Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Charged with committing four drug-related robberies of Milwaukee pharmacies; having used a firearm in connection with the robberies; and having possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, defendant was first represented by appointed counsel. He disagreed with how counsel proposed to handle the hearing on a motion to suppress and sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se. He did not seek a continuance; nor did he object to the hearing being conducted by a magistrate. The magistrate responded that “this hearing will proceed with the defendant … represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the court will address the defendant’s motion to remove counsel and proceed pro se.” The hearing lasted nine hours; 12 witnesses testified. After the hearing, the magistrate granted the motion to discharge counsel, then mooted it with respect to the suppression hearing, denying defendant’s motion to reopen the hearing to present additional evidence. The magistrate recommended that the original motion to suppress, be denied. The district judge agreed with both recommendations. Defendant represented himself at trial and on appeal. He was sentenced to 780 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered the court to hold a new hearing on the motion to suppress, allowing the defendant to represent himself. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to using the telephone to facilitate his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), and was sentenced to 24 months of probation. The sentencing judge imposed 18 conditions of probation and stated: “we’ll see what the next two years are going to bring in terms of your ability to conform …, because if you don’t, the 24 months of probation is going to be 24 months in prison,” meaning that if defendant violated any condition, he would be in prison for 24 months. Two months later, the probation service sought to revoke his probation. Defendant admitted: driving without a valid driver’s license; failing to attend a drug treatment program; and thrice submitting urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. Although the guidelines range for his probation violations was seven to 13 months, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the statutory maximum for his crime of conviction, the judge recalled the comments made at sentencing, and ordered 24 months’ custody. Defendant’s lawyer, stating that he had no non-frivolous ground for appealing the sentence, filed an Anders brief, to which defendant did not respond. The Seventh Circuit denied the Anders motion, stating that there is no authority indicating that a judge may treat a warning of consequences as creating a contract requiring him to impose those consequences should there be a violation. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

The government sued to enforce tax assessments against the Zabkas and tax liens against their property and against property of partnerships to which they had transferred assets. The district court ruled that the assessments (several million dollars) were valid and that, when the IRS made the assessments, the liens had attached to all the Zabkas’ personal property and to all their rights to property, including their ownership interests in the partnerships. The government sought appointment of a receiver. The court denied motions to reconsider calculation of the unpaid assessments, and directed the clerk to enter judgment. The order is captioned “Judgment in a civil case” and states: “Judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff.” The docket entry adds: “CASE TERMINATED.” The Zabkas appealed. The Zabkas filed another appeal from a subsequent order, which directed the government to propose a receiver. The judge ordered appointment of the receiver proposed by the government. The defendants appealed that order. They later appealed approval of property sales by the receiver and an order awarding interim compensation to the receiver. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction only over the appeal from the appointment of the receiver and affirmed that order, which was the last order in the first proceeding and so completed that proceeding. View "United States v. Zabka" on Justia Law

Gamesa contracted with Minnesota-based Outland Renewable Energy to provide maintenance for Gamesa wind turbines. Iberdrola operated Gamesa-made turbines at the Cayuga Wind Farm in Illinois. While servicing a Cayuga urbine, Outland employee McCoy was electrocuted when the turbine unexpectedly reenergized. McCoy filed a personal injury case in state court against Iberdro and Gamesa. The case was removed to federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. Iberdro impleaded Outland to seek indemnification based on contract and the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act. Outland raised 22 counterclaims: including indemnification; federal and state antitrust claims (Illinois, Minnesota, and Texas law); and other state law claims. Outland unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction against Gamesa’s allegedly unfair competitive practices. The district court dismissed all but one of Outland’s counterclaims. Only the indemnification claim survived. McCoy, Gamesa, and Outland settled. The district court accepted the settlement, protecting Outland and Gamesa from further contribution claims under the Illinois JTCA; all claims arising from the accident among those parties were dismissed. Only the original personal injury dispute between McCoy and Iberdrola remained, but the court had not issued a final judgment. About six months after the dismissal, Outland sought leave to amend, arguing for the first time that the substantive law of Minnesota should apply. The district court determined that Outland had waived that issue and denied leave to amend based on futility and undue delay. The proposed amended counterclaims arose from Gamesa’s 2011 attempt to acquire Outland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Outland’s third-party counterclaims are not part of the original case, so Outland needed an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction to assert them in this lawsuit. The court characterized Outland’s arguments as “desperate.” View "McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc." on Justia Law

Yang, a citizen of China, entered the U.S. in 1998, as a tourist. In 2000, he married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 visa petition and application for adjustment of status on Yang’s behalf, but withdrew her petition in 2003. , Yang’s application was denied after an investigation led USCIS to conclude that his marriage was fraudulent. In 2007 he divorced. Yang then filed an application for asylum and associated relief based on his practice of Falun Gong. Although Falun Gong was not officially banned in China until 1999, in 1998 the police arrested Yang and placed him in a cell overnight. Yang continued practicing Falun Gong in the U.S. and believed that Chinese officials knew of his practice. In 2008, Yang married Li, who immediately filed an I-130 petition on his behalf. USCIS sent notice of intent to deny, because it believed that Yang’s prior marriage had been a sham. Li submitted rebuttal materials, but USCIS lost them and denied the petition for lack of support. The IJ denied a continuance pending adjudication of the I-130. Yang also sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He was unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit remanded the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s denial of a continuance pending adjudication of Yang’s I- 130. View "Yang v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2007 the McDonalds opened a J.P. Morgan Bank investment account and a brokerage account with its affiliate, J.P. Morgan Securities (JPMS). Different contracts governed the accounts. The Bank managed the money in the investment account, while the McDonalds directed the funds in their JPMS brokerage account. By the end of 2008, the McDonalds had lost $1.5 million from the Bank investment account. The money held in the JPMS account produced a profit. The McDonalds filed an arbitration demand, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, and other misrepresentation and mismanagement. They did not name the Bank, but named only JPMS and Bank employees who set up and oversaw the accounts. The McDonalds claimed that the employees ignored their stated investment goals by putting nearly all their money in an illiquid proprietary hedge fund. The claim charged JPMS (not the Bank) with vicarious liability for failing to supervise. JPMS is registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, as are the employees. FINRA is an industry self-regulatory organization, and under its rules JPMS and the employees were subject to arbitration at the McDonalds’ request, an obligation reiterated in the contract governing the JPMS account. The Bank is not a member of FINRA; the Bank’s contract did not provide for arbitration. The Bank sought to prevent arbitration. The district court dismissed, finding that the Bank lacked standing to block the arbitration to which it was not a party and that the two employees were indispensable parties. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Bank has standing to sue because the arbitration would violate a forum-selection clause in its contract with the McDonalds. The McDonalds cannot avoid that clause by naming only an affiliate and the employees, who are not necessary parties.View "J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

A warrant was issued for Ball’s arrest based on an affidavit prepared and signed by Indianapolis detective Jones. Law enforcement had been investigating a drug trafficking gang, the Detroit Boys, and had obtained authority to monitor telephone “call centers” that took calls from customers and directed them to one of two drug distribution houses. According to the Jones affidavit, 13 of the intercepted calls either were placed by or made reference to “MamaToni.” Based in part on Jones’ and another detective’s familiarity with Ball’s voice, Ball was believed to be the person making or referenced in these calls. The affidavit also averred that Ball had been seen at the drug distribution houses. Ball was arrested by Jones and charged with narcotics possession. She posted bond. Prosecutors concluded that the wrong person had been arrested and charged. The state dismissed all charges. Ball filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the state defendants and granted judgment on the pleadings to the municipal defendants, leaving only a Fourth Amendment claim against Jones. Ball then was allowed to amend her complaint to abandon remaining federal claim and assert only state-law claims against Jones. The court remanded the case to state court, where it had originated. Ball appealed the adverse rulings on her other claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Ball v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

In 1990, Carter went to Stegemiller’s home because Stegemiller had filed a small claims case against his mother. Carter asked to discuss the case, then forced his way into Stegemiller’s home, started to strangle her, and struck her in the head with a tire iron. Carter held Stegemiller down and removed her jewelry while Carter’s accomplice, Mitchell, raped her. Before she lost consciousness, Stegemiller saw the men taking a stereo speaker from her home and heard one say “[M]ake sure she’s dead … she can identify us.” The two removed the telephones and locked and barricaded the doors so that Stegemiller could not leave or seek help. Stegemiller survived, with serious injuries. Convicted of felony burglary, robbery, rape, and attempted murder, Carter was sentenced to 90 years. A month later, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.” On direct appeal, Carter’s attorney failed to argue that the attempted murder jury instruction given at Carter’s trial constituted fundamental error. Carter lost his appeal. Rejecting a petition for post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Carter did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside the verdict. The district court rejected a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Butt" on Justia Law