail’s grievance procedure, though he knew from other inmates that there was such a procedure and had asked a guard for, but was never given a grievance form. Another prisoner testified that he overheard the plaintiff ask for the grievance form. The plaintiff eventually met with the Warden, who promised to speak to the medical staff and “take care of the problem.” He did not suggest that the plaintiff file a grievance. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the plaintiff asked a supervisor whether he should file a grievance and was told “not to worry about it.” When a jail official invites noncompliance with a procedure the prisoner is not required to follow the procedure.View "Swisher v. Porter Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

In 2009 the doctor was hired by a small rural Wisconsin critical access hospital, as the director of its emergency room. Fired just months after being hired, he sued the hospital in under Title VII, claiming that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his Indian ethnicity. He alleged that a hospital employee said to him “you must be that Middle Eastern guy whom they hired as ER director” and accused him of taking her job, spat at him, and told him he belonged to a terrorist class of people and was a danger to the hospital. Hospital personnel complained to the plaintiff’s superior that he was incompetent—that he had poor patient skills, behaved unprofessionally, misdiagnosed patient ailments, and couldn’t get along with staff. His superior urged him to resign after he had worked only 12 shifts. After delays because the plaintiff initially acted pro se, and filings that were inadequate or nonresponsive, the judge dismissed the case for failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that “the pratfalls of a party’s lawyer are imputed to the party” and that plaintiff offered no excuse for missing the deadline.View "Sheikh v. Grant Reg'l Health Ctr." on Justia Law

A 1991 judgment, not appealed, upheld a state statute prohibiting members of the Indian tribes from hunting deer at night outside the tribes’ reservations. Wisconsin Indians had hunted deer at night since before they had electricity. Tribe members sought relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) on the ground that its continued enforcement would be “no longer equitable” and asserting that “tribal members need to hunt for subsistence purposes. Between 25% and 93% of Tribal members are unemployed. They also claimed that “tribal members need to hunt at night for cultural and religious reasons.” The district court denied the motion, precipitating this appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that neighboring states allow night hunting; that the state has stringent regulations; and concerns about Indian cultural and dietary practices relating to deer hunting, poverty, and unemployment. Evidence presented by the tribes indicated that night hunting for deer in the identified territory is unlikely to create a serious safety problem.View "Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. WI" on Justia Law