Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brandner, an orthopedic surgeon, belongs to the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. He is no longer able to perform surgery, but does consultations and other medical endeavors that do not require fine motor control. He devotes most of his time to providing expert advice and testimony in litigation. The Academy concluded that Brandner violated its ethical standards by professing greater confidence in one case than the evidence warranted. The Academy decided to suspend him for one year. Brandner filed suit, contending that the Academy violated Illinois law and its own governing documents. The Academy deferred the suspension pending resolution of the litigation. The Academy is a private group, and Illinois law does not allow judicial review of a private group’s membership decisions unless membership is an “economic necessity” or affects “important economic interests.” The district court concluded that the suspension would devastate Brandner’s income, but that the Academy had followed its own rules. The court granted summary judgment for the Academy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed “Brandner has offered only hot air. … he has expressed his opinion with greater confidence than the evidence warrants. He has not established that a one-year suspension from the Academy would end his professional career.” View "Brandner v. Am. Acad.of Orthopaedic Surgeons" on Justia Law

Gibson, sued former manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigments, which were used, before the federal government banned them in the 1970s, in paints, including paints applied to residences. Gibson claimed negligence and strict liability, but cannot identify which manufacturer made the white lead carbonate pigment that injured him. He relied on the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet in 2005, under which plaintiffs are relieved of the traditional requirement to prove that a specific manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injury. The district court held that risk-contribution theory violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the broad deference that the Constitution grants to the development of state common law. The risk-contribution theory survives substantive due process scrutiny and the manufacturers’ other constitutional challenges. View "Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co." on Justia Law

Sobaleva, a citizen of Belarus, entered the U.S. on a valid student visa. She applied for asylum, contending that the Belarusian government persecuted her for her political opinion before she left and likely would do so again if she were to return. She also requested asylum for her husband, Potorac, a citizen of Moldova. An immigration judge denied Sobaleva’s application and ordered that she and Potorac be removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, stating that Sobaleva had not established either past persecution based on her political opinion or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding two significant flaws in the decisions: the judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard to conclude that Sobaleva was not persecuted in Belarus and misconstrued and disregarded important evidence. View "Sobaleva v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2008 Schane suffered a job-related injury while working for YRC. He drew workers’ compensation benefits until he returned to work in 2009. Schane was medically cleared for light-duty work only, and with no light work available, he resumed workers’ compensation in 2010. YRC and its employees, including Schane, participate in a multi-employer benefit trust fund and an “employee pension benefit plan” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 1002(2). Schane submitted a pension application in July 2009, after returning from his first stint on workers’ compensation, but left blank the line on indicating his last day of work because the plan does not permit participants to take a pension while they are receiving workers’ compensation. The following March, Schane told the plan that his last day of work would be October 31, 2010. He later delayed his last day by a year. In September 2011, he delayed again. On December 21, he wrote that he would retire at the end of the year and that his pension should therefore be effective on January 1, 2012. Schane and the plan could not agree on the date that he “retired” for purposes of calculating benefits: August 2009 or December 2011. The district court rejected Schane’s argument. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting the trustees’ flimsy defense of their interpretation on appeal. View "Schane v. Int'l Bh of Teamsters Union Local No. 710" on Justia Law

The Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(h), allows adult children of lawful permanent residents to maintain child status if their parent filed a visa petition on their behalf while they were under 21 and prevents such children from aging out of visa priority while their petition is under review. But an immigrant may take advantage of this provision only if he “sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year” of a visa number becoming available. Velásquez is the adult child of a lawful permanent resident. In 2005, when Velásquez was 17, his father filed a visa petition on his behalf. Velásquez’s visa number became available in March 2011. Velásquez took steps to acquire permanent-resident status within one year, but did not file a formal application for permanent status until 14 months after his visa number became available. Later, the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted a new rule that required an immigrant to file or attempt to file a substantially complete application for permanent status within one year to satisfy the “sought to acquire” prerequisite. Because Velásquez had not done so, the Board ordered him removed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the new interpretation of the Act’s ambiguous language to be reasonable, but holding that retroactive application works a manifest injustice in Velásquez’s case, View "Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Matthews, an African-American woman, applied for two open positions in Waukesha County: Economic Support Specialist and Economic Support Supervisor. She was not hired, and filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.Matthews dismissed her claim related to the Supervisor position. With respect to the Specialist position, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the county articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its hiring decision. View "Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty." on Justia Law

Murphy had a stroke in April 2007. Before leaving the hospital, Murphy was examined by Dr. Mayer, who noted a past history of headaches and diminished fluency in speech. Murphy started seeing a physical therapist but did not complete the program. A year later, Dr. Mayer noted that Murphy still had difficulty speaking and “some significant loss of sensation.” In September 2008, Murphy applied for social security disability benefits. Her application was denied. At a hearing, a vocational expert testified that there were no sedentary jobs in the regional economy for a person who could neither work with the general public nor use her hands more than occasionally for fine manipulation, but that there were a significant number of jobs for a person who had the capacity to do light, unskilled work, but who could only occasionally perform fine hand manipulation. The ALJ ruled that Murphy was not disabled. The Appeals Council adopted that decision. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the ALJ erroneously excluded information about Murphy’s potential inability to perform light work and by not questioning Murphy further about her failure to comply with her home exercise program and the activities she participated in while on vacation. View "Murphy v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Bormes, an attorney, tendered the filing fee for a lawsuit via pay.gov, which the federal courts use to facilitate electronic payments. The web site sent him an email receipt that included the last four digits of his credit card’s number, plus the card’s expiration date. Bormes, claiming that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1) allows a receipt to contain one or the other, but not both, filed suit against the United States seeking damages. In an earlier appeal the Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), does not waive sovereign immunity on a suit seeking to collect damages for an asserted violation of FCRA and remanded for determination of “whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under 1681n.” The Seventh Circuit held that although the United States has waived immunity against damages actions of this kind, it did not violate the statute on the merits. The statute as written applies to receipts “printed … at the point of the sale or transaction.” The email receipt that Bormes received met neither requirement. View "Bormes v. United States" on Justia Law

A patrolman pulled over Mohamed for running a red light. Upon searching Mohamed’s van, he found 1,170 packs of Newport-brand cigarettes not bearing Indiana tax stamps. He was charged under the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, which makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly to ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase contraband cigarettes,” 18 U.S.C. 2342(a). During deliberations, the jury submitted three questions to the district court: whether “more than 10,000 cigarettes being transported into Indiana from another state without paying [Indiana’s cigarette] tax [is] enough to be called contraband?” “Is the question at hand just that [Mohamed] had 10,000+ [cigarettes] and crossed state lines, or do we need to consider intent of what he planned to do with them once he crossed the state line? Sell, distribute, etc.?” “In the definition of ‘handled,’ is ‘buying’ applicable even if [the cigarettes] are bought in Kentucky? Can we see the entire copy of [the statute]” The district judge responded that she could not provide the information they had requested. The jury found Mohamed guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Mohamed intended to sell the cigarettes in Indiana. View "United States v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

Fellowes filed a breach-of-contract suit against Changzou Fellowes, a business established in China, under the international diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). Without discussing subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of Fellowes, despite the court’s assumption that Changzhou Fellowes had not been served with process. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that diversity jurisdiction is proper only if Changzhou Fellowes has its own citizenship, independent of its investors or members. Deciding whether a business enterprise based in a foreign nation should be treated as a corporation for the purpose of section 1332 can be difficult. Given the parties’ agreement that Changzhou Fellowes is closer to a limited liability company than to any other business structure in the U.S., it does not have its own citizenship and it does have the Illinois citizenship of its member Hong Kong Fellowes, which prevents litigation under the diversity jurisdiction. View "Fellowes Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Office Equip. Co." on Justia Law