Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several people interrogated by the infamous Jon Burge and other officers he trained or influenced sought damages under 42 U.S.C.1983. Between 1972 and 1991, while employed by Chicago’s police force, Burge regularly tortured people to extract statements. After the statute of limitations for prosecuting Burge about that misconduct expired, he was convicted of lying about his practices. The last interrogation about which any of the five plaintiffs complains occurred in 2004, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is two years. The last adverse event that might have been influenced by the interrogations was Freeman’s conviction in 2009, more than two years before the suit was filed and more than three years before Freeman joined the suit. The others are in prison following convictions for serious crimes; each conviction is supported by evidence independent of confessions induced by misconduct during interrogation. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs waited on the sidelines hoping that the acts of others would tarnish Burge’s reputation and make a suit easier to win. That is not the sort of diligence required to establish equitable tolling. View "Estate of Jones v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Chicago police officer, is black, and claimed racially motivated harassment, and retaliation for complaining about the harassment, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. While that suit was pending, he was fired. He claims retaliation for the internal complaints about harassment that he had made before he filed suit. Rather than amend his state court complaint to add a charge concerning his firing, he filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district judge stayed the federal suit while the state suit was pending. Brown dismissed the state case without prejudice. The district judge dismissed one count, alleging state claims, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the other claims, retaliation and racial discrimination, on the merits, as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit modified to place dismissal of the first claim on the district court’s supplemental state-law jurisdiction, acknowledging that it may be so similar to the state law claims as to merit dismissal, but reversed with respect to the dismissal of the due process claim in that count. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Brown v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Smith sued Greystone, a debt collector, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–92p, and seeking statutory damages and compensatory damages for emotional distress. The district judge certified it as a class action, but the suit was transferred and the new judge decertified the class. Another judge dismissed, ruling that it had been moot since November 2009, when Greystone offered Smith $1,500 plus costs and attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A controversy exists when the plaintiff wants more, or different, relief than the defendant is willing to provide. The district judge decided that Smith’s compensatory damages could not exceed $500, but, while an excessive demand may lead to sanctions for frivolous litigation, it does not diminish the court’s jurisdiction. A court must resolve the merits unless the defendant satisfies the plaintiff’s demand. An offer that the defendant or the judge believes sufficient, but which does not satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, does not justify dismissal. View "Smith v. Greystone Alliance LLC" on Justia Law

Pyles, an Illinois prisoner, injured his back when he slipped on wet stairs at Menard Correctional Center. Pyles sometimes used those stairs when showering, and a month before his fall he had alerted the warden, Gaetz, that this stairway can be treacherous because of the water tracked from the nearby showers. Pyles sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to the hazard, and that Wexford Health, which provides contract medical care to Menard inmates, and a Wexford physician, Fahim, were deliberately indifferent to his back injury. Pyles alleged that, after initially being treated for his fall, he suffered ongoing, significant pain, yet Dr. Fahim refused to investigate its cause. At screening, (28 U.S.C. 1915A) the district court dismissed the claim against the warden. A magistrate judge later granted summary judgment for Wexford and Dr. Fahim on the medical claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The slipping hazard about which Pyles complained was not sufficiently dangerous to support an Eighth Amendment claim. From the evidence submitted at summary judgment, a finder of fact could not reasonably conclude that Pyles’s medical claim rests on more than a disagreement with Dr. Fahim about the appropriate course of treatment. View "Pyles v. Fahim" on Justia Law

Mayfield was indicted for conspiring with a coworker and a drug courier to rob a stash house controlled by the courier’s suppliers. The conspiracy was a setup; the drug courier was an undercover government agent and the coworker was an informant. The district court barred Mayfield’s proposed entrapment defense. The jury, uninstructed on the entrapment issue, convicted Mayfield. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, but granted rehearing en banc and reversed. The elements of the entrapment defense, lack of predisposition and government inducement, are conceptually related but formally and temporally distinct. A defendant is entitled to an entrapment jury instruction if he can show that some evidence supports both elements. When the issue is raised before trial on the government’s motion to preclude the defense, the court must accept the defendant’s factual proffer as true and not weigh it against the government’s counterstatement. Mayfield proffered enough evidence to justify giving the issue to the jury. He provided some facts showing that he was not predisposed to commit the crimes before being approached by the informant, and he narrated a story of substantial government inducement beyond the mere offer of a chance to rob a stash house. View "United States v. Mayfield" on Justia Law

FFRF, a Wisconsin-based organization of atheists and agnostics, gives its co-presidents housing allowances. They paid income tax on that portion of their salaries. Neither sought to exclude this income on their tax returns and neither has claimed a refund. FFRF and the co-presidents challenged the parsonage exemption, 26 U.S.C. 107, which allows a minister to receive tax-free housing from his church, whether by giving the minister access to a church-owned residence or by giving the minister an allowance to obtain housing. Plaintiffs conceded that they lacked standing to challenge section 107(1), covering in-kind housing, but argued that they had standing to challenge section 107(2), which applies to rental allowances. The district court agreed and held that the subsection is an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. A person suffers no judicially cognizable injury merely because others receive a tax benefit that is conditioned on allegedly unconstitutional criteria, even if that person is otherwise “similarly situated” to those who receive the benefit. Only a person that has been denied such a benefit can be deemed to have suffered a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs were not denied the parsonage exemption. View "Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew" on Justia Law

In 2006 Western Capital made a $2.77 million loan to finance a Chicago development, which failed. Western initiated foreclosure, resulting in allegations that Western had breached its contract, committed fraud, and violated consumer protection statutes. Western requested that its insurers cover costs associated with its defense. Philadelphia Indemnity is Western’s general liability insurer. The mortgages were insured by CT on the standard ALTA form, which covers losses sustained because of defects in title and lien priority, and requires CT to pay costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title or the lien, but excludes “fees, costs or expenses incurred by the insured in the defense of those causes of action which allege matters not insured against by this policy.” The district court declined to enforce the limitation, applied the “complete defense” rule, and held that CT had a duty to defend the entire lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An insurer’s duty to defend is contractual. Title insurance, unlike general liability insurance, only indemnifies against losses incurred by reason of defects in title and specifically limits the duty to defend to claims within that coverage. The Illinois Supreme Court has never applied the complete-defense rule to title insurance. View "Western Capital Partners, LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Indiana’s Bureau of Motor Vehicles will not register or transfer a vehicle title unless the buyer furnishes a Social Security number. For corporations and similar entities, it requires a federal employer identification number (EIN). It is possible to obtain an EIN without having a Social Security number. Aliens whose visas do not allow them to work in the U.S. and aliens who lack authority to be in the U.S. can get an EIN. Defendants established a business that obtained an EIN, registered a limited liability company, and submitted the required paperwork and fees, using clients’ real names and addresses. Clients paid $350, which included fees for the BMV. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)), to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) by shielding unauthorized aliens from detection and encouraging them to reside in the U.S. and conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Seventh Circuit reversed and vacated. The Count One convictions could be sustained only if provision of any service—food, medicine, transportation—to an unauthorized alien is a felony. To convict of mail or wire fraud, the false statements must have deprived a victim of “money or property.” There was no allegation that title papers and licenses are Indiana’s “property.” View "United States v.Reyes" on Justia Law

Thulin was a Shopko pharmacist. During his tenure, Thulin observed what he believed to be a scheme in which Shopko submitted inflated claims for prescription drugs to the Medicaid program. Thulin filed a qui tam complaint, claiming violation of the federal False Claims Act by overbilling Medicaid, alleging that Shopko is a “sophisticated,” “multi-regional” business that developed and programmed the PDX system and should have been aware of federal law governing submission of claims, and bringing claims under the laws of eight states. The district court dismissed the federal claim under FRCP 9(b) and 12(b)(6). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To be liable under the Act, Shopko must have acted with “actual knowledge,” or “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard” of the possibility that its claims were false. Thulin’s allegations were not sufficient to satisfy that requirement even if Shopko’s practices were contrary to the Federal Assignment Law. Although malice, intent, and other conditions of the mind may be alleged generally, vague allegations that a corporation acted with reckless disregard or with reason to know of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that it was submitting false claims, simply because of its size or sophistication do not clear even this lower pleading threshold. View "Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Bowling was charged with strangulation (a felony), battery, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The matter was continued with an offer to dismiss the felony count in exchange for a plea of guilty to misdemeanors. Bowling later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in exchange for dismissal of all other charges. Before the plea, while the charges were pending, Bowling attempted to purchase a firearm from a federally licensed dealer and completed ATF Form 4473, answering “no” to: “Are you under indictment or information in any court for a felony, or for any other crime, for which the judge could imprison you for more than one year?” For “Current Residence Address,” Bowling provided a former address, two blocks from his current home; it was listed on his driver’s license and he maintains an office there. The government charged Bowling with making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6). The jury heard allegations that Bowling strangled a minor and induced the minor to consume alcoholic beverages in his home, but never heard about the plea offer. The judge instructed that: “A false street address is material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm.” Bowling was convicted. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial; the court violated Bowling’s due process right to present a mistake-of-fact defense. View "United States v. Bowling" on Justia Law