Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Morjal sued Chicago and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, conspiracy, false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution. Morjal accepted an offer of judgment under FRCP 68(a), which provided that the “Defendants offer to allow judgment to be taken against them … [$10,001.00] … plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs accrued to date.” The parties were unable to reach agreement as to the amount of attorneys’ fees. Morjal sought $22,190.50. After contentious litigation the district court awarded $17,205.50. Morjal then sought additional attorneys’ fees of $16,773.00 for time spent in litigating the fee petition. The defendants responded that Morjal was bound by the terms of the offer of judgment, which limited fees to those “accrued to date.” The district court concluded that, in some instances opposition to fees was “overly aggressive” and “arbitrary with no objective standard provided,” but awarded only $2,000 “to compensate for time spent responding to challenges to the fees that were unsupported and improper.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court had authority to award fees under section 1988, and did so only as to conduct of the defendants that fell outside the provisions of the offer of judgment. View "Morjal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2008 Motorola agreed to make a good-faith effort to purchase two percent of its cell-phone user-manual needs from Druckzentrum, a printer based in Germany. After a year, Motorola’s sales contracted sharply. Motorola consolidated its cell-phone manufacturing and distribution operations in China, buying all related print products there. Motorola notified Druckzentrum. The companies continued to do business for a few months. After losing Motorola’s business Druckzentrum entered bankruptcy and sued Motorola, alleging breach of contract and fraud in the inducement. Druckzentrum claimed that the contract gave it an exclusive right to all of Motorola’s user-manual printing business for cell phones sold in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia during the contract period. The district judge entered summary judgment for Motorola. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The written contract contained no promise of an exclusive right and was fully integrated, so Druckzentrum cannot use parol evidence of prior understandings. Although Motorola promised to make a good-faith effort, the contract listed reasons Motorola might justifiably miss the target, including business downturns. There was no evidence of bad faith. The evidence was insufficient to create a jury issue on the claim that Motorola fraudulently induced Druckzentrum to enter into or continue the contract. View "Druckzentrum Harry Jung GmbH v. Motorola Mobility LLC" on Justia Law

Stuhlmacher’s parents purchased a ladder from Home Depot so that their son, Kurt, a millwright technician, could work on the roof of a cabin he was building for them in Indiana. Kurt was using the ladder for the first time when it fell, causing him to fall. Kurt sued Home Depot and the ladder’s manufacturer, Tricam. The Stuhlmachers’ expert, Dr. Conry, testified that the ladder was defective, likely causing Kurt to sense instability and involuntarily shift his weight. The magistrate judge struck Dr. Conry’s testimony, finding that his explanation of how the accident occurred did not “square” with Kurt’s testimony that the ladder shot out to his left. Because the testimony was stricken, the Stuhlmachers did not have any evidence showing causation, so the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An expert’s testimony qualifies as relevant under Rule 702 so long as it assists the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case. Experts are allowed to posit alternate models to explain their conclusions. View "Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s decisions to redesignate three geographic areas—Milwaukee-Racine, Greater Chicago, and the Illinois portion of the St. Louis area—as having attained the 1997 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. The CAA mandates that before redesignating an area, EPA must confirm not just that ozone in an area dropped below a certain level, but also that the improvement in air quality resulted from “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions.” EPA interprets that edict to require a finding that the requisite ozone drops are “reasonably attributable” to permanent and enforceable reductions. Sierra Club argued that the Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this causation finding in each of the redesignations. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. EPA demonstrated that it “examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, that the Agency’s decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and that the Agency has made no clear error of judgment.” View "Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Jones pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Other charges were dismissed. Jones qualified for the safety valve and retroactive amendment to the USSG, resulting in a 46-month sentence, followed by five years of supervised release. Six months after his release, he was caught driving on a suspended license and charged with obstructing an officer. The court required community service and a cognitive behavioral therapy program. Jones accomplished both, but later resisted an officer during a traffic stop, was charged with aggravated battery for a bar fight, and was charged with battery for another fight. His girlfriend evicted him. The probation officer directed Jones to report, but he failed to do so. He drifted and did not report, failing to file four monthly probation reports. After he was found, Jones’s urine tested positive for marijuana. A petition to revoke supervised release noted the possibility of a three-year prison sentences. Jones’s attorney emphasized the relatively minor nature of the violations and that Jones was recovering from surgery, had established a stable residence, had completed a welding program, a substance-abuse evaluation, and a cognitive behavioral therapy program. The court announced a sentence of four months—the bottom of the Guidelines range, followed 36 months of supervised release. Jones stated that he thought, by pleading guilty, that he would not have continued supervised release. Jones completed the imprisonment sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the supervised release sentence. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A Marion, Indiana small claims court entered a judgment against Kevin about $1,000. He did not pay, although he had agreed to the judgment’s entry. Almost 20 years later Steel, claiming to represent the judgment creditor, asked the court to garnish Harold’s wages. It entered the requested order, which Harold moved to vacate, contending that Steel had misrepresented the judgment creditor’s identity (transactions after the judgment’s entry may or may not have transferred that asset to a new owner) and did not represent the only entity authorized to enforce the judgment. He did not contend that the request was untimely. A state judge sided with Steel and maintained the garnishment order in force. Instead of appealing, Harold filed a federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, contending that Steel and his law firm had violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e by making false statements. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it contested the state court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 1692e forbids debt collectors to tell lies but does not suggest that federal courts are to review state-court decisions about whether lies have been told. View "Harold v. Steel" on Justia Law

Ripberger, born in 1951, began working for IDOC as a substance abuse counselor in 1991. She lost her job in 2010, when IDOC contracted out its counseling program to Corizon. Ripberger alleges that Corizon’s decision not to hire her stemmed from previous events in 2009, when Orton-Bell and Ripberger complained that their desks were being used after hours. According to Ripberger, they were told it was “just” staff members, not inmates, using their desks for sex, and that they could simply wash down their desks. It came to light that Orton-Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody. Orton-Bell and the Major were terminated, but the Major quickly received unemployment benefits, kept his benefits, and began working again at the prison on a contract basis. Orton-Bell filed suit. Ripberger supported Orton-Bell’s sex discrimination complaint. Ripberger sued Corizon, claiming sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Corizon summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Ripberger was the unfortunate victim of a reduced workforce. View "Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a long-standing local ordinance, the City of Plymouth, Indiana pays its police officers “longevity pay” after each work anniversary, calculated by multiplying $225 by the number of years that the officer has been on the force. Faced with financial difficulties in 1989, Plymouth enacted a second longevity pay ordinance, which prorates longevity pay for officers who take a leave of absence during any given year, including for military service. During officer DeLee’s twelfth year on the job, he missed nearly eight months of work while serving in the Air Force Reserves. When he returned, Plymouth paid him one-third of his full longevity payment for that year. DeLee sued, arguing that longevity pay is a seniority-based benefit to which the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335, entitles him in full. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plymouth. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Plymouth’s longevity benefit is more appropriately characterized as a reward for lengthy service, rather than as compensation for work performed the preceding year, USERRA guarantees DeLee a full longevity payment for his twelfth year of employment. View "DeLee v. City of Plymouth" on Justia Law

Chicago’s Minority and Women-owned Procurement Program requires companies contracting with the city to hire or subcontract with minority-owned businesses (MBEs). An MBE must be at least 51 percent owned by members of a minority group, and its management and operations must be controlled by those members. RCN, a cable provider, participates in the MBE program. RCN seeks out MBE subcontractors using the city’s directory, where it found defendants in 2003. Defendants, white men, held out their cable installation business, ICS, as an MBE, but used false documentation and hired a black front-man to pose as ICS’s president. ICS fired defendant Giovenco before the fraud was discovered, but he continued to receive checks. In total, RCN paid ICS $8,303,562 before the city investigated. Its members dissolved ICS, trying to avoid detection. Convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, Potter was sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment, and Giovenco was sentenced to 36 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Giovenco’s claim that, because he no longer worked for ICS at the time of the mailings underlying the charges, he could not be held legally accountable for the scheme, and Potter’s challenge to his sentence, arguing that RCN did not actually suffer a loss. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

Accretive provides cost control, revenue cycle management, and compliance services to non-profit healthcare providers. Accretive and Fairview entered into a Revenue Cycle Operations Agreement (RCA), accounting for about 12% of Accretive’s revenue during the class period, and a Quality and Total Cost of Care (QTCC) contract, promoted as the future for healthcare services. In 2012, the Minnesota Attorney General sued Accretive for noncompliance with healthcare, debt collection, and consumer protection laws. Accretive wound down its RCA contract short of its term, expecting a loss of $62 to $68 million. The AG released a damaging report on Accretive’s business practices. Fairview cancelled its QTCC contract. Accretive’s stock fell from over $24 to under $10 per share. Plaintiffs filed a class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that Accretive concealed its practices to artificially inflate its common stock. The parties negotiated a settlement of $14 million: $0.20 per share ($0.14 with attorneys’ fees and expenses deducted). Notice was sent to 34,200 potential class members. Only one opted out; only Hayes filed an objection. At the fairness hearing, the district court granted approval, awarding attorneys’ fees of 30% and expenses of $63,911.14. Hayes did not attend. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hayes v. Accretive Health, Inc." on Justia Law