Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Esparza testified that he came to the U.S. in 1999 and returned to Mexico from late 2001 to early in 2002; again in late 2002; and finally early in 2008. In 2010 he was stopped for driving without a license, which led to the institution of removal proceedings. He applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that he has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less than 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires that the petitioner not have departed the U.S. “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The dates that he gave would have established that his total time in Mexico since 1999 was only 114 days, with no trip lasting longer than 90 days. The IJ denied cancellation of removal, stating that Esparza “simply cannot recall dates with the necessary specificity.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating: “It’s difficult to prove a negative” especially concerning dates years in the past, with no documentation. Esparza presented his evidence, which was weak but not nothing, and all the government did was point out weaknesses. “Some evidence would seem to preponderate over no evidence.”View "Lopez-Esparza v. Holder" on Justia Law

CBD designs and builds restaurants. Its client, Mongolian House, wanted to renovate an upscale Chicago restaurant called “Plan B.” CBD designed the interior and in 2006 filed blueprints to obtain a “repair and replace” building permit. CBD completed the construction work in 2007. In 2008 a CBD employee visited the city’s offices on other business and chanced upon blueprints for Plan B that were labeled with another architect’s name. The city refused to provide a copy, saying the blueprints were exempt from disclosure. Mongolian House defaulted on payments to CBD. In 2009 the city issued a new building permit for Plan B based on the 2008 blueprints. In 2012 CBD sued, alleging copyright infringement and state-law claims. The district court dismissed the claims under the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), reasoning that CBD was on “inquiry notice” of a possible copyright violation when its employee happened upon the 2008 blueprints. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court recently clarified that the Act’s limitations period establishes a “separate accrual rule” so that “each infringing act starts a new limitations period.” CBD’s complaint alleges potentially infringing acts within the three-year look-back period from the date of suit.View "Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House Inc." on Justia Law

Redbox operates automated self‐service kiosks at which customers rent DVDs and Blu‐ray discs with a debit or credit card. Redbox outsources certain functions to service providers, including Stream, which provides customer service when, for example, a customer encounters technical problems at a kiosk and requires help from a live person. If resolution of the issue requires accessing that customer’s video rental history the Stream employee will do so. Redbox has granted Stream access to the database in which Redbox stores relevant customer information. Plaintiffs challenged Stream’s ability to access customer rental histories and Stream’s use of customer records during employee training exercises as violating the Video Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits “video tape service provider[s]” like Redbox from “disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider,” 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1). The Act includes an exception for disclosure incident to the video tape service provider’s ordinary course of business, defined as debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of ownership. The district court granted Redbox summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Redbox’s actions fall within the exception for disclosures in the ordinary course of business: disclosures incident to “request processing.”View "Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC" on Justia Law

Berrey was injured in an automobile accident at work. The at‐fault driver, who did not work with Berrey, carried liability insurance, but the cost of Berrey’s injuries exceeded the policy’s limit. Berrey received partial compensation under her employer’s workers’ compensation scheme but, because her employer was not responsible for the accident, state law granted the workers’ compensation carrier a lien on any recovery from the at‐fault driver. The at‐fault driver’s insurer paid its full policy limit directly to the workers’ compensation carrier. Travelers provided underinsured motorist coverage to Berrey’s employer. The policy covered an employee injured by a third-party who did not carry adequate auto insurance to fully compensate for the employee’s loss. Travelers paid Berrey the difference between her total calculated damages and the at‐fault driver’s policy limit. Berrey claims that Travelers improperly deducted the at-fault driver’s insurance payment from the total it owed to Berrey because that payment was made directly to the workers’ compensation carrier rather than to Berrey herself. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the language of the policy supported Travelers’s calculation and that Berrey’s reading would undermine the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.View "Berrey v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

In 2011, nClosures and Block began a business relationship in which nClosures designed and Block manufactured metal enclosures for electronic tablets, such as iPads. The parties signed a confidentiality agreement; nClosures then divulged its designs for the enclosure device to Block for manufacture. The first device, the Rhino Elite, entered the market for sale in October 2011. By March 2012, however, Block developed its own competing device, the Atrio. nClosures sued, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court granted summary judgment to Block on both claims, but denied Block attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable jury could find that nClosures took reasonable steps to keep its proprietary information confidential, so that the confidentiality agreement was unenforceable and that no reasonable jury could find that a partnership existed between nClosures and Block that could give rise to a viable breach of fiduciary duty claim.View "nClosures Inc. v. Block & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Sinclair was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The police found a loaded handgun, a distribution quantity of marijuana, and tools of the drug-trafficking trade in his car. Sinclair was indicted for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Trial was set to begin on a Tuesday. Six days before trial, Sinclair wrote the judge asking for a continuance to allow his family to hire a private attorney. The judge received the letter on Thursday, docketed it on Friday, and scheduled a hearing for Monday, when he denied the request. The jury convicted Sinclair on all counts. Sinclair’s presentence report recommended grouping the drug count with the felon-in-possession count to determine the offense level, U.S.S.G. 3D1.2. The judge rejected the recommendation. Absent grouping, the offense level was 17 instead of 16. The judge imposed concurrent within guidelines prison terms of 57 months on the drug and felon-in-possession counts and tacked on the mandatory consecutive 60-month term for the 924(c) conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by denying a continuance and a challenge to the decision not to group the counts. The guidelines specifically provide that enhancements for firearm possession do not apply when the defendant is also convicted of violating section 924(c), which carries a mandatory consecutive sentence.View "United States v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Horton, a 20-year-old karate instructor who used his iPhone to film himself sexually molesting three of his young students, pleaded guilty to six counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Horton’s guidelines range was life, subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 30 years on each count. The district court imposed a 90-year prison sentence, which Horton argued was substantively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Horton failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded to his within-guidelines sentence.View "United States v. Horton" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police responded to shots fired behind a residence and discovered Moody with a loaded pistol. Moody admitted that the gun was his. He pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Moody had a 1993 Florida conviction for armed burglary of a dwelling, another Florida conviction a year later for robbing a motel with a firearm, and a 2005 Wisconsin conviction for robbing a bank. The convictions brought Moody within the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After thoroughly questioning Moody, the court accepted his guilty plea. The probation officer reported that Moody was subject to a 15-year statutory minimum sentence under the ACCA. If not for that mandatory penalty, Moody’s guidelines range under U.S.S.G. 4B1.4 would have been 135 to 168 months, based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal history category of IV. Neither party objected; the district court adopted the report. The government, complying with the plea agreement, recommended a 15-year prison term. The court imposed a 12-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing before a different judge and agreed with Moody’s counsel that there were no nonfrivolous arguments for setting aside the plea, dismissing his counter-appeal.View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Kolbusz owns and operates the Illinois Center for Dermatology and Skin Cancer and was a participating Medicare provider from 1993 until December 2012, receiving payment directly from Medicare. In October 2012 he was indicted for Medicare fraud. As a consequence, the Department of Health and Human Services imposed fraud prevention procedures on the practice, including payment suspension, resulting in his ultimate withdrawal from the Medicare program. In 2013, Kolbusz filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and her contractors, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395; and 28 U.S.C. 1361 (mandamus) to compel review of reimbursement claims he had submitted. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kolbusz’s failure to exhaust Medicare’s administrative appeals process precludes subject-matter jurisdiction of his mandamus action.View "Ctr for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Campbell recruited young women in the U.S. illegally, initially persuading the women to join his “Family” by offering comfortable places to live and jobs in massage parlors with no expectation that they perform sexual services. Later, Campbell required the women to break ties with their relatives and friends and confiscated their identification, immigration documents and money. Campbell renamed them, branded them with tattoos, abused them, and forced them to engage in prostitution. After a victim turned to law enforcement, Campbell was sentenced to life imprisonment. Campbell appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a conviction for harboring illegal aliens requires proof of his intent to shield the alien from detection by law enforcement and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required interstate commerce elements for Hobbs Act extortion and the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Any instructional error did not affect Campbell’s substantial rights. The prosecution produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that extortion of the women had a direct effect on interstate commerce or a threatened effect which never materialized because the women met Campbell’s demands.View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law