Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rollins had driven into a store parking lot and gotten out of his car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his car and show his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that because Rollins pleaded guilty, a finding that the defendant was illegally seized would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction. The judge also ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the police seized Rollins lawfully by ordering him back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest.View "Rollins v. Willett" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

Nayak owned outpatient surgery centers and made under-the-table payments to physicians that referred patients to his centers, including cash payments and payments to cover referring physicians’ advertising expenses. Nayak instructed some of his collaborators not to report these payments on their tax returns. Nayak was charged with honest-services mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1346, and obstruction of the administration of the tax system, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). Although the indictment a alleged that Nayak intended “to defraud and to deprive patients of their right to honest services of their physicians” through his scheme, there was no allegation that Nayak caused or intended to cause any sort of tangible harm to the patients in the form of higher costs or inferior care. After denial of his motion to dismiss, Nayak entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to dismiss the mail fraud charge. On appeal he argued that tangible harm to a victim is a necessary element of honest-services mail fraud, at least in cases not involving fraud by a public official. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that actual or intended tangible harm is not an element.View "United States v. Nayak" on Justia Law

A deputy stopped a truck in which Stacy was a passenger, knowing that Stacy and the driver had recently purchased notable quantities of pseudoephedrine pills from local pharmacies, possibly for use in manufacturing methamphetamine. An officer found a glass smoking pipe in the truck. Stacy was charged with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and four counts of possession of pseudoephedrine knowing that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2). The government planned to introduce evidence under Rule 404(b) about Stacy’s 2008 arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The district court stated that it would allow the evidence if the government laid a proper foundation and promised to caution the jury about the limited use of the evidence. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony about Stacy’s efforts in 2010 through 2012 to obtain pseudoephedrine pills for use in making methamphetamine, that police recovered a scale used to weigh methamphetamine from Stacy’s room, and that Stacy had provided the witness with pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. The government presented evidence of the 2008 arrest, claiming that it was to prove that Stacy knew pseudoephedrine was a controlled substance and that it was for the purpose of making methamphetamine. The court did not conduct further analysis, but cautioned the jury to consider the testimony only on the issues of intent and knowledge, not Stacy’s propensity to commit the charged offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and 336-month sentence, finding that admission of the prior acts evidence was harmless error.View "United States v. Stacy" on Justia Law

Campbell pleaded guilty in state court to first degree sexual assault of a child (his 10-year-old daughter). The maximum sentence was 60 years. The state agreed to dismiss three other counts and recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years, with no more than five to seven years’ initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision. The presentence report recommended 20-40 years’ initial confinement and seven to 10 years’ extended supervision. The state recommended a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The court sentenced Campbell to 30 years’ initial confinement and 10 years’ extended supervision. On remand, the prosecutor did not refer to the plea agreement not did defense counsel object to the omission, but the court was made aware of the agreement. The prosecutor spoke of the need to protect Campbell’s daughter and the public. The court imposed an initial term of 34 years. The state appeals court affirmed. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding that Campbell could not establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object because the prosecutor had not materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.View "Campbell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Evansville detectives received a tip from Hutchinson that Hutchinson’s neighbor, Schmitt had acquired a semi-automatic assault rifle in exchange for $200 and two grams of methamphetamine. Hutchinson had arranged the deal and stated that Schmitt had the gun at home. With an arrest warrant, SWAT officers entered Schmitt’s residence the next day and immediately found Schmitt and Wyatt, and, in plain view, marijuana, methamphetamine, and pills containing controlled substances. Less than five minutes later, an officer in the basement saw a semiautomatic rifle and loaded magazines. They obtained a warrant to seize the drugs, firearm, and related evidence. Schmitt was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The district judge denied a motion to suppress, finding that the gun was in plain view during a protective sweep. Schmitt, who pled guilty in state court to possession of the drugs, also moved to exclude the drugs. Finding that the drug evidence was “inextricably intertwined with the charged act,” and “would be a motive for the defendant to have a firearm,” the federal court concluded that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. At trial, the judge allowed introduction of Schmitt’s state conviction record. Schmitt was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court should not have admitted Schmitt’s conviction; Schmitt did not open the door to that evidence and it was not relevant except to impeach the government’s own witness, but the error was harmless.View "United States v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

In 1981 the plaintiff began working as one of two hairdresser-manicurists at a nursing home. Mondays and Tuesdays the plaintiff would transport residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the nursing home’s beauty shop, do their hair, then return them to their rooms. Other days she mainly did the hair of ambulatory residents and of residents confined to their rooms. She had unrelated duties, such as helping in the laundry and carrying trays. In 2010 the plaintiff had a hysterectomy. Her doctor gave her permission to return to work eight weeks later, with the notation that she could not push over 20 pounds, raised to 50 pounds five months later. The doctor advised “you can’t be pushing and lifting” people in wheelchairs, because, over time, that would tear loose the mesh lining “and you’ll be back in for bladder repair.” The plaintiff notified her supervisor, who stated that he would not accommodate her disability. She quit. Until she was replaced, the remaining hairdresser received assistance from other staff in transporting residents. There was no indication that this diversion of staff from their normal duties was costly or impaired the care provided the residents. The district court rejected plaintiff’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the employer would have a difficult time establishing that a reasonable accommodation would be a hardship.View "Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC" on Justia Law

The Wiggintons receive Social Security disability benefits. They applied to Bank of America for a mortgage to be repaid using those benefits. The Bank asked for information from their physicians, or the SSA, showing that the benefits would last for at least three years. When no such information was forthcoming, the Bank declined to make the loan. An administrative complaint and negotiations followed; the seller pulled out of the transaction. The Wiggintons sued, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, noting that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691(b)(2), provides that it does not constitute discrimination (for purposes of that statute) for a bank to collect information about “whether the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program if such inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit-worthiness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege that the Wiggintons were treated worse than other applicants. The court noted that the Bank has since settled a suit by the Department of Justice and promised not to ask for the sort of information it sought from the Wiggintons.View "Wigginton v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Whirlpool purchased injection-molded plastic knobs and decorative metal stampings from Grigoleit. In 1992 Whirlpool told Grigoleit that it would start using products made by Phillips. Grigoleit believed that Phillips was using a method protected by its patents. Ultimately Grigoleit licensed its patents to Whirlpool and Phillips; instead of royalties Grigoleit got Whirlpool’s business for the “Estate” and “Roper” brand lines and a promise of consideration for other business. The agreement and the patents expired in 2003. An arbitrator concluded that Whirlpool had failed to consider Grigoleit’s parts for some lines of washers and dryers and was liable for payment of money royalties or damages. Grigoleit demanded the profit it would have made had Whirlpool purchased its requirements of knobs exclusively from Grigoleit. The district court concluded that a reasonable royalty fell in the range of 1¢ to 12¢ per part and the parties then agreed that royalties would then be $140,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that lost profits differ from royalties. The caption on the contract is “LICENSE AGREEMENT” and the heading on paragraph 3 is “Royalties.” The agreement is a patent license; the court was not obliged to treat it as a requirements contract.View "Grigoleit Co. v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

After a sports-related injury, Bluestein, an M.D., took intermittent time off for several months, then requested open-ended leave. She was termnted and sued Central Wisconsin Anesthesiology, for discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court concluded that Bluestein, a full partner, shareholder, and member of the board of directors of Central Wisconsin, was an employer rather than an employee at the service corporation, and was ineligible for the protections of those statutes. The court also found that Bluestein’s claims would fail as a matter of law on the merits and ordered Bluestein and her attorney to pay attorneys’ fees to Central Wisconsin for pursuing a frivolous lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment and the award of fees and declined to award additional attorneys’ fees.View "Bluestein v. Cent. WI Anesthesiology, S.C." on Justia Law